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 Abstract 
In The Art of War, Sun Tzu begins by stating: “War is a matter of vital importance 
to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin.  It is mandatory that 
it be thoroughly studied” (c500BC/1963, p. 63).  Sun Tzu follows this opening by stating 
five fundamental factors a commander must master to be successful in combat (Tzu, 
c500BC/1963, p. 65).  The first of these factors is moral influence which Sun Tzu defines 
as “that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so they will 
accompany them in life and death without fear of mortal peril” (Tzu, c500BC/1963, 
p. 64).  In the face of the instant communication provided by satellites, 24 hour news 
media coverage, and other technological advances, this factor is even more relevant 
today.   
This research provides an analytic framework, based on the principles of fourth 
generation operations, capturing the effects of will and resolve of the combatant and 
population.  The strategic level model investigates the long term impacts of asymmetric 
conflict.  These results are primarily measured in the socio-political arena rather than the 
military battlefield.  The model developed in this dissertation remains a model of conflict 
and combat.  However, some of the impacts from the political, economic, and 
informational instruments of power are represented in the model through the dynamic 
adaptation of public resolve and combat spirit.  To paraphrase Sun Tzu, war is vitally 
important and must be studied (Tzu, c500BC/1963, p. 63).  Therefore, this dissertation 
puts forth a means to model key aspects of conflict in the ‘long war.’ 
iv 
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MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF RESOLVE AND MORALE  
 
FOR THE ‘LONG WAR’ 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Background 
In The Art of War, Sun Tzu states:  
War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the 
road to survival or ruin.  It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied. 
(c500BC/1963, p. 63) 
 
Sun Tzu follows this opening by stating five fundamental factors a commander must 
master to be successful in combat (Tzu, c500BC/1963, p. 65).  The first of these factors is 
moral influence which Sun Tzu defines as “that which causes the people to be in 
harmony with their leaders, so they will accompany them in life and death without fear of 
mortal peril” (Tzu, c500BC/1963, p. 64).  In the face of the instant communication 
provided by satellites, 24 hour news media coverage, and other technological advances, 
this factor is even more relevant today.   
Current combat models were developed in a time of strategic parity.  They 
generally focused on impacting the military and infrastructure.  Such an approach was 
acceptable when all combat models correlated to national survival of the combatants; i.e. 
force on force attrition.  Today, the US is the sole superpower and the conflicts it faces 
are often asymmetrical.  Combatants may not be nation-states and national survival may 
not be perceived as being directly threatened.  When national survival is attacked through 
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conventional means, the military, as an instrument of power, is one of the most critical 
elements of national power.  Therefore, modeling a near peer as force on force was 
sufficient for generating courses of action and comparative analyses of weapon systems.  
The other instruments, diplomatic, informational, and economic, if considered in models 
at all, were analysis functions.  The exception to this practice could be found, in part, in 
some models of military operations other than war (MOOTW). 
Today’s conflicts involve a foe who is directly attacking our population’s and our 
coalition partners’ will and support as their principle strategy.  To paraphrase Sun Tzu, 
war is vitally important and must be studied (Tzu, c500BC/1963, p. 63).  Therefore, this 
dissertation develops a framework to model key aspects of conflict in the “long war” 
(QDR 2006, p. v). 
Problem Statement 
Clausewitz reminds the reader that war is a political tool and the political 
goals must always be considered when developing military goals and objectives: 
We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true 
political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on 
with other means…The political objective is the goal, war is the means of 
reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their 
purpose.  (Clausewitz, 1832/1984, p. 87) 
 
Additionally, the political goal is the true objective and must be achieved regardless of 
the status of the military goals.  To help assure the Department of Defense is achieving 
the political goals, every four years the Quadrennial Defense Review is performed.  The 
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report stated 35 shifts in emphasis that the 
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Department of Defense must pursue to meet the new strategic environment.  This 
dissertation directly addresses five of these shifts.  These five are: 
• From nation-state threats – to decentralized network threats from non-state 
enemies (p. vi) 
 
• From conducting war against nations – to conducting war in countries we are 
not at war with (safe havens) (p. vi) 
 
• From major conventional combat operations – to multiple irregular, 
asymmetric operations (p. vii) 
 
• From static post-operations analysis – to dynamic diagnostics and real-time 
lessons learned (p. vii) 
 
• From “one size fits all” deterrence – to tailored deterrence for rogue powers, 
terrorist networks and near-peer competitors (p. vi) 
 
 The likelihood of interstate conflict in the near future has decreased.  This 
evolution of paradigm is evident in the first three above shifts of emphasis suggested by 
the Quadrennial Defense Review Report.  Therefore, a refinement of the definition of 
conflict is required to better understand the world the US military and its coalition 
partners are facing.  This dissertation offers a definition of fourth generation operations 
and proposes that fourth generation operations represent an environment which is 
decentralized, irregular, and asymmetric.  The combatants may be from a nation-state 
(with or without the government’s or population’s support) or from one of several 
transnational groups. 
The fourth shift in emphasis suggests that the models must be dynamic, capable of 
updates based on current events and situations.  While methods have been developed to 
incorporate the impacts of resolution and combatant’s spirit within combat models, these 
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models do not update the parameters based on the actions within the model.  These 
traditional models present a static representation of key aspects of conflict.   
The fifth shift in DoD emphasis suggests that courses of action tested within a 
combat model may significantly differ from case to case, context to context, or 
environment to environment.  It follows, then, that the tools available to the combatant 
commander can not be limited to classical attrition based warfare. 
This research creates a conflict model which incorporates the effects of public 
resolution, combat spirit, will-to-fight and morale.  Current combat models are generally 
limited to modeling a single battle.  This focus, while adequate for a major, traditional 
armed engagement, does not fully address many of the key aspects of conflict which face 
the nation and its coalition partners at the start of the 21st century.  With transnational 
terrorists fomenting insurgencies throughout the world, the victors of future conflict may 
not be decided by the decisive battle of conventional troops.  The proposed model does 
not replace current combat models, since it would be foolish to assume that traditional 
warfare will not exist in the future.  Additionally, these campaign level models may still 
be useful in analyzing the courses of action in a traditional battle and aiding in the proper 
equipping and resourcing of battles and campaigns.   
The proposed strategic level model investigates the longer term impacts of 
asymmetric conflict on public resolve and soldier morale.  Additionally, this strategic 
level model captures the impacts of multiple engagements.  As such, the proposed 
strategic level model must incorporate the effects of the combat spirit of the troops, and 
the morale of the population.  The proposed model is still a model of conflict and combat.  
However, some of the impacts from the political, economic, and informational 
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instruments of power are represented in the model through the dynamic adaptation of 
public resolve and combat spirit.  
General Assumptions and Scope 
 The proposed model is focused on the strategic level of war, implying that the 
impacts are measured in terms of weeks, months and years.  Individual duels and battles 
are not modeled.  It is assumed a higher fidelity operational or tactical model is able to 
provide inputs to this lower fidelity model.   
 The focus of this research is the resolve and spirit of the people within a 
combatant group and the supporting population, not the terrain.  The current location of 
the forward line of troops is not modeled nor is the percentage or location of land held by 
either friend or foe.  Specific movement of troops, other than how they affect a 
combatants’ will-to-fight, are not accounted for or modeled. 
The proposed strategic level model of fourth generation operations is initially 
developed as a deterministic model.  Hartman states a model is deterministic if it 
“contains no probabilities or random effects” (Hartman, 2005, p. 1-3).  He further defines 
stochastic models as “those models that incorporate uncertain outcomes using probability 
distributions over the sample space of possible outcomes” (Hartman, 2005, p. 1-3).  As a 
first step in modeling national resolution; modeling the environment deterministically 
provides insights that can assist in developing future efforts.   
Deterministic models are used throughout combat modeling.  Hartman states that 
deterministic combat models are typically used for highly aggregated combat (Hartman, 
2005, p. 2-2).  Higher resolution models of combat tend to be stochastic, while lower 
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resolution deterministic models “resolve the complex phenomenon of large scale combat 
into a collection of single shots” (Hartman, 2005, p. 2-2).  Such models can reduce the 
complexity of the combat scenario to something better understood.   
The definition of fourth generation operations is based on the literature of fourth 
generation warfare.  This dissertation assumes fourth generation operations is an 
extension or outgrowth of the concept of fourth generation warfare.   
Finally, this research assumes that the will-to-fight of the combatants and public 
resolve of the population are critical to modeling conflict and combat.  Specifically, the 
importance is increased when viewing irregular asymmetric conflict.  The principles of 
fourth generation operations rely on the principles of legitimacy and perseverance.  It is 
assumed these principles reinforce the importance of public resolve and combat spirit.  It 
is further assumed legitimacy is represented within the views of the indigenous 
population and perseverance represents the combatants and combatants’ support 
structure.  
Research Contributions 
The overall objective and contribution of this research is to: 
Provide an analytic framework of elements of fourth generation operations, 
capturing the effects of will of the population and combatant. 
 
To obtain the objective, four principal objectives must be achieved and combined.  These 
principal objectives are: 
1) Develop and model a theory of fourth generation operations based on the 
framework of US Joint doctrine 
 
2) Develop the supporting principles of fourth generation operations 
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3) Construct a theoretical modeling framework to dynamically portray public 
resolve, will-to-fight, morale and combat spirit within a combat model 
 
4) Provide a capability to model and evaluate the impacts of public resolve, will-
to-fight, morale, and combat spirit of combatants and population on the 
outcome of the conflict 
 
The objectives of this research provide six specific contributions to the field of operations 
research and specifically combat and conflict modeling.  These are discussed in greater 
detail in Chapters 3 through 7 and summarized in Chapter 8. 
1) Developed a theory of fourth generation operations based on the framework of 
US joint doctrine  
 
2) Developed the supporting principles of fourth generation operations 
• Introduced principle of Population Perception 
 
3) Constructed a theoretical modeling framework to dynamically portray fatigue 
within a combat model 
• System dynamic model with events  
• Implemented the Lanchester Laws within a system dynamics model 
 
4) Constructed a theoretical modeling framework of public resolve 
• Founded on empirical evidence of four key factors 
• Provided a capability to model and evaluate impacts of conflict on public 
resolve 
 
5) Constructed a theoretical modeling framework that dynamically portrays 
soldier morale 
• Provided a capability to model and evaluate impacts of soldier morale on 
outcome of conflict 
 
6) Constructed an analytic framework of fourth generation operations which 
captures the will of the population and combatants 
Document Overview 
 This dissertation is divided into multiple chapters.  The first chapter introduces 
the problem, provides a summary of assumptions, and lists the research contributions.   
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The second chapter presents the relevant literature.  This chapter begins by 
describing fourth generation warfare.  This is followed by an introduction to discrete 
event simulations and system dynamics.  This is followed by an introduction to 
generalized linear models focusing on logistic regression.  The next section of the 
literature review focuses on the tools used to model combat.  The Lanchester Laws are 
introduced and illustrated with some examples and explanations.  The next area discussed 
is the research previously accomplished to model the impacts of the will-to-fight, morale 
and combat spirit.  The literature review concludes with a discussion of control theory. 
Chapters 3 though 7 build upon the literature review to construct an analytic 
framework of fourth generation operations.  Figure I-1 provides a framework of the 
research depicting the four steps, used in this research, to develop a fourth generation 
operations model.  Each input is divided into a separate chapter to develop the required 
contributions.  The results from each individual chapter are combined together, producing 
an analytic framework of fourth generation operations which captures the will of the 
population and combatants. 
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Figure I-1: Framework of Research 
Specifically, the third chapter introduces the concept of fourth generation 
operations.  Assuming that fourth generation operations is an outgrowth of fourth 
generation warfare, the dissertation next develops and identifies the principles required 
for this type of conflict.  Thus, the principles of fourth generation operations are formed 
and examined.  These principles are based on the current principles of war and principles 
of joint operations, along with discussions of the principles of counterinsurgency warfare.  
This chapter addresses the first two principal objectives. 
Chapter 4 develops a framework using the Lanchester Laws in a system dynamics 
model with events.  Two models of the Lanchester Laws are compared.  The first is a 
traditional discrete event simulation and the other is a system dynamics model.  
Comparisons of the modeling techniques are presented through the implementation of an 
excursion where the forces are fatigued.   
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The fifth chapter presents a format to understand the perception of the ongoing 
operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq.  Specifically, the public resolve for the conflict 
is analyzed.  Models for the public resolve are created and evaluated based on linear and 
non-linear modeling techniques.  The objective was to construct a theoretical modeling 
framework of public resolve.  The framework was founded on empirical evidence of key 
factors influencing the public resolve.  This chapter contributes to the public resolve 
portion of the third principle objective.  
Chapter 6 presents a theoretical modeling framework of combat spirit.  Several 
factors which impact the framework are discussed.  The chapter includes an application 
of the modeling framework.  The notional morale of each brigade and battalion that have 
deployed into Iraq is presented and combined to produce the notional morale for the 
United States Army and the United States Marine Corps (USMC).  An excursion based 
on the impact of multiple deployments was also presented.  This chapter completes the 
third principle objective of the research. 
The seventh chapter combines the previous chapters to build a notional model of 
elements of fourth generation operations which evaluates the public resolve of the 
conflict and the morale of the troops.  This model is represented within a system 
dynamics framework.  The model is then verified and validated to build confidence in the 
model.  Two demonstrations of the model’s utility conclude the chapter.  This completes 
the fourth and final principle objective of the research. 
The final chapter provides a summary of the objectives and contributions to the 
field, and suggestions for future research. 
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II. Literature Review 
This chapter presents a summary of the literature that underpins this research.  
The first section describes fourth generation warfare.  The review next identifies the 
principles used within current conflicts.  The concept of a strategic level model is then 
introduced.  The areas of discrete event simulation and system dynamics are introduced 
along with some examples of how these tools have been applied to national security 
problems. The Lanchester Laws are also discussed and illustrated with some examples 
and explanations.  This review is followed by a discussion on the research previously 
accomplished to model the impacts of the will-to-fight, morale and combat spirit.  Next, a 
discussion on data fitting is provided; specifically logistic regression and overdispersion 
are introduced.  Control theory is the final area introduced in the literature review.   
Fourth Generation Warfare 
Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States: JP 1 defines military 
operations other than war (MOOTW) as “situations short of war that require the use of 
US military forces” (JP 1, 2001, p. III-8).  In September 2006, Doctrine for Joint 
Operations: JP 3-0, dated September 2001 was reissued as Joint Operations: JP 3-0.  
Several changes were made in the document including the deletion of the term MOOTW.  
By removing this phrase from joint vocabulary, several modifications were made to 
JP 3-0.  To begin, the range of military operations lost the dichotomy of war and 
MOOTW.   The old and new paradigm is illustrated in Figure II-1.   
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Figure II-1: Range of Military Operations (adapted from JP 3-0, 2001 & 2006) 
Figure II-1 demonstrates how doctrine had previously defined the range of 
military operations as discontinuous.  The US goals were associated to the 
methodological approach of conflict.  The new paradigm is a continuation from limited 
crisis response to full-scale major campaigns.  Additionally, the new perspective states 
that all operations require military engagement, security operations, and deterrence.   
An additional change to joint operations is the phasing of these operations.  
JP 3-0, dated September 2001 defined four phases of a joint campaign.  The first phase 
was to deter and engage the enemy while the crisis is developing (JP 3-0, 2001, p. III-19).  
The second phase was to seize the initiative.  Both combatant and noncombatant 
operations can be utilized to achieve the access to the region of operations required by 
subsequent phases (JP 3-0, 2001, p. III-20).  The third phase of operations was to 
decisively defeat the enemy (JP 3-0, 2001, p. III-21).  This was also known as the conflict 
or combat phase of operations.  The final phase of operations was the transition to a self-
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sustaining peace (JP 3-0, 2001, p. III-21).  This phase was additionally referred to as 
post-hostilities.  The phases and typical associated goals are portrayed in the top portion 
of Figure II-2. 
No clear break existed between phase three (decisive operations) and phase four 
(transition) within JP 3-0 dated September 2001.  For example, when there was no 
official cessation of hostilities, or the complete defeat and destruction of the enemy, the 
operations existed between phases three and four.  It has been suggested that conflict in 
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and OPERATION IRAQ FREEDOM may be 
judged to be in the ‘between’ phase or ‘phase 3.5.’ 
JP 3-0 dated September 2006 expanded the phases of joint operations to six 
phases.  A new phase was added prior to the crisis being defined and deterred.  This new 
phase, phase 0, shapes the operational environment through appropriate prevention and 
preparation.  Additionally, a new phase was added in the gap previously described 
between phases three and four.  This is now referred to as the stabilization phase of 
JP 3-0 dated September 2006.  The final phase remains a transition of power to the civil 
authorities and redeployment of the military.  The phases and typical associated goals are 
portrayed in Figure II-2. 
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Figure II-2: Phases of Joint Operations (adapted from JP 3-0, 2001 & 2006) 
In 2003, the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (UK/MOD) Joint Doctrine 
and Concept Centre released the study, Strategic Trends, which is a view of what the 
world may look like for the next 30 years.  The study looked at seven different 
dimensions: Physical, Social, Science and Technology, Economic, Legal, Political and 
Military (Strategic Trends, 2003, para. 2).  The military dimension stated three types of 
armed conflict which currently exist and will continue to exist.  Interstate conflict is 
conflict between nations.  Intrastate conflict is conflict within a nation to include 
domestic terrorism, insurgencies and civil war.  The final type of conflict is international 
terrorism, which is defined as “between non-state actors and foreign states” (Strategic 
Trends, 2003, para. 7.2).  These three types of conflict are used here to establish a 
common set of terms for this dissertation.   
The following is a review of each of these three types of conflict and discussion 
regarding the likelihood that the United States of America will be involved in each type 
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of conflict in the first part of the 21st century.  This discussion is followed by an 
introduction to fourth generation warfare.   
The National Intelligence Council (NIC), which is responsible for the strategic 
thinking of the United States Intelligence Community, commissioned the 2020 project to 
take a broad and long term view of future threats.  An outcome of this project is the 2004 
document entitled, Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence 
Council’s 2020 Project.  This document follows in the footsteps of the NIC’s 2015 
project which resulted in the publication Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the 
Future with Nongovernment Experts.  These two documents present the NIC’s vision of 
the global environment.  They include proposed alternate futures which are used for 
debate and discussion of both current and expected trends.  The documents also include a 
discussion of significant discontinuities which describe the outlier events that could 
change the overall trends.  The NIC discounts the claim that interstate conflict will occur.  
The likelihood of great power conflict escalating into total war in the next 15 
years is lower than at any time in the past century, unlike during previous 
centuries when local conflicts sparked world wars.  (Mapping the Global Future, 
2004, p. 14) 
 
The UK/MOD agrees that the future is unlikely to hold much interstate conflict 
for three reasons (Strategic Trends, 2003, para. 7.4).  First, it is unlikely that a new 
superpower will emerge as in the Cold War, thus the United States will keep its current 
hegemony for the near term.  Secondly, this superiority of the United States will 
discourage attacks by foreign countries; this includes attacking the allies and interests of 
the United States.  Finally, the risks and penalties of interstate warfare are continually 
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increasing.   Simply put, countries can not afford to directly wage warfare against the 
United States (Strategic Trends, 2003, para. 7.4).   
Nye, in The Paradox of American Power, appears to agree with the UK/MOD.  
“The closest thing to an equal that the United States faces at the beginning of the twenty 
first century is the European Union” (2002, p. 29).  Nye justifies this remark by showing 
the economy of the European Union is roughly equal to the United States economy.  
Further, the European Union has a larger population and larger share of the world 
exportation of goods than the United States.  Additionally, the European Union has 
already begun to challenge the United States economically with the Euro and by 
countering United States sanctions against Cuba and Iran (Nye, 2002, p. 30).   
In considering any near to mid-term peer, the threat from China must be 
acknowledged.  “The United States is much more likely to go to war with China than it is 
with any other major power”; however, “it is hardly inevitable that China will be a threat 
to American interests” (Betts, 2000, p. 17).  The United States economy is twice that of 
China; only with strong growth will China’s economy be equal by 2020 (Nye: 19).  Nye 
therefore suggests the most likely conflict with China would occur over Taiwan and not 
from China challenging the United States to be the dominant power in East Asia (2002, 
p. 22).  While it is a possibility that war could erupt with China over Taiwan (or perhaps 
North Korea), both sides would suffer greatly. 
In 2003, Barnett wrote an article in Esquire magazine entitled “The Pentagon’s 
New Map.”  This article was expanded in Barnett’s 2004 book by the same name.  
Barnett reinforces the contention that state-on-state wars are a condition of the past 
(Barnett, 2004, p. 85).  He claims “when wars occur now, they are almost exclusively 
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internal wars, where some subsection of a state wishes to break off from the whole or 
where social violence between groups within a state erupts into full-blown civil war” 
(Barnett, 2004, p. 85).  This views lead to the discussion of intrastate conflict. 
The UK/MOD compiled data from the Peace Science Society’s Correlates of War 
Project dataset.  Figure II-3, presents the number of interstate and intrastate conflicts 
from 1946-1995 complied by UK/MOD. 
 
Figure II-3: Number of conflicts from 1946-1995 (Strategic Trends, 2003, Chart A) 
This data shows how interstate conflict remains low and constant for each ten year 
period; however, the number of intrastate conflicts has been increasing.  Strategic Trends 
claims the increase in intrastate conflict results from “independence movements, 
separatist nationalism, and surrogate superpower conflict” (Strategic Trends, 
2003, para. 7.3). 
The United States involvement in the number of conflicts from 1946-1995 was 
found by analyzing the Correlates of War Projects dataset version 3.0.  These data 
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include the United States in the following three interstate conflicts: Korea-1950, 
Vietnam-1965, and the Gulf War-1991 (Sarkees, 2000, p. 134).  The United States was 
involved in five intrastate conflicts during that time period: Lebanon-1958, Vietnam-
1961, Laos-1964, Cambodia-1970, and Somolia-1992 (Sarkees, 2000, p. 139).  The 
UK/MOD sees the likelihood of intrastate warfare increasing as globalization impacts the 
culture of non-globalized countries (Strategic Trends, 2003, para. 7.6).  The pre 9/11 
trend was that the United States was involved in such intrastate conflicts at a rate of one 
per decade.  There is no reason to expect this trend will do anything but increase with the 
current Global War on Terrorism. 
Barnett states that during the mid-1990’s the Pentagon was developing war plans 
for combat against a mythical asymmetric near-peer scenario (Barnett, 2004, p. 93).  
Barnett claims this asymmetrical threat comes from transnational terrorists, not from any 
nation or state whose people or assets can be directly attacked.  This leads the discussion 
to the final type of conflict expected by the UK/MOD, international terrorism.  
The United States is currently involved in the Global War on Terrorism, the 
‘Long War’.  As such, the first part of the 21st century must include the United States 
combating international terrorism.  However, many definitions for terrorism exist (Wentz 
& Wagenhals, 2004, p. 6).  The UK/MOD’s Strategic Trends defines terrorism as armed 
conflict between “non-state actors and foreign states” (Strategic Trends, 2003, para. 7.2).  
The types of non-state actors were categorized and presented in Table II-1.   
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Table II-1: Potential Non-state Adversaries (Strategic Trends, 2003, Table C) 
Sectarian Obsessionalists Militarists Profiteers Proliferators 
Tribalists 
Religious 
denominators 
Nationalists 
Insurgents 
Revolutionists 
Warloads 
Dissidents 
Militants 
Gangs 
Vigilantes 
Single 
movement 
issues 
Cults 
Sects 
Radicals 
Mentally 
unstable 
individuals 
Anarchists 
Dissidents 
Militants 
Instigators 
Mercenaries 
Extreme right 
paramilitaries
Private 
military 
companies 
Cartels 
Criminals 
Opportunists
Pirates 
Of Information
Of Technology
Of Weapons 
 
The UK/MOD provides a very broad definition of terrorism which includes five 
different factions: religious, fixated, militaristic, exploiters for profit, and proliferators.  
These categorizations include areas which are excluded in the definitions of terrorism 
used by the United Nations and the United States.  Wentz and Wagenhals state the United 
Nations defines terrorism as (2004, p. 6):  
A unique form of crime. Terrorist acts often contain elements of warfare, politics 
and propaganda. For security reasons and due to the lack of popular support, 
terrorist organizations are usually small, making detection and infiltration 
difficult. Although the goals of terrorism are sometimes shared by wider 
constituencies, their methods are generally abhorred.  (2004, p. 6) 
 
The United Nations and UK/MOD both have different definitions than the United States 
definition of terrorism.  The National Security Strategy defines terrorism as  
Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.  
(2002, p. 5) 
 
The National Security Strategy definition is the basis of the following definitions from 
the Department of Defense, Department of State and Department of Homeland Security.  
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U.S. Department of Defense: The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat 
of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate 
governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, 
religious, or ideological (JP 3-07.2, 1998, p. I-1). 
 
U.S. Department of State: the premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine 
agents, usually intended to influence an audience (Title 22 of the U.S. Code, 
Chapter 38, Section 2656f(d)). 
 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Any premeditated, unlawful act 
dangerous to human life or public welfare that is intended to intimidate or coerce 
civilian populations or governments (National Strategy for Homeland Security, 
2002, p. 2) 
  
The common theme is that terrorism is a premeditated form of violence used to 
insight fear to attain a goal, objective, or program.  No matter the specific definition, 
terrorism will be a focus for the Department of Defense, Department of State, and 
Department of Homeland Security for the first part of the 21st century.  However, even 
with the multiple definitions, the specifics of terrorism are nebulous. 
These nebulous definitions of terrorism are subsumed in the term violent non-
state actors (VNSA) used by Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer in their several technical 
reports and their book, Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-State Actors.  The 
VNSA does not abide by Clausewitz’s concept of Trinitarian war (Thomas & Kiser, 
2002, p. 74).  The concept of Trinitarian war assumes the major three elements of war are 
political leadership, the army and the population (Thomas & Kiser, 2002, p. 74).  VNSAs 
do not follow this paradigm and instead reflect pre-nation state politics.  Additionally, 
VNSAs employ tactics which are “asymmetric, including violent crimes, guerrilla 
operations, terrorism, and in some rare cases, cyber warfare” (Thomas & Kiser, 2002, 
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p. 75).  These tactics are not typical of the modern army.  This concept of a VNSA may 
be a better means to understand the enemy faced in current and future conflicts.  
In October 1989, Lind, Nightengale, Schmitt, Sutton and Wilson authored “The 
Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.” Their article, which was 
simultaneously published in both Marine Corps Gazette, and Military Review, coined the 
term Fourth Generation Warfare.   
 Lind et al., maintain that there have been three generations of modern warfare.  
The first generation began with the employment of the smoothbore musket.  This 
technology required the tactics to be changed to create a more effective army.  
Specifically, armies lined up to produce a high rate of fire (Lind et al., 1989, p. 2).   
 The second generation of modern warfare also began as a response to 
technological changes: the invention of the “rifled musket, breechloaders, barber wire, 
machine gun, and indirect fire” (Lind et al., 1989, p. 3).  These new weapons defeated the 
lines and columns tactics of first generation warfare.  In second generation war, artillery 
and massed firepower were used to overcome infantry and massed manpower.  Both the 
first and second generations of warfare were overall linear in nature (Lind et al., 1989, 
p. 3).   
 The third generation of modern war is embodied in the idea of blitzkrieg or 
maneuver warfare.  Although the technology continued to increase, the shift of tactics 
came from a change in ideas of warfare (Lind et al., 1989, p. 4).  The difference of tactics 
enabled the Germans to better command and control their troops through the effective 
and efficient implementation of technologies (radio and tanks) readily available to all the 
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allies.  The attacker planned to bypass and cut-off the defender, causing the defender to 
collapse due to a lack of access to command and logistics.  
The mechanism for transition for each of the previous three generations of 
warfare was improvements in technology or ideas (Lind et al., 1989, p. 4).  Similarly, a 
change in technology or ideas results in the fourth generation of warfare.  Several 
elements of the previous three generations are expected to be present and improved upon 
in the fourth generation.  First, the independence of the individual combatant has 
increased with each generation.  The expectation of the commander’s intent may directly 
translate into the mission order (Lind et al., 1989, p. 4).  Second, decreasing the reliance 
on the logistic train, forces the combatants to increase their reliance on the enemy’s 
resources and territory (Lind et al., 1989, p. 4).  Third, maneuver warfare continues to be 
exploited (Lind et al., 1989, p. 4).  Finally, the ability to cut-off the enemy may be 
improved such that the enemy is attacked internally.  Lind et al. assert that “targets will 
include such things as the population’s support for the war and the enemy’s culture” 
(1989, p. 5). 
 Changes of technology creating fourth generation warfare was felt to lead to 
improved weapons which may cause the individual combatant to have the military 
strength and value an order of magnitude greater than seen in previous generations.  
Unfortunately, in 1989, the authors claim, “the current American research, development, 
and procurement process may simply not be able to make the transition to a military 
effective fourth generation of weapons” (p. 8).  Currently, the technology grows 
significantly faster than the DOD acquisition process can maintain.  This is evident by 
Moore’s Law which states that the number of transistors on a chip will double every two 
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years; however, the DOD acquisition process takes significantly longer (Moore, 1965, 
p. 2).  For example, the F-22 took over twenty years from concept to an operational 
capability. 
 A change of ideas creating the fourth generation of warfare may also be a 
possibility (Lind et al., 1989, p. 8).  Lind et al., state “the genesis of an idea-based fourth 
generation maybe visible in terrorism” (1989, p. 8).  This does not imply that terrorism is 
the fourth generation of warfare; just some of the elements of terrorism may be present in 
the fourth generation of warfare.  Some of these elements include how terrorism attacks 
the enemy internally to cause the enemy to collapse.  In addition, terrorists use the 
strength of a free society’s freedom and openness as a weapon (Lind et al., 1989, p. 8-9).  
Terrorists can wage their warfare while being protected by the very laws of their enemy.  
This enables the terrorist to be hidden within the society until the moment of attack.  
Terrorist actions are able to bring the combat to the population directly, bypassing 
standing armies.  An additional element is that the terrorists are able to live off the land, 
perhaps in the land of his enemy, until an attack.  A final element of terrorism which may 
translate into the fourth generation of warfare is that the material of conflict can be far 
cheaper than in previous generations of war.  As an example, Lind et al. note a third 
generation stealth bomber costs multiple millions of dollars, whereas a terrorist stealth 
bomber is an average looking car, possibly stolen, filled with explosives (1989, p. 10). 
 Münkler, in his article entitled “The Wars of the 21st Century,” agrees that the 
next generation of warfare may include a demilitarization of war. 
21st century wars will be fought only partially by soldiers and not against 
traditional military objectives.  Thus a future objective will be the will or morale 
of the population and not just the standing army.  (2003, p. 18)   
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Münkler continues by stating the wars of the 21st century will not “be a linear extension 
of the trends of the twentieth century” (2003, p. 9).   Münkler statement suggests that 
fourth generation warfare may not simply be the next step in evolution of war, but a shift 
to a new paradigm of warfare.   
In a 1994 article entitled “The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation,” 
Hammes provides five tactical traits inherent in fourth generation warfare (p. 44): 
• Be fought in a complex arena of low-intensity conflict 
 
• Include tactics/techniques from earlier generations 
 
• Be fought across the spectrum of political, social, economic, and military 
networks. 
 
• Be fought worldwide through these networks 
 
• Involve a mix of national, international, transnational, and subnational actors 
(p. 44). 
 
These traits can be seen in the conflicts occurring within Iraq and Afghanistan. 
In 2004, Lind revisited the four generations of war in light of the post 9/11 
environment and the military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Lind states that in the 
fourth generation of warfare the “state has lost its monopoly on war” (2004, p. 13).  
Fourth generation war has also returned to a warfare of cultures and is no longer solely a 
warfare of states.  The tactics of the evolving fourth generation warfare are not new.  A 
number of the tactics are standard guerrilla tactics.  Additional tactics are “classic Arab 
light cavalry warfare carried out with modern technology” (Lind, 2004, p. 16).  Lind 
reiterates, the warfare in Iraq is not yet fourth generation warfare.   
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 Hammes disagrees with Lind stating the “Fourth generation warfare, which is 
now playing out in Iraq and Afghanistan, is a modern form of insurgency” (2005, p. 1).  
Hammes continues by explaining this type of warfare is the only kind that the United 
States has lost and the enemy knows this.  Hammes suggests the United States has lost 
such conflicts three times: in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia (2005, p. 2).   
This idea of insurgency is not new; Münkler suggests Mao Tse-tung used a 
deceleration of the course of events successfully by means of guerilla warfare (2003, 
p. 7).  The insurgency method of decelerating events is used against an enemy which is 
superior in technology and organization.  A technologically and organizationally superior 
adversary accelerates the warfare to obtain the decisive battle.  However, the decisive 
battle of the Napoleonic era is meaningless in the fourth generation of war (Hammes, 
2005, p. 2).  Guerilla warfare makes the enemy pay the price of attempting acceleration 
until it becomes unaffordable (Münkler, 2003, p. 8).   
The dramatic superiority the US military apparatus has achieved over all 
potential enemies in the last two decades is largely due to its capacity to exploit 
the various opportunities for accelerating the pace at the different combat levels 
(Münkler, 2003, p. 8) 
 
This asymmetry forces an enemy to evolve to an asymmetric insurgency approach. 
 Fadok, in a School of Advanced Aerospace Studies Thesis, wrote about 
controlling the pace of the battle.  He explains that Mao Tse-tung used a protracted war to 
defeat the Imperial Japanese (Fadok, 1995, p. 19).  Fadok illustrated the point that 
controlling the pace of the conflict wins the war with a basketball analogy.  In his 
example, a team which is known for the ‘fast break’ style of play is playing a team which 
is not suited for that style of game; perhaps better at a ‘run and gun’ style.  Fadok states 
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that typically the fast break team continues to increase the pace of the game until it 
paralyzes the other team.  However, the ‘run and gun’ team may be able to slow down the 
pace of the game.  When this occurs, the players and fans of the ‘fast break’ team gets 
restless which allows the ‘run and gun’ team the possibility to win.  Fadok continues by 
stating the “analogy seems to apply even better when, as in war, we remove the time 
clock” (1995, p. 18).  It is apparent that insurgency tactics are very capable of protracting 
the war against the fast paced United States forces operating in a conventional warfare 
mode.   
 Those countries oriented towards preserving life, “will ultimately be defeated by 
those who are ready to sacrifice themselves” (Münkler, 2003, p. 19).  The first three 
generations of warfare attempted to preserve life of one’s own army while attritting or 
annihilating the enemy.  The concepts of the potential fourth generation of warfare, such 
as sacrificing troops which is used as a key tactic, is often difficult for Western Nations to 
understand and thus is difficult to prepare successful defenses against.   
Manwaring presents five fundamental concepts in “The New Master of Wizard’s 
Chess: The Real Hugo Chavez and Asymmetric Warfare”, which are required to prepare 
and defeat the fourth generation combatants.  The five “educational and organizational 
imperatives” are summarized below (Manwaring, 2005, p. 48): 
1. Military and civilian leaders at all levels of combat must understand how the 
fourth generation tactics achieve political ends 
 
2. Civilian and military personnel must learn to work well with the media and 
coalitions 
 
3. Leaders must grow the intelligence capabilities well beyond their current 
abilities 
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4. Since traditional peacekeeping operations will continually become hazardous, 
the peacekeepers must become effective warfighters 
 
5. All civilian and military instruments of power must be working together to 
achieve the same end state (Manwaring, 2005, p. 48) 
 
Manwaring warns that unless the five imperatives are incorporated into the United States 
strategies and doctrine, conflicts will end with unfavorable outcomes (2005, p. 48). 
With fourth generation warfare reviewed, the next section discusses the principles 
of warfare. 
Principles of Fourth Generation Warfare 
To advance against the enemy’s main force (objective), with the intention 
of destroying it (offensive), with the greatest numbers possible (mass and 
economy of force), with the least friction (co-operation), and in the 
shortest possible time (movement), so that we may take him unawares 
(surprise), without undue risks to ourselves (security) – J. F. C. Fuller 
(Fuller, 1916, p. 5) 
 
The current principles of war, while evolving from the dawn of conflict, are based 
on the eight principles suggested by Fuller in 1916.  The eight strategical principles 
suggested by Fuller were; Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Movement, 
Surprise, Security, and Cooperation (1916, p. 3).  (Strategic is now the modern term for 
strategical.)  These are nearly identical to the principles of war found in today’s US Joint 
doctrine.  The principle of Simplicity was not included by Fuller.  Additionally, the 
principles of Movement and Cooperation have been reworded to Maneuver and Unity of 
Command.   
The strategical principles of war proposed by Fuller are immediately followed by 
nine considerations which must be acknowledged regarding the principles of war.  These 
conditions are time, space, ground, weather, numbers, moral, communication, supply and 
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armament (Fuller, 1916, p. 3).  After a discussion of the eight principles and nine 
considerations, Fuller introduces the tactical principles of war.  His three tactical 
principles of war are demoralization, endurance, and shock (Fuller, 1916, p. 18).  These 
three principles are required to develop the four stages of attack; approach, 
demoralization, decision, and annihilation (Fuller: 20). 
The principles of war and MOOTW from Joint Publication 1 (2000), are 
discussed to assist in developing the principles of fourth generation operations.  
Table II-2 summarizes the principles of war from JP 1.  Table II-3 presents the principles 
of MOOTW from JP 1.  
Table II-2: Principles of War (JP 1, 2000, Appendix B) 
Principle Definition 
Objective Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective 
Offensive Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative 
Mass Concentrate the effects of combat power at the place and time to achieve decisive results 
Economy of Force Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts 
Maneuver Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power 
Unity of Command Ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective 
Security Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage 
Surprise Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which it is unprepared 
Simplicity Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding 
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Table II-3: Principles of MOOTW (JP 1, 2000, Appendix C) 
Principle Definition 
Objective Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective 
Unity of Effort Seek unity of effort in every operation 
Security Prevent hostile factions from acquiring a military, political, or informational advantage 
Restraint Apply appropriate military capability prudently 
Perseverance Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims 
Legitimacy Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable 
 
 Both the principles of war and MOOTW share the concepts of Objective, 
Security, and Unity of Command.  The principles of MOOTW refer to Unity of 
Command as Unity of Effort since it must include civil, military and other agencies.   
The 2006 update to JP 3-0, changed the principles of war by creating the term 
principles of joint operations, this change has also been reflected in the 2007 update to 
JP-1 entitled, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.  These principles are a 
merger of the principles of war and MOOTW.  All nine of the original principles of war 
are included with only minor changes.  Additionally, the three unique principles of 
MOOTW were added.  The new JP 3-0 redefines the principle Restraint to “limit 
collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force” (JP 3-0, 2006, p. A-3).  The 
definition of Perseverance has been changed to “ensure the commitment necessary to 
attain the national strategic end state” (JP 3-0, 2006, p. A-4).  Whereas, the definition of 
Legitimacy is to “develop and maintain the will necessary to attain the national strategic 
end state” (JP 3-0, 2006, p. A-4).  The principle of Perseverance includes the concepts 
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that all instruments of power (political, military, informational and economic) may be 
required through the duration of a long conflict.  While the principle of Legitimacy may 
include influences from foreign nations, indigenous government, indigenous civilian 
population, and the participating forces.  Figure II-4 illustrates the relationship of the 
principles of joint operations.   
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Restraint
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1: JP 1; Appendix B; Nov 00
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Figure II-4: Principles of Joint Operations 
The concept of fighting a counterinsurgency is related to what has been occurring 
in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  For this reason, it is important to insure the principles, 
laws, and deductions, of counterinsurgency are encapsulated within the principles of joint 
operations and specifically fourth generation operations.  Galula considered the 
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requirements to fight a counterinsurgency in his text, Counterinsurgency Warfare: 
Theory and Practice.  He proposed six principles of waging a counterinsurgency.   
First, initiative is required (Galula, 1964, p. 82).  He defines this as an offensive 
strategy which tracts as Offensive from the principles of joint operations.   
The second principle suggested by Galula, is “full utilization of the 
counterinsurgent’s assets” (1964, p. 83).  Galula explains that all assets must be applied 
to include propaganda (informational), economic, military and administrative (political).  
All the national instruments of power or Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic 
(DIME) must be employed.  Therefore, this is equivalent to the Mass principle, only in 
the proper scale.  Galula realizes that all instruments of power available to a nation-state 
must be utilized to defeat an insurgency. 
Galula’s third principle is Economy of Force (1964, p. 81).  Economy of Force is 
one of the Joint doctrine’s principles of war. 
Irreversibility is the fourth principle suggested by Galula (1964, p. 82).  The 
example and definition provided by Galula suggests this is similar to the Perseverance 
principle of joint operations.  The example Galula provides is when the 
counterinsurgent’s military gains the confidence and support of the population, the 
insurgent’s power will be difficult to rebuild (1964, p. 82).  Additionally, once leaders 
within the population emerge and support the counterinsurgency, they can be trusted 
because the leaders have too much to lose if the insurgency returns. 
 Galula’s fifth principle is “To Command is to Control” (1964, p. 85).  This is the 
principle of Unity of Command.   
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Galula’s final principle is Simplicity, which is again a direct classic principle of 
war (1964, p. 84).  Figure II-5 relates the principles of war and principles of MOOTW to 
the principles of counterinsurgency suggested by Galula.   
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Figure II-5: Galula's Principles of Counterinsurgency 
Galula also presents four laws which must be followed to win a war against 
insurgents: 
The first law:  The support of the population is as necessary for the 
counterinsurgency as for the insurgent (Galula, 1964, p. 74) 
 
The second law: The support is gained through an active minority  
(Galula, 1964, p. 75) 
 
The third law: Support from the population is conditional (Galula, 1964, p. 78) 
 
The fourth law: Intensity of efforts and vastness are essential (Galula, 1964, p. 79) 
 
 The first three laws Galula proposes encompass the idea that the population’s 
perception of the conflict is extremely important to the success of the operation.  These 
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laws support the joint operations principle of Legitimacy as well as recognizing the 
importance of public opinion.  Galula proposes persuading a minority to gain the support 
of the entire population.  Additionally, the population’s support is always conditional.  
The fourth law differs in that it involves the principles of Mass and Economy of Force.  
In addition to the four laws, the third law has four important deductions. 
1) Effective political action on the population must be preceded by military and 
police operations against the insurgent political organizations 
 
2) Political, social, economic, and other reforms, however much they ought to be 
wanted and popular, are inoperative while the insurgent still controls the 
population 
 
3) The counterinsurgency needs a convincing success as early as possible in 
order to demonstrate that he has the will, the means, and the ability to win 
 
4) The counterinsurgency cannot safely enter into negotiations except from a 
position of strength, or his political supporters will flock to the insurgent side 
(Galula, 1964, p. 78-79)   
 
The first two deductions support the principle of Legitimacy.  The third deduction 
requires both the principles of Mass and Objective.  The third deduction again suggests 
that the population’s perception is significantly important.  The final deduction involves 
the principles of Perseverance and Irreversibility.  Traditionally, counterinsurgency 
tactics have involved limiting the opposition’s area of operations and undermining the 
insurgents’ support within a nation.  Containment and denial is problematic for today’s 
transnational insurgency.  The insurgencies may have cells throughout the world, which, 
enhanced by modern communication, can communicate in ways previously unimagined. 
Hoffman and Taw, in their RAND publication A Strategic Framework for 
Countering Terrorism and Insurgency, give four elements critical to a successful 
counterinsurgency:   
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1. An effective overall command and control structure 
 
2. “Legitimizing” measures, taken by the government to build public trust and 
support, combined with antiterrorist legislation sensitive to public sentiments 
 
3. Coordination within and between intelligence services 
 
4. Collaboration among governments and security forces of different countries 
(Hoffman & Taw, 1992, p. 3) 
 
The first and fourth elements relate to the principles of Unity of Command.  The 
second element is the MOOTW principle of Legitimacy.  The third element is a 
combination of both the principles of Security and Unity of Command.  This reinforces 
the requirement of these principles within proposed principles of fourth generation 
operations. 
Dupuy suggests thirteen “Timeless Verities of Combat” in his book, 
Understanding War (Dupuy, 1987 p. 1).  These are overarching principles that apply to 
all types of combat as oppose to the more limited scope of fourth generation operations, 
MOOTWs, or other specific combat variants.  Dupuy’s Verities of Combat are presented 
in Table II-4.  A discussion on how the verity of combat is related to the principles of war 
and MOOTW is also included in Table II-4. 
The verities of combat all have relations to the principles of war and the principles 
of MOOTW.  As shown in Table II-5, all the principles of war and MOOTW are present 
within the verities of combat except for the MOOTW principle of Legitimacy. 
The Joint Forces Staff College provides a collection of several countries’ 
principles of war in JFSC Pub-1: Joint Staff Officer’s Guide.  Table II-6 is a summary 
provided by the Joint Forces Staff College. 
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Table II-4: Dupuy’s Timeless Verities of Combat and Discussion 
Verities of Combat Discussion 
1. Offensive action is essential to 
positive combat results  
(p. 1) 
Similar to the principle of Offensive.  If the 
combatant does not seize the initiative, the battle’s 
objectives will not be obtained. 
2. Defensive strength is greater 
than offensive strength  
(p. 2) 
The defender maintains both the principles of 
Restraint and Mass 
3. Defensive posture is 
necessary when successful 
offense is impossible (p. 2) 
When the forces cannot be offensive, employing 
the principle of Economy of Force in a defensive 
nature is the only alternative. 
4. Flank or rear attack is more 
likely to succeed than frontal 
attack (p. 3) 
The principle of Maneuver insures the combatant 
attacks the enemy at the weakest position. 
5. Initiative permits application 
of preponderant combat power 
(p. 3) 
Galula’s principles of counterinsurgency address 
the importance of initiative.  This is contained 
within the principle of Offensive. 
6. Defenders’ chances of success 
are directly proportional to 
fortification strength (p. 4) 
The ability of the defender to delay the attacker 
provides an opportunity to Mass and retain the 
principle of Security. 
7. An attacker willing to pay the 
price can always penetrate the 
strongest defenses (p. 5) 
With the proper leadership provided by the 
principle of Unity of Command, the associated 
Objective can be achieved with Perseverance. 
8. Successful defense requires 
depth and reserves (p. 5) 
The proper application of the reserves can shift the 
tide of the battle.  This requires an understanding of 
the principle of Economy of Force 
9. Superior Combat Power 
Always Wins (p. 6) 
An outnumbered force can win the battle if the 
principles of Mass and Maneuver are combined to 
obtain superior combat power. 
10. Surprise substantially 
enhances combat power (p. 6) 
The principle of Surprise “has been proven to be 
the greatest of all combat multipliers” (p. 6). 
11. Firepower kills, disrupts, 
suppresses, and causes 
dispersion (p. 7) 
The nature of warfare causes significant friction.  
This friction is best countered by a strong 
command.  Therefore, the principle of Unity of 
Command is required. 
12. Combat activities are always 
slower, less productive, and less 
efficient than anticipated (p. 7) 
“In war more than anywhere else things do not turn 
out as we expect . . . Perseverance in the chosen 
course is the essential counterweight” (Clausewitz, 
1832/1964, p. 193). 
13. Combat is too complex to be 
described in a single, simple 
aphorism (p. 7) 
Since the nature of war is extremely complex, the 
principle of Simplicity attempts to bring the nature 
of the battle to the most simplistic form 
 
Table II-5: Collection of the Various Principles of Warfare 
 Principles of MOOTW 
Principles  
of War 
Fuller’s 
Principles of 
War 
Galula’s  
Principles of 
Counter-
insurgency 
Hoffman & 
Taw’s 
Principles 
Dupuy’s 
Verities of 
Combat 
Principles of 
Joint 
Operations 
Objective X X X   1 & 7 X 
Offensive  X X Initiative  1 & 5 X 
Mass  X X Utilization of Assets  2, 6 & 9 X 
Economy of 
Force Restraint X X X  2, 3, 6 & 8 X 
Maneuver  X Movement   4 & 9 X 
Unity of 
Command 
Unity of 
Effort X Cooperation 
Command is 
Control 
Command & 
Control: 
Collaboration
7 & 11 X 
Security X X X  X 6 X 
Surprise  X X   6 X 
Perseverance X   Irreversibility  7 & 12 X 
Simplicity  X  X  13 X 
Legitimacy X    X  X 
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Table II-6: Mulinational Principles of War (JFSC Pub 1, 2000, Figure D-1) 
United States Great Britain Australia 
Former Soviet 
Union 
“Principles of 
Military Art” 
France 
People’s 
Republic of 
China 
Objective 
Selection & 
Maintenance of 
Aim 
  
Selection & 
Maintenance of 
Aim 
Offensive Offensive Action   
Offensive 
Action 
Mass Concentration of Force 
Massing and 
Correlation of 
Forces 
Concentration 
of Effort 
Concentration 
of Force 
Economy of 
Force 
Economy of 
Force 
Economy, 
Sufficiency of 
Force 
  
Maneuver Flexibility Initiative  Initiative and Flexibility 
Unity of 
Command Cooperation   Coordination 
Security Security   Security 
Surprise Surprise Surprise Surprise Surprise 
Simplicity     
 Maintenance of Morale 
Mobility & 
Tempo, 
Simultaneous 
Attack on All 
Levels, 
Preservation of 
Combat 
Effectiveness, 
Interworking & 
Coordination 
Liberty of 
Action 
Morale, 
Mobility, 
Political 
Mobilization,
Freedom of 
Action 
Adapted from JP 1, FM 100-1, AFM 1-1, and FMFM 6-4, Military Review, May 1955, and Soviet 
Battlefield Development Plan 
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Strategic Level Modeling 
In the first part of the 21st century we can anticipate the nation and its coalition 
partners will be involved in intrastate conflicts, often focused on combating international 
terrorism.  As discussed earlier, an interstate war involving the US is highly unlikely in 
the early part of the century.  Next, this research addresses how the principles of Joint 
Operations can be modeled to provide insight to current and future decision makers.  This 
type of analysis is expected to be most effective at the campaign or the strategic level.  
Unfortunately, campaign models of the projected fourth generation warfare primarily 
exist as attrition based models of interstate conflict (Lanchester Law based models.)   
Taylor and Lane state, “A campaign model can be defined as one that captures the 
full scope of a military campaign” (Taylor & Lane, 2004, p. 333).  Additionally, Hughes, 
in his book Military Modeling for Decision Making, provides a definition of campaign 
models though an example: 
…the defense of shipping in the Atlantic over an extended campaign, air-ground 
combat in a Major Regional Contingency, or the joint air campaign of missile and 
bomber attacks against Iraq in preparation for the ground campaign. (1997, p. 6) 
 
Compare this to the examples provided for single engagement models and battle 
or multiple-unit engagement models: 
Single engagement models, such as submarine versus submarine, fighter versus 
bomber, or tank versus tank. 
 
Battle or multiple-unit engagement models, such as a naval task force versus 
combined air and submarine attackers, or an army divisional assault on a 
defending brigade, or a formation of air interceptors vectored by a fighter 
direction system to attack fighter-bombers who are conducting a strike.  (Hughes, 
1997, p. 6) 
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Dupuy, in Understanding War, defines a hierarchy of combat.  He defined the 
frequently used terms of war, campaign, battle, engagement, action, and duel.  These 
terms are presented in the hierarchy given in Table II-7.  This table summarizes the 
specifics on the duration, type or unit, and goal for each level of combat.   
Table II-7: Hierarchy of Combat (Dupuy, 1987, Table 7-1 Page 67) 
Level of Combat Duration Units Involved Common Tread 
War Months – Years National Forces National Goals 
Campaign Weeks  – Months Army Groups or Field Armies Strategic Goals 
Battle Days  – Weeks Field Armies or Army Corps 
Operational 
Mission 
Engagement 1 – 5 Days Divisions – Companies Tactical Mission 
Action 1 – 24 Hours Battalions – Squads Local Objective 
Duel Minutes 
Two Individuals, 
People or Mobile 
Fighting Machines 
Local Objective 
 
Dupuy states that the first level in the hierarchy is war, and war is conflict 
between nations or states (1987, p. 65).  This statement must be expanded to include 
transnational terrorist organizations to capture fourth generation operations.  Dupuy 
continues by stating that a war is fought for political or economic reasons.  The next level 
in the hierarchy is a campaign, which is the first subdivision of a war.  This is followed 
by a battle which is the clash of major forces with an operational objective.  Engagement 
is the next level of warfare.  An action is a specific event within an engagement.  The 
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final level of combat is the duel; which is the interaction between two entities of combat.  
This can be, for instance, between two tanks, two riflemen, or two aircraft.  A man with a 
rocket propelled grenade (RPG) might dual a tank.  Technically speaking, however, the 
rules of the duel (in the classic sense) are two equivalently armed combatants. 
Dupuy further described the levels of combat by relating them to tactics, 
operations, and strategy.  Figure II-6 presents a diagram relating how these concepts 
relate to the levels of combat.  Additionally, the commanders for each level are presented. 
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Figure II-6: Relationship of Tactics, Operations, and Strategy (Dupuy, 1987, Figure 7-1 Page 69) 
Air Force Instruction 16-1003 (AFI 16-1003), categorizes analytical models as 
one of four areas: campaign, mission, engagement and other.  The definitions provided 
for each category follow, though no definition for ‘other’ existed in the AFI. 
Campaign Model—A model that attempts to capture all important aspects of 
aerospace power over the duration of a conflict across an entire theater or 
theaters of operation in a force vs. force campaign length scenario. 
(AFI 16-1003, 2006, p. 7). 
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Mission Model—A model that captures one or more interacting aspects of 
aerospace power during the course of representing an aerospace mission or 
missions by evaluating mission effectiveness against enemy forces in a few-on-few 
or many-on-many combat scenario.  (AFI 16-1003, 2006, p. 8). 
 
Engagement Model—A model that provides measures of effectiveness at the 
system level of representation by evaluating system effectiveness against enemy 
systems in a one-on-one or few-on-few combat scenario.  (AFI 16-1003, 2006, 
p. 7). 
 
Hill, Miller and McIntyre present the levels of combat and the models included in 
the Air Force Standard Analysis Toolkit at each level in their article “Applications of 
Discrete Event Simulation Modeling to Military Problems” (Hill, Miller & McIntyre, 
2001, p. 782).  This listing of types of models is commonly portrayed in a pyramid of 
models as shown in Figure II-7.   
 
 
Figure II-7: Hierarchy of Models (Hill, Miller & McIntyre, 2001, Figure 1 Page 782) 
It is a proposition of this research that the hierarchy of military modeling can be 
appropriately classified by how the model represents time.  Engineering or system level 
models focus on instantaneous events.  The instantaneous event needs only seconds to 
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capture the impact and effect.  An example is molecules flowing over a wing (resulting in 
lift) or the moments and forces on an aircraft during a weapon’s release.  This could also 
encompass Dupuy’s duel. 
An engagement model looks at time as a short series of events or actions.  Such 
models account for time in minutes.  Examples of engagement models include: the 
engagement of two aircraft in a basic fighter maneuver (i.e. dogfight) or a tank locating 
and shooting at an enemy’s position.  This covers both Dupuy’s action and duel levels of 
combat.  
A mission model is focused on the aggregation required to model in terms of 
hours of activities.  Therefore, a mission model can capture the events of take-off, aircraft 
refueling, ingress towards the target, attacking the target, and finally returning to base.  
The mission model also includes the activities of the enemy’s forces.  These actions may 
include the surface-to-air lay down, air-to-air defenses, and target movement.  A mission 
model is capable of modeling Dupuy’s engagement and a single battle.  This can be 
further seen as modeling multiple actions. 
Campaign models continue this trend; time is represented as multiple days of 
missions and engagements.  Therefore, the campaign model is aggregated to allow for 
multiple missions in a day over several days or months.  This provides the ability to 
analyze the impacts of logistics and attrition over an extended time.  A campaign model 
can capture the effects of larger battles and Dupuy’s campaign.   
A strategic model captures the impacts of battles and campaigns over months or 
years.  This proposed definition of campaign and strategic models facilitates the ability to 
view the impacts of intrastate warfare, international terrorism, fourth generation warfare, 
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or the ‘long war.’  Figure II-8 presents this hierarchy, along with the appropriate time 
measure.  Figure II-9 relates Dupuy’s levels of combat and the proposed hierarchy of 
combat models. 
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Days
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Figure II-8: Hierarchy of Combat Models 
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Figure II-9: Relationship of Level of Combat and Hierarchy of Combat Models 
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The traditional definitions of the hierarchy of models consider the level of detail 
and aggregation of entities as the defining attribute.  This can be seen as the fidelity of 
forces within the model.  The weakness of the traditional paradigm is that models which 
incorporate details of an adversary’s decision process and the impacts of our actions over 
time is considered an engineering level model because of the detail required to model the 
influences of the adversary.  Models of an adversary’s decision making process obviously 
provide insight and support to the campaign and strategic plans and, as such, should be 
considered campaign/ strategic models.  The descriptions of the hierarchy of combat 
models do not contradict the current hierarchy; however, they add the engineering and 
strategic level models and focus on the primary measurement of the event instead of the 
level of aggregation and the size/ type of entities.  Therefore, both paradigms can and do 
exist simultaneously to describe combat models. 
Discrete Event Simulation 
Law and Kelton define discrete event simulation as “the modeling of a system as 
it evolves over time by a representation in which the state variables change 
instantaneously at separate points in time” (2000, p. 6).  Many of today’s combat models 
can be characterized as discrete event simulations.  These include THUNDER, STORM, 
CEM, TACWAR and JWARS, among others.  (THUNDER and STORM are the leading 
campaign models used by the US Air Force.  CEM is used by the US Army Center for 
Army Analysis.  TACWAR is the official campaign model of the Joint Staff.  JWARS is 
a next generation campaign model under development by Joint Forces Command). 
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Kelton, Sadowski and Sadowski suggest nine elements of discrete event 
simulations:  Entities, Attributes, Resources, Queues, (Global) Variables, Statistical 
Accumulators, Events, Simulation Clock, and Starting and Stopping (2002, p. 24-28).  An 
entity is the first common piece of a discrete event simulation.  The entity is created by 
the user or the model.  The entity has specific attributes which gives the entity individual 
characteristics.  As the entity moves through the system, resources are expended.  The 
waiting for, and consumption of, these resources creates queues within the system.  
Additionally, variables are globally changed within the system. 
Statistical accumulators are used to measure the status of the attributes, variables, 
and queues.  Events are the time that a change to variables, entities, and attributes occurs 
within the simulation.  The time of the event is tracked by the simulation clock.  This is 
not a continuous clock but a time sequential list of events.  Finally, the simulation must 
have starting and stopping conditions.   
Banks lists thirteen advantages of discrete event simulations (1998, p. 10-12).  
Ten of these thirteen advantages are inherit in modeling a system, regardless of the tool 
being used.  However, three of Banks’ advantages are more directly related to discrete 
event simulation as opposed to some other methodologies.  First, discrete event 
simulations can compress and expand time.  The time clock within a simulation can be 
altered to investigate specific events in great detail or increased so the impact over 
days/weeks/months/years can be investigated.   
Next, discrete event simulations can be used to identify constraints.  Simulations 
can reveal the bottlenecks within complex systems.  This can assist in revealing the 
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causes of delays.  Discrete event simulation modeling and data collection of queues is 
specifically significant.   
Finally, discrete event simulation can help visualize the interactions within the 
analysis.  Most modern simulations have animation features which allow the users to 
visualize the events but generally require smaller time slices.  The focus of a discrete 
event simulation, however, is generally the actions at the event instead of the entirety of 
the system. 
As suggested earlier, most combat models have traditionally been implemented as 
discrete event simulations.  The advantages and flexibility of discrete event simulations 
have allowed an array of applications of combat to be modeled by this approach, from the 
high fidelity engineering-level models to the lower-fidelity campaign-level models. 
System Dynamics 
Forrester defines a system as a “grouping of parts that operate together for a 
common purpose” (1968, p. 1-1).  This grouping can include the parts, people, and/or 
resources required of the system.  A system of combat might include the equipment, 
troops, leaders, and supplies of both sides of the battle.  Sweetser states that “dynamics 
refers to change over time.  System dynamics is, therefore, a methodology used to 
understand how systems change over time” (1999, p. 2).  The system dynamics society 
defines system dynamics as the “methodology for studying and managing complex 
feedback systems” (SDS, 2006, p. 1).  
Forrester discusses two types of systems, ‘open’ and ‘feedback’ (1968, p. 1-5).  
An open system takes inputs and produces an output that does not influence future inputs.  
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A feedback system, or closed system, uses the outputs of one cycle to affect inputs for 
future cycles of decisions.  The feedback can be seen as positive feedback (where an 
action produces more actions) or negative feedback (where the system seeks a goal).  
Thus, a system with feedback is preferred when decisions are made by decision makers 
which rely on the past performance or can affect functions integral to future decisions.  
This is clearly a trait of combat.  The modern commander is aware of the current position 
of troops, material, force strengths, and outcomes which are feedback from the previous 
time period of combat.  Additionally, the current decision impacts future locations of 
troops and material and therefore future options and decisions. 
A system dynamics model changes in a transient nature rather than at an event.  
This implies that the system is continuous in both states and variables.  Thus, the rate of 
effectiveness is continuously changing over time rather than held at a constant until the 
next event which changes the rate occurs.  A final attribute of system dynamics models is 
their non-linear nature; the model can capture effects which are more than additive.  
The concepts of levels and rates drive system dynamics models.  When a system 
is at rest, the levels are the amount of materials and supplies that are present 
(Forrester, 1961, p. 68).  This might be viewed in a combat model as the number of 
troops, equipment, or material present at any point during the model.  The rates are the 
instantaneous flows of materials and items rather than time stepped increments in discrete 
event simulations (Forrester, 1961, p. 69).  The rates of flow can depend upon levels 
determined within the model.  Additionally, information about the levels must be 
communicated to adjust the “valve” which controls the rate of flows within the model.  
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Figure II-10 is a representation of a system dynamics model of saving money with 
positive feedback presented by Kirkwood (2005, p. 10).   
SAVINGS INTEREST
INTEREST RATE 
Figure II-10: System Dynamics Model of Savings 
The Savings is a level and is indicated by a square container.  Interest is a 
decision function that is represented by a valve.  The valve controls the rate of flow into 
Savings from Interest which is represented as the double arrow.  Finally, the Interest is 
dependent upon the current level of Savings and the Interest Rate.  This dependency is 
identified by the single arrows.  The Interest causes a rate to change the amount of the 
Savings.  Assuming an initial Savings level of $100 and an Interest Rate of 5% per year, 
the positive feedback and growth of the system can be observed. 
System dynamics models can easily be adjusted by the decision maker to test new 
and different scenarios (Sweetser, 1999, p. 1).  This includes adding new linkages and 
feedback loops to the system.  Additionally, system dynamics models are designed to 
model continuous processes rather than discrete events (Sweetser, 1999, p. 2).  The flow 
of battle can certainly be seen as a continuous event.  
System dynamics models are able to represent “softer” qualitative aspects, such as 
behavior.  These aspects can be difficult to model in a discrete event simulation.  Coyle 
states, “system dynamics, however and rightly, is strategic in orientation and it is often 
seen as necessary to introduce ‘soft’ variables” (2000, p. 227).  Examples of these softer 
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variables include: consumer satisfaction, chaos, suffering, and other human activities 
(Aracil, 1999, p. 5).  For further information regarding the use of system dynamics to 
model the qualitative effects and the softer aspects see Aracil (1999), Coyle (2000), and 
Forrester (1994), among others.  The application of qualitative aspects is pertinent to 
combat since such drivers as morale, training, and leadership are all qualitative concepts 
which historically have been difficult to model. 
Another feature of system dynamics models, similar to complex adaptive systems, 
is these models are focused on the internal dynamics of the individual system.  The 
evolution of the system is more important than the specific event that precipitated the 
solution (Sweetser, 1999, p. 3).  This concept is also valued in combat modeling, as the 
solution or victory may be less important than the path to achieve the victory in a 
modeling analysis. 
A final advantage of system dynamics models is the choice of time step does not 
impact the results.  This allows the modeler to focus on the interactions within the model 
and not the size of the time step to get the required level of detail. 
Regression Models 
 This section provides an introduction to simple linear regression models, multiple 
linear regression models and logistic regression models. 
Least Square Linear Regression Models 
Least square regression models fit a relationship of one or more independent 
factors to a dependent factor.  In this dissertation, simple linear regression models 
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(Equation II-1) and multiple linear regression (Equation II-2) analyses are applied.  The 
regression coefficients are βi and the independent variables are xi.   
 0 1 1y= + ·xβ β ε+  (II-1) 
 0 1 1 ny= · = + · + + · nx x xβ ε β β β ε′ + +"  (II-2) 
The errors (ε) are assumed to have a mean of zero, all have the same (but 
unknown) variance, and be uncorrelated (Montgomery, Peck, & Vining:, 2001, p. 13).   
Least squares estimates can be used to estimate the regression coefficients (βi) 
(Montgomery, Peck, & Vining:, 2001, p. 71).  The regression analysis results used 
throughout this dissertation are presented in an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) table.  
Some of the definitions, assumptions and interpretations are discussed next. 
The coefficient of determination, or R2, measures the amount of variation present 
in the response after the accounting for the independent variables (Hughes & Grawoig, 
1971, p. 344).  As more factors are added to the model, an adjusted R2 is preferred since 
it accounts for the degrees of freedom of the associated model.  When the R2 and adjusted 
R2 are close to one, this implies most of the variability of the response is explained by the 
regression model (Montgomery, Peck, & Vining:, 2001, p. 40).  The standard error of the 
model, or Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) is the square root of the mean squared error.  
Since the models in this dissertation are used to predict the public support for a 
conflict, the Prediction Error Sum of Squares (PRESS) statistic and R2Prediction are 
included in the ANOVA tables.  The PRESS statistic is a measure of the prediction 
quality of the model.  It is defined as 
2
( )
1
ˆ
n
i i
i
y y
=
⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦∑ where  is the ith predicted 
response when the regression is performed without the ith respective data points 
( )ˆ iy
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(Montgomery, Peck, & Vining: 2001, p. 152).  The R2Prediction is defined as 
1 TotalPRESS SS− , where SSTotal is the total sum of squares from the ANOVA table.  
R2Prediction ‘explains’ the percent of variability in predicting new observations 
(Montgomery, Peck, & Vining: 2001, p. 153).  Similar to R2, a R2Prediction close to one is 
highly desired. 
The null hypothesis for the F-test is that all of the coefficients are equal to zero 
(H0: βi = 0 ∀ i ; Ha: βi ≠ 0 some at least one i).  If the observed F-test statistic is larger 
than the appropriate reference value from the F-distribution, then the null hypothesis is 
rejected (indicating at least one regression coefficient is significant).   
The null hypothesis used in the analysis for each variable was that the regression 
coefficient equaled zero (H0: βi = 0; Ha: βi ≠ 0).  The magnitude of the t-test statistic was 
compared to the appropriate reference value from the two-sided t-distribution with 
α = 0.05.  The null hypothesis was rejected if the magnitude is greater than the critical 
value (implying a coefficient other than zero), or failed to reject (implying there was 
insufficient evidence to support the coefficient is not zero). 
For further details on linear regression analyses see Hughes & Grawoig (1971), 
Neter et al. (1996), or Montgomery, Peck, & Vining (2001) among others. 
Logistic Regression Models 
Montgomery, Peck, and Vining provide some benefits of using generalized linear 
models (GLMs).  First, GLMs unify both linear and non-linear techniques.  Second, the 
assumptions and requirements that the data are normal and have constant variance are no 
longer required.  Finally, the responses only need to be a member of the exponential 
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family.  This broader category includes all exponential, gamma, normal, Poisson, and 
binomial distributions (Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 2001, p. 443).  Specifically, 
multivariate logistic regression is used in this study to model public support.  The logistic 
regression model was chosen after exploring the Poisson distribution, because the survey 
data used in the study are binary.  Equation II-3 is the basic multivariate logistic 
regression model.   
 1( )
1 1
x
x x
eE y
e e
β
β β
′
′ ′−= =+ +  (II-3) 
 The method of maximum likelihood is used to estimate the parameters.  The 
expected responses for each observation are therefore ( )iE y pi= .  A link function is used 
to transform the basic model to a linear model.  This link for the binomial model is 
known as the logit function and presented in Equation II-4. 
 ( ) ln
1
pg x x
p
β⎛ ⎞ ′= =⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠  (II-4) 
 Deviance is used to measure the goodness of fit.  Equation II-5 is presented by 
Collett to evaluate the deviance of a binary logistic model (2003, p. 67).  The deviance 
measures the difference of log of the likelihood function of the saturated model and the 
fitted model. 
 (
1
ˆ ˆ2 log log 1
ˆ1
n
i
i
i i
pDev y p
p=
= − + −−∑ )i  (II-5) 
The goodness of fit is evaluated by comparing the deviance of the model to a χ2 
with (n - p) degrees of freedom.  If Dev > χ2(n-p) then the model is not adequate.  There are 
two possible reasons for this inadequacy (Collett, 2003, p. 195).  The first explanation is 
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that the model requires additional factors to be included or the factors which are included, 
need to be transformed to better represent the data.  The second reason the deviance is 
high could be that the data is overdispersed or has extra binomial variation.   
Overdispersion is present when the actual variance is greater than the expected 
variance.  Since a binomial was used for the data analyzed in this study, the variance is 
based directly on the mean.  This direct connection between mean and variance is not the 
best representation of the data.  
Lambert and Roeder developed a simple diagnostic for indicating a logistic 
regression model with overdispersion.  Their test plotted the binomial probability (p) to 
the convexity of the binomial plot represented by 1
1
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−
=
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(Lambert & Roeder, 1995, p. 1226).  If the resulting curve is convex, then the model has 
overdispersion.   
Williams provided the following procedure to evaluate the overdispersion 
factor,φ  (Williams, 1982, p. 146): 
1) Let overdispersion factor φ =0 and all weights wi=1, evaluate the Pearson 
deviance (χ2) of the saturated model (all possible factors), 
where ( )( )
2
2
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆ1
n
i i i i
i i i i
w y n p
Pearson Deviance
n p p
χ
=
−= = −∑ . 
2) Compare χ2 with χ2(n-p) where n is the number of binomial observations and p is 
the number of parameters of the fitted model.  If χ2 is unacceptably large, 
conclude φ >0 and estimate 
( )
( )( )
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i i i i
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∑
, where 
and di is the ith diagonal element of the variance-covariance 
matrix. 
(1i )i i iv n p p= −
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3) Let the new weights be, ( )( ) 1ˆ1 1i iw n φ −= + −  and estimate β and recalculate χ2. 
4) If χ2 is close to the degrees of freedom (n - p) quit, else recalculate φˆ  and 
return to step 3. 
 
 After correcting a model for dispersion, the deviance can no longer be used to 
check overall adequacy of the model.  This is because the deviance has been adjusted to 
be close to the degrees of freedom within of the model.   
This section provided an introduction to generalized linear models and 
overdispersion.  For more detailed please see Montgomery, Peck, and Vining (2001) or 
Collett (2003). 
Lanchester Laws 
 This section is divided into three subsections.  The first provides a background to 
the Lanchester Laws.  The second is a discussion of the direct and area fire applications 
of the Lanchester Laws.  The final subsection demonstrates how the Lanchester Laws 
have been applied to insurgency warfare. 
Lanchester’s Work 
Beginning on September 4, 1914, Lanchester published a series of sixteen weekly 
articles entitled “Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm.”  The fifth and sixth 
articles, printed on October 2nd and 9th are the foundations of the Lanchester Laws.  A 
brief summary is provided in this section.  MacKay provides an excellent mathematical 
summary of the Lanchester Laws (MacKay, 2006, p. 17). 
Lanchester begins by proposing that the ancient battle was comprised of several 
individual duels.  Lanchester states that in an ancient battle there is “little or no 
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importance” between a battle of 1000 Blue forces versus 1000 Red forces and 500 Blue 
forces versus 500 Red forces (1914, p. 422).  These two battles result in the same 
victorious side depending only on the individual fighting value and not numerical 
strength of the forces.  Although the equations were never directly listed, Taylor and 
others suggest that Lanchester could mathematically represent his statements of the linear 
ancient battle as Equation II-6 (Taylor, 1983a, p. 54). 
 dR cE
dB k
= =  (II-6) 
where, B and R are the number of Blue and Red forces engaged, c and k are the individual 
fighting values for the Red and Blue forces (better known as the Red / Blue attrition 
coefficients), and E is the exchange ratio.  Equation II-6 can be integrated and rewritten 
as the Lanchester Linear Law, Equation II-7 (Taylor, 1983a, p. 54).. 
 0 0[ ( )] [ (k R R t c B B t)]− = −  (II-7) 
Equation II-7 assumes R0 and B0 are the initial sizes of the Red and Blue forces, and B(t) 
and R(t) are the number of loses for Blue and Red forces, respectively, at time t. 
 The Linear Law can also be demonstrated as the Area Fire Equation  
(Equation II-8): 
 
dB R B c
dt
dR R B k
dt
= − × ×
= − × ×
 (II-8) 
 The Area Fire Equations have been used to describe the effectiveness of attritting 
an enemy’s army by shooting into any area as opposed to directly targeting an individual.  
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This characterizes both the impacts of artillery and shooting in the direction of a non-
tracked target. 
Taylor provides the following example as an application of the Lanchester Linear 
Law.  For this example, let there initially be one hundred Red forces (R0 = 100), and let 
k = c, thus the exchange ratio is one (E=1).  Additionally, let the initial number of Blue 
forces (B0) increase from 100 to 300 in increments of 50.  Solving for the size of Blue’s 
forces surviving ( 0 ( )fB B B t= − ) when all Red forces are annihilated ( ) 
provides the results given in 
( ) 100R t =
Table II-8. 
Table II-8: Ancient Warfare Example (Taylor, 1983a, p. 56) 
B0 100 150 200 250 300
Bf 0 50 100 150 200
Blue losses 100 100 100 100 100
* Fighting continues until Rf = 0 
 
Lanchester provides a description of ancient battle to introduce the idea that 
modern battle is a result of a concentration of resources as opposed to a series of duels.  
The concentration of forces allows for a single target to be attacked from multiple sources 
and thus is no longer a simple duel.  However, when it is assumed that the forces have 
equal individual fighting values, “the number of men knocked out per unit time will be 
directly proportional to the numerical strength of the opposing force” (Lanchester, 1914, 
p. 422).  Lanchester provides the following two equations as mathematical 
representations of the preceding statement (Equation II-9); when integrated, these are 
now referred to as the Lanchester Square Laws (Equation II-10) (Taylor, 1983a, p. 61). 
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 dB R c
dt
dR B k
dt
= − ×
= − ×
 (II-9) 
  (II-10) 2 2 2 20 0[ ( )] [ ( )]k R R t c B B t− = −
Using the same assumptions from Taylor’s Lanchester Linear Law example, Table II-9 
presents the impact of concentration of forces determined by solving the Lanchester 
Square Law. 
Table II-9: Modern Warfare Example (Taylor, 1983a, p. 62) 
B0 100 150 200 250 300
Bf 0 112 173 229 283
Blue losses 100 38 27 21 17 
* Fighting continues until Rf = 0 
 
Taylor explains the Lanchester Laws can be used to answer the following seven questions 
for previous generations of warfare: 
1. Who will “win”?  Be annihilated? 
 
2. What force ratio is required to guarantee victory? 
 
3. How many survivors will the winner have? 
 
4. How long will be battle last? 
 
5. How do the force levels change over time? 
 
6. How do the parameters [i.e. initial force levels, b0 and r0, and the attrition-
rate coefficients, c and k] affect the outcome of battle? 
 
7. Is concentration of forces a good tactic? (Taylor, 1983a, p. 65-66) 
 
These are broad questions whose answers are applicable to a battle where political 
objective is achieved by attritting or annihilating the enemy’s forces.   The equations for 
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the solutions of each of these questions are found directly from the Lanchester Linear and 
Square Laws.    
It is important to note that the Lanchester Laws were also developed 
independently by Osipov in 1915 (Helmbold, 1993 p. 279).  The work by Osipov begins 
with a comparison of the casualties of 38 battles spanning from 1805 until 1905 (Osipov, 
1915/1995, p. 296).  Osipov states that a mathematical model of the casualties can be 
made by inversely relating the remaining strengths to the initial strengths.  He provides 
Equation II-11, where A and B are the initial strengths of each side and A′ and B′ are the 
remains strength of forces at a specific time (Osipov, 1915/1995, p. 299). 
 2 2 2A B A B′ ′ 2− = −  (II-11) 
Osipov adds that the effectiveness of each side impacts the outcome of the battle.  Osipov 
includes two factors α and β, which “are the hits caused by riflemen on sides A and B in 
one unit of time” (1915/1995, p. 302).  Osipov includes these factors into Equation II-11 
yielding the new expression for casualties, Equation II-12. 
 2 2 2 2( ) (A A B Bα β )′ ′− = −  (II-12) 
Equation II-12, with variable and parameter substitutions, is equivalent to the Lanchester 
Square Law in Equation II-10.  Osipov continues by providing a method to include the 
impacts of machine guns and artillery.  This enables the work to move from a 
homogenous to a heterogeneous study of combat.  Osipov showed Equation II-13 
determines the number of riflemen casualties given A riflemen and M cannons for one 
side, and B riflemen and N cannons for the other side, with α being the rate of kill of the 
riflemen and β being the rate of kill of the cannons (1915/1995, p. 303). 
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2 2 2
A M A M B N B Nβ β βα α α
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛′+ − + = + − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝
2β
α
⎞′ ⎟⎠  (II-13) 
If a = A – A′ and b = B – B′, then Equation II-13 can be reduced to a more familiar 
Lanchester representation, Equation II-14, which is the Lanchester Law for multiple 
weapons (Osipov, 1915/1995, p. 303).  
 2 2 2 2( ) ( ) 2 ( )A A B B aM bNβα′ ′− = − − −  (II-14) 
Modeling Area and Direct Fire 
The Lanchester Laws, originally representing ancient and more modern warfare, 
evolved into representing area and direct fire weapons.  Fortunately, the analyst may not 
have to choose between the two laws but instead can use a combination.  Helmbold 
expanded the Lanchester Laws by representing both the Linear and Square Laws in one 
general form given in Equation II-15 (1965, p. 858). 
 
1
1
w
w
dB Bc R
dt R
dR Rk B
dt B
−
−
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (II-15) 
When the Weiss parameter (w) equals 1, the Lanchester Square Law results.  
Similarly, when w = 1/2, the result is a form of the Lanchester Linear Law.  Additionally, 
when w = 0 the expression in Equation II-15 describes the Lanchester Logarithmic Laws.  
The Lanchester Logarithmic Laws are typically used to describe the number of casualties 
of non-fighting participants, such as the doctors, chaplains, and headquarters staff 
(Helmbold, 1965, p. 858). 
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Bracken introduced a tactical parameter to the Lanchester Laws in “Lanchester 
Models of the Ardennes Campaign.”  This parameter has been used by authors, since its 
introduction, to better fit the Lanchester Laws to historical battles (See Chen and Chu 
(2001), Lucas and Turkes (2004), and Hung et al. (2005)).   
Starting from the general form of the Lanchester Laws (Equation II-15), Bracken 
added a tactical parameter, d, and rewrote w in terms of p and q, where p + q = 1, to result 
in Equation II-16 (Bracken, 1995, p. 419). 
 
( 1 )
(1 )
p q
p q
dB c d or d R B
dt
dR k d or d B R
dt
=
=
 (II-16) 
The Red and Blue exponent parameters (p and q) are able to model the linear laws, 
square laws and the continuous range between.  When p = q = 0.5 the linear laws result, 
and when p = 1 and q = 0 the square laws result. 
Bracken’s tactical parameter was used as a constant d for the defending force and 
1/d for the attacking force.  The parameter switched when the attacking force changed 
during the battle.  When d < 1 the defender receives less casualties and when d > 1 the 
defender receives more casualties.  Bracken (1995), Chen and Chu (2001), Lucas and 
Turkes (2004), and Hung et al. (2005) all showed the data of the Ardennes Campaign 
(Battle of the Bulge) and the Battle of Kursk could be better fit using Bracken’s Tactical 
Parameter, d.  During both of these battles, the attacking force changed. 
Regardless of the source, Bracken’s parameter suggests a means to capture the 
impacts of will-to-fight of the troops when they are attacking or defending.  This 
approach to incorporate the will and morale of the troops works effectively only for true 
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attrition based battles found in interstate conflicts and some intrastate conflicts.  For 
example, this method works for a Korean conflict but was not a good fit for historical 
data from Bosnia or Somalia.  The alliance battles in Bosnia and Somalia did not involve 
large force on force engagements; therefore, a turning point as required by Bracken’s 
Tactical Parameter did not exist.  While not applicable to all conflicts, the methodology 
of incorporating a morale/will factor, as well as the attrition coefficient is valid.   
Modeling Insurgencies 
 Deitchman published an early article applying the Lanchester Laws to insurgent 
warfare (Taylor, 1983b, p. 446).  This article, entitled “A Lanchester Model of Guerrilla 
Warfare,” focused on the force ratios and size of the guerrilla bands versus the 
conventional/regular army.  Deitchman suggests that an ambush set by the guerrillas is 
best described by the guerrillas attacking by direct fire, while the conventional army 
returns fire into an area or using indirect fire.  Equation II-17 describes this engagement, 
where x1 is the number of guerrillas, x2 is the number of conventional forces, 1x and 2x are 
the rate of change of force size over time, A = r2 Ae2/ A1 (where r2 is the rate of fire of the 
conventional army, Ae2 is the conventional army’s single round area effectiveness, and A1 
is the area that the guerrillas are hiding) and b = r1p12 (where r1 is the rate of fire of the 
guerrilla’s weapons, and p12 is the single shot probability of kill of the guerrilla’s 
weapons) (Deitchman, 1962, p. 821). 
 1
2 1
2 1x Ax x
x bx
= −
= −

  (II-17) 
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Equation II-18 is the condition for equality given these circumstances (Deitchman, 1962, 
p. 821). 
 
0
2
1 2
A
02
x x
b
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (II-18) 
Deitchman continues his analysis of guerrilla warfare by demonstrating that  
Equation II-18  implies that the regular forces must have a significantly favorable force 
ratio to be able to win against the guerrillas.  Unfortunately, the area fire weapons may 
only slightly improve the capabilities of the regular forces, since the rate of fire is 
reduced (Deitchman, 1962, p. 824).   
Deitchman justifies his results with historical data arguing that the lower the force 
ratio, the more likely it is that the guerrillas win the conflict.  Figure II-11 illustrates the 
outcome of guerrilla warfare since World War II up to the publication of Deitchman’s 
work in 1962 correlated to the force ratio of regular forces versus guerrilla forces.    
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Figure II-11: Estimated Force Ratios in Guerrilla Wars (Deitchman, 1962, Figure 2 Page 821) 
Deitchman indicates significant limitations to his methodology at the beginning of the 
article: 
This analysis neglects many important factors in guerrilla-counterguerrilla 
operations, particularly the effect of the attitude and support of the local 
population, for which the two sides must contend by political, economic, and 
psychological as well as military means. (Deitchman, 1962, p. 819) 
 
This dissertation directly improves upon these limitations. 
Schaffer, in his RAND research paper entitled Lanchester Models of Guerrilla 
Engagements, continued Deitchman’s research.  He specifically modeled three categories 
of guerrilla warfare; skirmishes, ambushes, and sieges.  Schaffer begins with a general 
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form of the Lanchester Laws for the number of casualties, c, of each side m and n (1967, 
p. 5).   
Equation II-19 presents this formulation, where kn (t,m)n=knmn when the linear 
law is appropriate and kn (t,m)n=knn when the square law is appropriate.  The 
term  represents the use of supporting fire within the Lanchester Laws. ( , ) ( )
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Schaffer continues with two assumptions about the rate of surrender and desertion 
with the model (1967, p. 6).  First, the expected values for the rates can be developed in a 
similar manner and thus they can be added together.  Second, the rate of surrender and 
desertion is based on the rate of casualties and the difference between the force ratio and 
one.  Schaffer postulates the rates can be represented as the power series (Equation II-20), 
where am, an, bm, bn, cm and cn are all coefficients representing the discipline and morale 
of the troops (1967, p. 6).   
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Equation II-20 assumes the rates 
s d
dm
dt +
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ and s d
dn
dt +
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ must be less than zero, am 
and an also must be less than or equal to zero, and if the force ratio m/n is greater than 
one, then  (similarly if n/m > 1, then0
im
c = 0
in
c = ).   
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Schaffer then combines the casualty, surrender, and desertion rates to reduce the 
power series to only first and second order terms to get the generalized attrition 
equations, Equation II-21. 
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Equation II-21 still requires and 0dm dn
dt dt
< , and 0m nb b ≤ , and if 1mn > , then 
(similarly 0mc = 1nm > , ). 0nc =
Schaffer first investigates skirmishes.  He defines skirmishes as where the 
riflemen on each side are engaged in aimed fire (Schaffer, 1967, p. 9).  Since aimed fire 
is considered on both sides, Equation II-21 reduces to Equation II-22.  
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 Assuming there are more m forces than n forces and no supporting fire,  
Equation II-22 further reduces to Equation II-23 (Schaffer, 1967, p. 13). 
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 Schaffer next models the ambush.  Similar to Deitchman, Schaffer assumed the 
ambushee initially engages in area fire.  However, as the battle continues, the ambushee 
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transfers to aimed fire (Schaffer, 1967, p. 24).  The ambushers use aimed fire during the 
entire engagement.  Schaffer assumes that at the start of the engagement the ambusher 
has little motivation to desert or surrender and that at a predetermined time, tc, they 
typically begin removing their forces from the battle to prevent undue attrition.   
Equation II-24 represents Schaffer’s formulation of this exchange, where H represents a 
unit step function, indicating the combat strength of the ambushers remaining in the fight 
at time t (Schaffer, 1967, p. 25): 
 ( )( ) 1n n c mc t c H t t H n
⎛ ⎞= − ⎜⎝ ⎠− ⎟  (II-24) 
The generalized attrition equations for the rate of attrition of the ambushed (m) 
and the ambusher (n) are presented as Equation II-25 (Schaffer, 1976, p. 25): 
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The final category of guerrilla warfare modeled by Schaffer is the siege.  The 
siege takes place in two stages (Schaffer, 1967, p. 39).  The first stage employs the 
support weapons when the riflemen are out of range.  This is used to prepare the 
battlefield.  Unfortunately it does compromise the element of surprise.  The second stage 
is the engagement of riflemen.  Sieges can either involve both stages or only one stage.  
For the first stage of the siege, the generalized attrition equation, Equation II-21, can be 
reduced to Equation II-26 (Schaffer, 1967, p. 40). 
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 The second stage of a siege can be represented as Equation II-27 where 
nK
P is the 
probability of kill of the weapon used by side n, n mA
m
γ  is the average time for a troop to 
acquire a target and 
mf
t is the time to fire on a target (Schaffer, 1967, p. 45). 
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Schaffer’s work is continued in the 1969 RAND research paper, Application of 
Lanchester Theory to Insurgency Problems.  This paper includes applications, data and 
conclusions about skirmishes and ambushes from the Vietnam conflict.   
Over the last one hundred years a great deal of development of the Lanchester 
Laws has occurred.  This discussion was limited to the development of the initial theory 
and the progression of that theory as applied to guerrilla and insurgency warfare.  It is 
important to note that in most of the work presented the attrition coefficients are assumed 
to be static and not dependent upon the current conditions within the model.  Therefore, it 
has been assumed that the parameters do not change within the battle.  The Bracken 
tactical parameter was the one of the few occurrences in the literature where the attrition 
coefficients were adjusted based on current conditions within the conflict.  Additionally, 
it could be concluded that since only one battle/ campaign is modeled that this must be 
the decisive battle of the war.  No dynamic impacts of the previous battles, or future 
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influences from the modeled battle, are directly accounted for within the reviewed 
Lanchester Laws.  
Modeling Will-to-Fight, Morale, and Combat Spirit 
While much has been written about how warfare is changing; a resilient aspect is 
the permanence that warfare directly attacks the will-to-fight.  This was known in Sun 
Tzu’s time and can be seen in the emphasis of information operations and recent creation 
of Air Force Cyber Command.  This section discusses the will-to-fight and morale of the 
combatant as related to combat effectiveness.  The discussion thus far has included some 
means to incorporate the will-to-fight, morale and combat spirit into combat models.  
Bracken added a tactical parameter to the Lanchester Laws.  This parameter gave an 
advantage to the attacker during a battle.  When correlating the Lanchester model to 
historical data, Bracken’s parameter was used as a free variable to best fit the casualties 
of the battle.  His parameter was not determined dynamically by the model.  Additionally, 
the value and impact was predetermined only for the time the parameter (or its inverse) 
was applied.   
Schaffer introduced the coefficients of am, an, bm, bn, cm and cn which all 
representing the discipline and morale of the troops (1967, p. 25).  Schaffer also 
introduces the parameter, tc, which indicated the time that the ambushers begin 
withdrawing their troops from battle (1967, p. 6).  All of Schaffer’s parameters were 
determined prior to the model being run and were static during the model’s application.   
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Neither Bracken nor Schaffer related the values of their parameters to the actions 
and events within the model.  This is acceptable for a single, short battle but is not 
applicable in the longer durations required for campaign and strategic level models.   
The impacts of combat degradation and unit deterioration are discussed in the first 
subsection.  The conclusions of Marshall are presented and discussed.  This subsection on 
degradation and deterioration includes the impacts of ineffective combatants, the 
differences between training versus active combat, and how the factors can be 
implemented in the Lanchester Laws.  Next, Perry’s civil stability index accounts for the 
impacts of the population will within a combat model.  The civil stability index 
subsection is followed by a discussion of how morale has been incorporated within the 
modern campaign models, specifically the Joint Warfare System (JWARS).  The final 
subsection discuss how morale has been previously modeled.  This discussion begins by 
presenting the individual components of combat spirit, and concludes with a discussion 
on how morale of the troops changes while they are deployed. 
Combat Degradation 
The ideas of morale and combat spirit have refined over the years.  During World 
War One, ‘shell shock’ was considered a physical injury as opposed to a mental 
restriction, since men did not suffer from mental deficiencies.  “At first, doctors in the 
UK proposed an organic explanation: either a microscopic cerebral hemorrhage caused 
by the concussive or toxic effects of an exploding shell” (Jones & Wessely, 2007, 
p. 167). 
 69
Marshall investigated the psychological aspects of war in his book: Man Against 
Fire.  He interviewed World War Two and later Korean combatants immediately after 
battle and reported remarkable trends about the willingness of combatants to actually 
engage the enemy.  Marshall found that a number of combatants did not fire at the 
enemy.   
…not more than one quarter of his men will ever strike a real blow unless they 
are compelled by almost overpowering circumstance or unless all junior leaders 
consistently “ride heard” on troops with the specific mission of increasing their 
fire. 
 
The 25 per cent stands even for the well trained and campaign-seasoned troops.  I 
mean that 75 per cent will not fire or will not persist in firing against the enemy 
and his works.  These men may face the danger but they will not fight. (Marshall, 
1947, p. 50) 
 
Marshall’s results indicate that the 25% that actually fought against the enemy 
varies based on the type of equipment the combatant carried.   
…we found that on an average not more than 15 per cent of the men had actually 
fired at the enemy positions of personnel with rifles, carbines, grenades, 
bazookas, BARs, or machine guns during the course of an entire  engagement.  
Even allowing for the dead and wounded, and assuming that in their number 
there would be the same proportion of active firers as among the living, the figure 
did not rise above 20 to 25 per cent of the total for any action. The best showing 
that could be made by the most spirited and aggressive companies was that one 
man in four had made at least some use of his firepower. (Marshall, 1947, p. 54) 
 
The assumption that the dead fired their weapons at the same rate as the surviving 
may be questioned.  Those that actively attacked/defended their position may have 
become targets because of their aggressiveness, and thus were killed.  Additionally, it 
could be argued the statistics quoted by Marshall included all the troops within the 
theater; it is not expected combat service support personnel regularly engage in combat 
operations.  Marshall counters this latter argument stating: 
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Most of the actions had taken place under conditions of ground and maneuver 
where it would have been possible for at least 80 per cent of the men to fire, and 
where nearly all hands, at one time or another, were operating within satisfactory 
firing distance of enemy works. (Marshall, 1947, p. 54) 
 
It can therefore be seen that the percentage does include some number of supporting 
troops; however, all troops were within direct contact with the enemy, and capable of 
engaging the enemy.   
Chambers attempted to discredit Marshall’s claims in his article “S.L.A. 
Marshall’s Men Against Fire: New Evidence Regarding Fire Ratios.”  Through an 
interview with Frank J Brennan, Chambers concludes that Marshall may not have been 
very scientific in his data collection process.  Brennan was an escort officer for Marshall 
during some of Marshall’s post-battle interviews with troops during the Korean War 
(Chambers, 2003, p. 115).  When questioned whether Marshall asked the troops 
specifically about the firing their weapons, Brannan responded: 
I remember he brought up the question but that he did not push it in regard to the 
amount of firing.  That came up incidentally rather than as a result of a specific 
question from him.  He asked mostly open-ended questions to elicit information 
about what really occurred (Chambers, 2003, p. 117). 
 
Continuing the interview, Brennan said he discussed the conclusion in the book Men 
Against Fire with Marshall.  Brennan states: 
I asked him specifically whether those percentages of his 25 or 30 per cent of the 
men firing their weapons – were supportable.  He assured me that they were 
supportable talking to the soldiers of the time (Chambers, 2003, p. 117). 
 
By supportable, Brennan meant, “any attempt to quantify the percentage that he presented 
in his book” (Chambers, 2003, p. 117).  From the interview with Brannan, Chambers 
concludes that:  
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Marshall was unscientific in his methodology and that his figures about the 
percentage of troops firing their weapons were either sloppy, fabricated or simply 
guesswork. (Chambers, 2003, p. 119) 
 
While the methods used by Marshall may be contested, the original book, Men Against 
Fire, did cause many within the US Army to recognize that not all armed and able 
warfighters were engaging the enemy.  Additionally, the data used by Marshall was based 
originally on World War Two data and expanded to the Korean War.  Both of these 
conflicts involved a significant number of draftees as opposed to volunteer forces.  This 
factor was not included in Marshall’s analysis. 
Rowland’s paper “The Use of Historical Data in the Assessment of Combat 
Degradation” compared actual combat results to trials performed in training.  The results 
suggest an amount of force degradation that is experienced in battle (Rowland, 1987, 
p. 149).  Rowland used data from the US Civil War through the infantry battle of the 
Falklands in 1982.   
Rowland began by quantifying the effects of force ratio to the battle’s casualties.  
The horizontal axis of Figure II-12 indicates the force ratio of attacking to defending 
infantrymen.  The vertical axis is the effect of the rate of fire in terms of attacker 
casualties per defender.  Notice that both axes are logarithmic scale.  Rowland points out 
that at a 4:1 force ratio, the number of casualties is double the number when the force 
ratio is even (1:1) (Rowland, 1987, p. 150).   
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Figure II-12: Variation of Attack Casualties /Defense (Rowland, 1987, Figure 1 Page 151) 
Rowland then compared the rifle data from actual combat to the rifle data from the 
training trials.  The rifle data from the Boer Wars, US Civil War, and specific battles 
from World War I (Landrecies, Mons, and Neuve Chappelle) was used to create  
Figure II-13 (Rowland, 1987, p. 152).   
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Figure II-13: Comparison of Rifle Data (Rowland, 1987, Figure 3 Page 152) 
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Rowland notes the trends in the slopes between the trials and actual combat are 
similar; however, the specific data from over 47 battles is quite different than the trials.  
The actual battles indicate the number of attacker casualties per defender range from one 
tenth to one eighth of the trial data.  The data produced by Rowland does indicate support 
to S. L. A. Marshall’s claim that on average 15% of riflemen engage in combat 
(Rowland, 1987, p. 153).   
 Rowland continued the analysis by looking at machine-gun and artillery fire.  
These results again indicated degradation in the effectiveness of the actual battles when 
compared to the training trials.  Rowland’s paper concluded with Equation II-28, which 
was the defender’s casualties caused from small arms fire, where D is a factor for 
prepared/hasty positions, G is a constant for weapon type, Na is the number of attackers, 
Nd is the number of defenders, d is the preparatory bombardment density (lb/yd2), t is the 
duration of the preparatory bombardment, ta is the number of attacking armored fighting 
vehicles, and Ns is the number of defending machine guns and anti-tank guns (Rowland, 
1987, p. 161). 
 ( ) ( ) (0.68 0.5/ 1 exp 5.75 / 1 exp 1.1 /a d a sD G N N d t t N⎡ ⎤⋅ − − − − )⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦  (II-28) 
Civil Stability Index 
Perry created a tool useful in capturing the population’s morale.  In his thesis 
entitled, Modeling Operations Other Than War: Non-Combatants in Combat Modeling, 
Perry developed the Civil Stability Index (CSI).  This index is defined such that the lower 
values imply anarchy/instability.  Table II-10 provides subjective examples of the CSI 
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number for observable conditions.  Perry used this CSI within a model of MOOTW 
representing the influence of the population within his model.  
Table II-10: Sample CSI Value Representations (Perry, 1994, Table 1 Page 21) 
CSI Number Conditions 
0.15 Rwanda, April 1994 
0.25 LA Riots, 1992 
0.40 South Africa, March 1994 
0.50 Washington, D.C. Urban housing, after dark 
0.75 Average day in any European city 
0.85 Average day in a U.S. small town in the Midwest 
 
Perry proposed that specific thresholds of the CSI cause the model to alter its 
activities.  Table II-11 lists the CSI thresholds and associated activities his model 
performs.  The CSI is directly tied to the success of the conflict, effectiveness of 
weapons, and the number of guerrillas and potential guerrillas.   
Table II-11: Activity on Model Caused by CSI Thresholds (Perry, 1994, Table 2 Page 22) 
CSI Threshold Resulting Model Activities 
> 0.15  U.S. must cease offensive action 
> 0.20 Perform random draw each day against 10% chance that outside force required U.S. to withdraw from theater 
> 0.30 U.S. player prohibited from using area fire weapons 
> 0.40 Transfer 2% of unarmed civilian unit personnel to armed personnel for each day CSI is below 0.40 
< 0.60 Civilians prohibited from supporting rebels with log/intel 
< 0.65 Transfer 2% of armed personnel per civilian unit to unarmed personnel 
 
The CSI was updated based on the actions within the model.  This created a 
feedback loop common to system dynamics.  These updates were presented in the form 
of the rates found in Table II-12. 
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Table II-12: CSI Activities (Perry, 1994, Table 3 Page 22) 
CSI Change Impacts on CSI by Model Activities 
+0.01 Per delivery of logistical support to civilian unit 
+0.01 Per day without a starvation death 
+0.01 Per day without a combat death 
-0.00007 Per death due to starvation 
-0.0003 Per death due to direct combat 
-0.0001 Per death due to collateral damage 
-0.1 Per incident of terror attack 
-0.05 Per day of rioting, pro-rated % of day 
 
 The interactions of the CSI can be seen in Figure II-14.  Logistical support can 
only improve the CSI, while terror attacks and rioting only decreases the CSI value.  The 
absence of deaths increase the value of the CSI; however, each death due to starvation, 
direct combat, and collateral damage negatively affect the CSI.  All values in Tables II-10 
through II-12 were determined subjectively or as estimates to demonstrate the model 
(Perry, 1994, p. 21). 
Civil 
Stability 
Index
+ -
Logistical support Terror Attacks
Rioting
+ -
Starvation Deaths
Combat Deaths
- Direct or Collateral  
Figure II-14: Schematic of Impacts to CSI 
Table II-13 is an example provided by Perry indicating how the CSI was calculated at the 
beginning of each simulation day (Perry, 1994, p. 57).  In this example, combat had not 
begun; therefore, only the deaths due to starvation were included in the calculation. 
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Table II-13: Changes to CSI Due to Starvation (Perry, 1994, Table 12 Page 58) 
Node Units Casualties Old CSI Modifiers New CSI 
N1 R1 / W1 2 / 8 0.45 -0.00007 * 10 0.4493 
N2 R2 3 0.45 -0.00007 * 3 0.4498 
N3 B1 / B2 0 / 0 0.45 0 0.4500 
N6 W2 8 0.40 -0.00007 * 8 0.3998 
 
Using the CSI within a combat model provides the analyst an ability to connect the 
actions of the combatants to the public resolve for the conflict.  This provides 
justification for other events to occur within the model. 
Campaign Model Implementation (JWARS) 
Bross, in a technical report titled, Measuring the “Will to Fight” in Simulation, 
used the definitions of the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) to incorporate 
morale and leadership into the campaign model JWARS.  JWARS was used in 
conjunction with the Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulation (SEAS) model 
to adjust to actions with the models.  JWARS is a campaign level model which “has the 
capability to adjust the ability of the respective combatant forces by a variety of 
behavioral factors such as leadership, training, etc” (Bross, 2005, p. 2).  These factors are 
referred to by the JWARS community as ‘soft factors.’  SEAS “is an agent-based 
simulation that concentrates on the non-military aspects of social interaction” (Bross, 
2005, p. 2).  These models were used together during the war-game Unified Vision 04 
(UV04).  The goal of the experiment was to link the ‘will-to-fight’ attributes of SEAS to 
the JWARS morale and unit cohesion values.   
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Bross’ claim that JWARS is capable of adjusting the ability of combatants based 
on leadership and training does not imply a direct value within JWARS linking training 
to the combatant’s effectiveness.  The soft factors within JWARS are able to adjust five 
behaviors of troops used within JWARS.  These behaviors are:  
• Unit Rate of Direct Fire 
• Unit Speed of Maneuver 
• Unit Suppression of the Rate of Direct Fire 
• Unit Suppression of the Speed of Maneuver 
• Unit Breakpoints (Bross, 2005, p. 4) 
 
The five behaviors are impacted by factors associated to the country, unit function, and 
unit ranking.  The country factor is determined by a vector of sixteen country attributes 
defined by NGIC.  These attributes are presented in Table II-14. 
Table II-14: NGIC Country Attributes (Bross, 2005, Table 1 Page 5) 
Ability to Assimilate Joint and Combined Operations 
Air Defense Leadership 
Battle Command Maneuver 
Combat Experience Mobility and Survivability 
Combat Service Support Morale and Cohesion 
Combined Arms Operations Power Projection 
Fire Support Readiness 
Intelligence Training 
 
Bross only investigated the impact of the morale and cohesion attributes; 
however, when one attribute within JWARS is activated, they are all active.  The number 
used for the morale and cohesion attribute within JWARS is based on the score 
developed by NGIC.  This score is based on the evaluation of the sub-elements of morale 
and cohesion.  Table II-15 represents the sub-elements and score for an arbitrary 
adversary.   
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Table II-15: NGIC Morale and Cohesion Sub-elements (Bross, 2005, Table 2 Page 6) 
Level 
Service 
Officers 
& 
soldiers Pride 
Risk 
Soldiers 
& leaders Discipline Tension 
Ldr-Sub 
Loyalty 
Soldier 
Loyalty 
Unit 
Morale 
National 
Support 
10 
Serve in 
regiment 
or cohort 
All units 
have pride 
Share risk 
assumption 
All units 
highly 
disciplined 
Tension 
within units 
almost non-
existent 
High 
degree 
High 
degree Very high 
Very high 
degree 
9 Serve in same units 
90% + 
units have 
pride 
Share risk 
assumption 
90%+ units 
highly 
disciplined 
Tension 
within units 
almost non-
existent 
Reasonable 
degree 
High 
degree 
High in 
most 
units 
Moderately 
high degree 
8 Serve in same units 
Many 
units have 
pride 
Share risk 
assumption 
Many units 
highly 
disciplined 
Tension 
within units 
almost non-
existent 
Reasonable 
degree 
Reasonable 
degree 
Fairly 
good in 
most 
units 
High 
degree 
7 
Usually 
serve in 
same unit 
Many 
units have 
pride 
Sometimes 
share risk 
assumption 
Many units 
highly 
disciplined 
Tension 
within units 
minimal 
Some 
degree 
Reasonable 
degree 
Good in 
elite 
units; 
others 
fair 
Mostly 
supports 
6 
Sometimes 
serve in 
same units 
Some units 
have pride 
Sometimes 
share risk 
assumption 
Units 
generally 
disciplined 
Tension 
within units 
minimal 
Some 
degree 
Some 
degree 
Fair in 
most 
units 
Mostly 
supports; 
some 
dissidents 
do not 
5 
Sometimes 
serve in 
same units 
Some units 
have pride 
Sometimes 
share risk 
assumption 
Units 
generally 
disciplined 
Some 
tension 
within units 
Little 
degree 
Some 
degree 
Low in 
some 
units 
Nation 
supports; 
many 
dissidents 
do not 
4 
Sometimes 
serve in 
same units 
Few units 
have pride 
Sometimes 
share risk 
assumption 
Units 
generally 
disciplined 
Some 
tension 
within units 
Little 
degree 
Little 
degree 
Low in 
most 
units 
Nation 
tends to 
support; 
large 
minority 
does not 
3 
Sometimes 
serve in 
same units 
Few units 
have pride 
Risk 
assumption 
between 
soldiers & 
leaders 
unusual 
Units 
frequently 
lack 
discipline 
Some 
tension 
within units 
Little to no 
degree 
Little 
degree 
Low in 
all units 
Nation 
divided 
2 
Seldom 
serve in 
same units 
Few units 
have pride 
Risk 
assumption 
between 
soldiers & 
leaders 
unusual 
Units 
frequently 
lack 
discipline 
Frequent 
tension 
within units 
Little to no 
degree 
Little to no 
degree 
Low in 
most 
units; low 
desertion 
rate 
Nation does 
not support; 
some 
groups do 
1 
Seldom 
serve in 
same units 
Virtually 
all lack 
pride 
Risk 
assumption 
between 
soldiers & 
leaders 
almost non-
existent 
Absence of 
discipline 
Frequent 
tension 
within units 
Little to no 
degree 
Little to no 
degree 
Low in 
most 
units; 
high 
desertion 
rate 
Nation has 
no respect 
for military 
Score 8 6 3 7 5 7 6 7 9 
Average NGIC Factor = 6.4 
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Bross states that the columns associated with service officers and soldiers, pride, 
discipline, leader-sub loyalty, soldiers loyalty, and unit morale do not change during a 
short (20 day) conflict (2005, p. 7).  This implies that the columns associated with risk 
soldiers and leaders, tension, and national support are the only characteristics that could 
change during a short conflict.  
The unit function factor of JWARS divides the unit into one of three categories; 
combat, combat support, and combat service support.  A setting for each category is fixed 
globally (Bross, 2005, p. 7).  Since this is a global variable, it impacts all combatants 
equally.  Generally, the combat units have a factor of one.  The value of the combat 
support unit is less that the combat unit, and the value of the combat service support unit 
is less than the combat support unit. 
The unit ranking factor is the final contribution to the soft factors.  Again, each 
unit is considered to be in one of three categories.  It is assumed the unit is an elite, 
standard or militia unit.  The value for each follows a similar relation as the unit function 
factor and is again considered a global factor.  Thus, the value for elite unit is greater than 
the standard unit which is greater than the militia unit.  This greatly limits the capabilities 
of the model when comparing asymmetrical forces since the factors involving a 
conventional force being ambushed are not properly modeled. 
 Bross states Equation II-29 for the impact for each behavior where N is the county 
factor, R is the unit ranking factor and F is the unit function, the % subscript indicates the 
amount of influence of the factor on the total behavior (2005, p. 8). 
 ( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )% % %1 1 1 1 1 1BehaviorSF N N R R F F= − ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ −  (II-29) 
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Bross next restricted the investigation to only elite combat troops and so reduced 
Equation II-29 to Equation II-30 (2005, p. 8). 
 ( )( )( )%1 1BehaviorSF N N= − ⋅ −  (II-30) 
Bross concludes with an experimental design which changed the country 
attributes to impact the behaviors of the JWARS model.  Figure II-15 represents the Red 
and Blue troop losses as the Red soft factors are varied from ineffective to effective 
(Bross, 2005, p. 12).  The area indicated by the ripple on the chart suggests the possibility 
of an area Dewar et al. refers to as non-monotonic behavior.  If so, the results are chaotic 
in nature. 
BLUE
Ripple
UV04
Factor
Range
Blue - MEAN  
Figure II-15: Troop loses by Red Soft Factor (Bross, 2005, Figure 6 Page 12) 
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Bross concludes that the impact of the will-to-fight on combat outcomes within 
JWARS with the following statement: 
Combat outcomes vary significantly, both statistically and military, as the will to 
fight takes on different values.  Even more important for the analyst is the fact 
that these effects are strongly non-linear and evidenced primarily as interactions.  
This means that tracing cause-and-effects will be extremely difficult in the battles 
produced by the model, just as it is in real historical and operational analysis. 
The search for answers will be more time consuming rather than quick due to this 
level of complexity. (Bross, 2005, p. 19) 
 
 As indicted in Bross’s conclusions, an impact to the model is evident as factors 
relating to will-to-fight are changed.  However, this test did not dynamically change these 
factors, but rather merely established that the model does depend on the factors.  
Additionally, these factors were not traced to specific events or actions conducted by 
friend or foe.  Finally, the complexity of JWARS has limited the conclusions and direct 
connections of will-to-fight to the results of the battle. 
Efforts to Model Morale 
The effectiveness of the troops as presented by Marshall and Rowland is 
dependent upon the combat spirit or morale of the troops.  There are many definitions and 
descriptions of morale.  An analysis by Richardson decomposed morale into three 
divisions (Richardson, 1978, p. 171).   
The first division is the personal or individual morale.  This division includes 
physical and mental factors.  The physical factors are aspects such as health, food, rest 
and sleep.  The mental factors included understanding the cause, self-confidence in 
abilities, religious beliefs and moral principles, and the perception of the quality of 
leadership.   
 82
Williams wrote of morale that mail and food were the “two areas of largest 
complaint” (Williams, 1992, p. 21).  This indicated two major aspects of both the 
physical and mental factors.  Lt. Thornton stated “In garrison and in the field, officers 
must fight continually to secure prompt deliverance of mail.  No other factor in a 
soldier’s existence is so important as the prompt receipt of news from home” (Thornton, 
1943, p. 1).  This factor, evolving to internet connectivity and e-mail, appears to be as 
important in the network centric, inter-connected world.  
The second division suggested by Richardson is the morale of the small group; 
also known as unit cohesion (1978, p. 171).  Richardson describes three facets of unit 
cohesion.  First, the soldier is a member of the unit with confidence in leadership.  
Second, the soldier has the confidence and respect of comrades.  Finally, the soldier is 
determined to not let friends down (both leaders and comrades in arms).  During World 
War II Spiegel observed unit cohesion during the Tunisian campaign.  He states: 
They expressed little hate for the enemy and they had little desire to kill.  Rather, 
their aggressive action was motivated by a positive force – love more than hate – 
manifested by 1) a regard for their comrades who shared the same dangers, 2) a 
respect for their platoon leader or company commander who led then wisely, and 
backed them with everything at his command, 3) a concern for their reputation 
with their commander and leaders, and 4) an urge to contribute to the task and 
success of their group and unit.  They were fighting for themselves and for their 
unit, and in that way for their country and their cause.  (Spiegel, 1944, p. 310) 
 
The third division presented by Richardson is the unit morale.  This is the Esprit 
de Corps of the unit as a whole.  This division represents the importance of being in the 
Army, Corps, or division.  General Anthony Zinni stated, “Service rivalry leads to service 
pride, which is good for building morale and esprit” (Zinni, 2001, p. 3).  Morale 
influences the decision to join the specific services and further drives the individual to 
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strive for being a Ranger, Special Force Operator, or a member of other elite 
organizations.  It also leads members of selected units to believe their unit is special. 
The review of morale and combat spirit thus far has been static in nature.  The 
research that follows is based in part on the results of a World War II study which 
suggested a dynamic model for morale dependent upon the number of sorties flown by 
Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber crews.  Stafford-Clark, a flight surgeon, interviewed and 
flew with the bomber aircrew members for over four years (Stafford-Clark, 1949, p. 14).  
The RAF Bomber Command’s policy was the airman’s tour of duty was complete after 
thirty successful bomber missions.   
The average rate of loss over this period was officially assessed at 5 percent on 
each operation, but this referred in fact only to aircraft which were missing.  It 
did not include crashes in the United Kingdom, either on takeoff or return, 
whether due to the normal hazards of flying or to enemy action.  In practice the 
chances of any particular individual surviving his 30 trips alive, unwounded and 
without having been taken prisoner, or having been forced down over enemy 
territory were generally accepted by the air crew themselves as being just about 
one in five.  (Stafford-Clark, 1949, p. 13) 
 
 Over the duration of the 30 missions, the morale of each aircrew varied.  The 
opportunity to accomplish the mission and the novelty of flying drove the aircrews to a 
high morale for the first two or three operational missions.  By the fifth to eighth mission, 
the aircrew had most likely seen aircraft shot down and the novelty of operational flying 
was gone (Stafford-Clark, 1949, p. 19).  This decrease in morale appeared to continue 
subconsciously until about the twelfth to fifteenth mission when the morale was at the 
lowest point.  The morale increased as the aircrew only looked toward the success and 
surviving the next mission.  From the mid-point in missions to be flown, aircrew’s morale 
increased (Stafford-Clark, 1949, p. 20).  The peak occurred near the twenty-fifth mission.  
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At this point the cumulative stress and fatigue were apparent.  The commanding officer 
could suspend the tour-of-duty for the aircrew at this point; however, “by far the majority 
of aircrew who survive a tour complete their full quota of thirty operational sorties” 
(Stafford-Clark, 1949, p. 20).   
Stafford-Clark presented Figure II-16, as a graphical illustration of the change to 
morale for each mission.  He offered no mathematical derivation for his illustration.   
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Figure II-16: Stafford-Clark Model of Morale (Stafford-Clark, 1949, Figure 1 Page 21) 
Several cases were analyzed by Stafford-Clark to show different implications of 
the curve.  Group A were aircrew that entered the service with a low morale.  These 
aircrew members did not complete the 30 missions (Stafford-Clark, 1949, p. 27).  Group 
B suffered from an impact of environment and low outlook for their future .  It could be 
suggested that these aircrew suffered from a lack of unit cohesion.  The group B aircrew 
had extremely low morale before their morale improved (Stafford-Clark, 1949, p. 29).  
The majority of these aircrew members did return to duty.  Group C aircrew reported 
very low morale due to the cumulative stress of the operations.  These aircrew members 
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also continued to fly; however, they were at critical levels for their morale (Stafford-
Clark, 1949, p. 31).  Figure II-17 presents the number of aircrew in each group, and the 
prognosis of each case is also indicated.  The cases that encountered exceptional stress all 
had bad prognoses.  Figure II-18 demonstrates the impact to the generic morale curve 
from each of the groups. 
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Figure II-17: Number of Aircrew in each Group  
(Stafford-Clark, 1949, Table 2 Page 24) 
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Figure II-18: Impact to Morale Model from each Group  
(Stafford-Clark, 1949, Figures 2-4 Pages 36-37) 
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 Menninger appears to have built upon the work of Stafford-Clark by applying the 
morale curve to the duration of time of a Peace Corps member’s tour of duty.  
Additionally, four periods of crisis are identified and the universality and scalability of 
the morale curve was introduced.   
 Menninger used the results of nearly 1,000 questionnaires of Peace Corps 
members to build the morale curve presented in Figure II-19 (Menninger, 1988, p. 200).  
There were four critical periods of psychological adjustment that were identified: arrival, 
engagement, acceptance, and reentry.   
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Figure II-19: Morale Curve for the Peace Corps (Menninger, 1988, Figure 1 Page 201) 
 A direct benefit of Menninger’s Morale Curve is how it varies on time versus 
number of missions.  Additionally, Menninger provides support that this model is both 
universal and scalable.  Menninger suggests that the morale curve is accurate (scalable) 
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for a twenty-four month Peace Corps commitment as well as a five day education 
seminar, nine month academic year, or a four year college education (Menninger, 1975, 
p. 110).  For example, during a six week camp, the first week is the point of high morale 
associated with arrival.  The crisis of engagement occurs during the end of the second 
week.  The crisis of acceptance occurs during week four.  Finally, reentry occurs during 
the final week (Menninger, 1988, p. 202-203).  Similarly, the four year degree program 
demonstrates “freshman anxiety, the sophomore slump, junior activism, and the senior 
disorientation” (Menninger, 1975, p. 110).   
 Menninger also provides information on how to employ the morale curve when 
there is no expected end to the state of affairs:   
When the new situation has no clear end point, there is no obvious fourth crisis 
(reentry); rather, as a general rule, the process evolves over a 2-year period as 
the individual develops a new sense of self.  (Menninger, 1988, p. 204) 
 
This provides an ability to model the morale of an individual that is in a conflict 
with no clear deployment/redeployment schedule or fighting for one’s own survival.  
Figure II-20 presents Swank and Marchand’s schematic representation of the 
impact of combat efficiency of the first sixty days of combat during the D-day invasion.  
As seen previously by both Stafford-Clark and Menninger, the morale and effectiveness 
is high or quickly increases when the soldier first enters combat.  Stafford-Clark’s model 
defends the lack of efficiency after the second month by the description of Group A 
aircrew. Figure II-20 is restricted to a continuous period of extreme conflict.  This 
occurred during the engagement phase suggested by Menninger.  It is not clear whether 
the morale and effectiveness are recoverable and thus increase to a phase of acceptance. 
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Figure II-20: Effects of Continuous Combat (Swank & Marchand, 1946, Figure 1 Page 238) 
 This section provided a review of how morale has been modeled.  The review 
included three models of morale: RAF bomber crews during World War II, deployments 
of the Peace Corps, and the sixty days following invasion at Normandy.  These three 
models demonstrate how morale has changed with time during a conflict.     
Control Theory 
Control theory provides the capability to analyze the response to systems over 
time (Ogata, 1997, p. 63).  A brief overview of how a system at equilibrium responds to 
an impulse is provided.  The discussion is limited to the second order transient response 
to a unit-impulse of an underdamped system.  Basically, this is how a system establishes 
equilibrium over time, following an impulse or significant event, based on a damping 
ratio (ζ) for the period (T).  The transient response is based on the undamped (or 
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resonant) natural frequency ( nω ), which is defined as 21
d
n
ωω ζ= − , where 
2
d T
πω = .  dω  
is referred to as the damped natural frequency.  With ζ and ωn defined, the transient 
response c(t) is represented by Equation II-31 (Ogata, 1997, p. 159): 
 ( ) 22 sin 11 n
tn
nc t e t
ζωω ω ζζ= − − , where 0 ≤ ζ < 1 and t ≥ 0 (II-31) 
The response over time can be seen for varying ζ’s in Figure II-21.   
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 2 4 6 8 10
t
c(
t)
 /
12
= 0
= 0.1
= 0.2
= 0.4
= 0.6
= 0.8
= 1
nω
nω
 
Figure II-21: Response over Time as ζ Varies 
When ζ = 0 the system is undamped and continues to respond to the impulse at 
full magnitude indefinitely.  When ζ = 1 the system is critically damped and returns to 
equilibrium with out undershooting the status quo.  While 0 < ζ < 1, the system is 
underdamped and the settling time increases as ζ decreases.   
If ζ and nω  are known, the system is easily defined.  However, if any two peaks 
are known, the function can be fit using the log decrement method.  The log decrement 
 90
method solves 
2 4 2
δζ δ π= + where 
1 ln n
n m
x
m x
δ
+
⎛ ⎞= ⎜⎝ ⎠⎟
 (Macioce, 2003, p. 12).  The 
height of the first peak is xn, and xn+1 is the height of the next peak.  The valley between 
the peaks can be used, where xn+0.5 is the distance from equilibrium.  Using a control 
theory approach may prove useful in fitting the morale curve. 
Summary 
 This chapter introduced and discussed fourth generation warfare.  The principles 
for such a conflict were also presented.  Next, the concept of a strategic level model was 
introduced.  The section is followed by a brief overview of system dynamics.  This field 
is focused on the use of continuous event models which contain feedback within the 
system.  The Lanchester Laws were then described.  Due to the similarity of fourth 
generation warfare and guerrilla warfare, the application of Lanchester Laws in this 
specific field was thoroughly discussed.  Unfortunately, none of the research in this area 
involves dynamic models, and thus does not capture all of the key aspects of fourth 
generation warfare. 
 The section on modeling the will-to-fight provides several descriptions, models, 
and trends in modeling morale and public resolve.  This was followed by a brief 
introduction to control theory’s second order response to an impulse. 
Attributes of each of these methods are used within the next chapters to create a 
theory and modeling framework of fourth generation operations. 
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III. Fourth Generation Operations and Principles 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter develops the concepts of fourth generation operations and associated 
principles.  Additionally, the first two contributions of the dissertation are achieved in 
this chapter.  They develop a concept of fourth generation operations based on the 
framework of US Joint doctrine and develop the supporting principles of fourth 
generation operations.  This contribution requires the introduction of the principle of 
Population Perception.   
Fourth Generation Operations 
 An element of Lind et al.’s fourth generation warfare is the attrition of the will 
and morale of the enemy (Lind et al., 1989, p. 5).  This attrition compels the enemy to 
capitulate to the goals and objectives of their foe.  This chapter asserts that fourth 
generation warfare, particularly the aspects of will and resolve, is the backbone of fourth 
generation operations.  Joint doctrine presents conflict bridging the spectrum from peace 
to war and back to peace (JP 3-0, 2006, p. IV-26).  It is critical in today’s arena that 
military operations and responsibilities span across this spectrum, thus operations is 
substituted for warfare.   
Fourth generation operations are defined in this study as conflict which combines 
elements of guerrilla tactics, insurgency, terrorism, traditional warfare, and the ability to 
exploit and skip generations of technology to conduct operations, particularly to target 
the will and morale of the enemy’s support structure, in order to achieve political victory.  
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In this definition, the support structure refers to both the population and the combatants.  
This definition does not focus on nation-states, and therefore includes cases where 
transnational groups are the instigator or target of the conflict.  Additionally, the specific 
methods applied in the conflict are not specified; therefore, fourth generation operations 
may use any military, diplomatic, economic or informational instrument of power to 
influence their enemy’s will and morale.  Just as US military doctrine has expanded the 
concept of information warfare to the broader and more inclusive concept of information 
operations, fourth generation warfare must be expanded to fourth generation operations.   
In this paradigm, operations occur not only during actual conflict, but also across 
the spectrum from peace to combat and back to peace.  Transnational asymmetric conflict 
does not require a conventional declaration of war to be initiated.  While 9/11 may be an 
easily identified starting point for the ‘long war,’ our foes started their operations well 
before that date.  Since the population may be specifically targeted by the combatants 
within fourth generation operations, fourth generation operations require a change in 
technology, tactics, doctrine, combatants, and definition of conflict from those for third 
generation warfare. 
Fourth generation operations, while not currently defined in US doctrine, 
addresses a gap previously identified within the doctrine used by the US military.  This 
gap has been filled by continuous transitions from non-war operations to full-scale 
campaigns with the additional phases of joint operations (specifically stabilization) and 
back to a sustainable peace (JP 3-0, 2006, p. IV-26). 
 The concept of fourth generation operations does not precisely fit any of the 
definitions of combating terrorism, supporting counterinsurgency, or supporting 
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insurgency provided by joint doctrine.  It clearly bridges the gap in the range of 
operations between war and MOOTW.  This is evident by the current operations in both 
Iraq and Afghanistan where the major traditional war operations ended with a resounding 
victory by the coalition forces; yet, the transition to ‘supporting’ the indigenous forces in 
their suppression of counterinsurgents and terrorists has been difficult to achieve.  The 
US and coalition forces are currently still overseeing the majority of counterinsurgency 
and peacekeeping operations in a number of areas.  Obviously, the military is not in a 
supporting role.  While this is an intermediate goal in both Iraq and Afghanistan, this goal 
has not yet been fully achieved.  Environments within Iraq and Afghanistan can be cited 
as two occurrences of fourth generation operations, as can elements of the worldwide 
global war on terrorism.   
 Figure III-1 depicts the relationships of the first four generations of war and 
fourth generation operations.  The transition from fourth generation warfare to fourth 
generation operations is represented by dotted lines as opposed to the previous 
generations.  The solid lines represent the evolution of generations.  Additionally, the 
recognition of the four instruments of power (diplomatic, information, military, and 
economic) are listed to emphasize how all the instruments of power are now required.  
Defeating the enemy’s standing army does not immediately result in political victory, 
particularly when the enemy may not have a standing army in the classic sense.  Finally, 
three dimensions of the operational environment are listed.  These three dimensions 
interact within fourth generation operations to accomplish the objectives. 
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Figure III-1: Fourth Generation Operations 
With the fourth generation operations defined, the principles of fourth generation 
operations are next introduced. 
Principles of Fourth Generation Operations 
While the principles of joint operations may be sufficient in covering aspects of 
fighting a counterinsurgency, they are not necessarily sufficient for fourth generation 
operations.  This section proposes the addition of one more principle for fourth 
generation operations to those introduced in Chapter 2 (Objective, Offensive, Mass, 
Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, Simplicity, 
Restraint, Perseverance, and Legitimacy).  The new principle is Population Perception.  
The principle of Population Perception focuses on the indigenous population. 
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Population Perception can be viewed as the combatant’s attention and response to 
the effects of the operations within the appropriate population.  The other principles 
which exist mainly in the cognitive operational environment include Perseverance and 
Legitimacy.  Perseverance, Legitimacy, and Population Perception all interrelate.   
This research redefines Perseverance as ensuring the commitment of both the 
American population and military, necessary to attain the national strategic end state.  
This definition is based on US military doctrine with the italics area added.  The principle 
of Perseverance is how our military and supporting population perceives the ongoing 
operations.  The supporting population of our forces (US population) is distinctly 
different than the supported population (indigenous Iraqi population).  This is best 
presented by the response to the question: Can we achieve our objectives if we continue 
operations?   
Legitimacy is redefined as developing and maintaining the will of both the 
government and military, necessary to attain the national strategic end state.  Legitimacy 
is the perception of both the US military and indigenous government by the enemy and 
the indigenous (supported) population.  Legitimacy is understood by the response to the 
question: Are we doing the right thing?   
Finally, Population Perception is defined as attending and responding to the 
operation’s effects within the appropriate population.  Population Perception is how the 
government and military are perceived by the appropriate population.  Population 
Perception is represented by the question: Do they think we can achieve our objectives 
and are doing the right thing?   
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Population Perception is not to be confused with perception management, which 
is defined as: 
Perception Management — Actions to convey and/or deny selected information 
and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and 
objective reasoning as well as to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to 
influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official 
actions favorable to the originator’s objectives. In various ways, perception 
management combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception, 
and psychological operations. (JP 1-02, 2006, p. 407) 
 
Perception Management may be used to shape Population Perception. 
This study proposes thirteen principles of fourth generation operations.  These 
principles begin with the twelve principles of joint operations and include the principle of 
Population Perspective.  These thirteen principles are defined in Table III-1.  Changes to 
the principles of joint operations (JP 3-0, 2006, Appendix A) are indicated by italics.   
Summary 
 This chapter introduced the concept of fourth generation operations.  Fourth 
generations operations are the evolution and extension of third and fourth generation 
warfare based on a change of tactics, technology, and combatants.  These operations are 
currently ongoing in Afghanistan and Iraq, and with the Global War on Terrorism. 
 The principles of joint operations were used as a building block for the principles 
of fourth generation operations.  The principles of fourth generation operations include 
all the principles of joint operations.  The chapter redefined the principles of Legitimacy 
and Perseverance and added the principle of Population Perspective to create the 
principles of fourth generation operations.   
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Table III-1: Principles of Fourth Generation Operations 
Principle Definition* 
Objective Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal 
Offensive Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative 
Mass Concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results  
Economy of Force Allocating minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts 
Maneuver Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power 
Unity of Command  
Ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for 
every objective, including military, coalition, American 
government and civilian organizations 
Security Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage 
Surprise Strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared   
Simplicity Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding 
Restraint Limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force
Perseverance Ensure the commitment, of both the American population and military, necessary to attain the national strategic end state  
Legitimacy Develop and maintain the will, of both the government and military, necessary to attain the national strategic end state  
Population 
Perception 
Attend and respond to the operation’s effects within the 
appropriate population 
* Changes to definitions found in JP 3-0, 2006 are indicated by italics.  JP 3-0 provides 
updated definitions of principles found in JP 1, 2000 (see Table II-2 and Table II-3). 
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IV. Lanchester Laws in a System Dynamics Framework 
Chapter Overview 
System dynamics models are able to represent qualitative aspects of combat that 
may be difficult to capture in a discrete event simulation.  Additionally, the system 
dynamics construct allows for the modeling of continuous events and incorporating 
system feedback.  This chapter develops a systems dynamics framework of the 
Lanchester Laws with events.  Two models of the Lanchester Laws are presented.  The 
first is a traditional discrete event simulation which is offered as a baseline for 
comparison; the other is a system dynamics implementation of the Lanchester Laws.  
Results from the discrete event simulation and the system dynamics model are analyzed, 
compared and contrasted. 
 The chapter provides examples of how the Lanchester Laws can be modeled using 
both discrete event simulation and system dynamics.  Comparisons of the modeling 
techniques are presented through the implementation of an excursion (compared to a 
baseline) where reserve forces are implemented.  The suitability of the system dynamics 
framework in some settings is further demonstrated with an excursion where the forces 
are fatigued.  The chapter concludes with a summary of results. 
Discrete Event Simulation versus Systems Dynamics 
This section compares and contrasts modeling the Lanchester Square Law in both 
a discrete event simulation and system dynamics model.  A simple case is used in this 
section to demonstrate how to apply the discussed framework.  These illustrations can be 
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solved analytically; however as the complexity of interactions and dimension of the state-
space increase in an actual operational scenario, the analytic solution becomes prohibitive 
to solve.  This is evident by the number of complex combat scenarios which require 
simulation to model the initial interactions and are therefore never reduced to analytic 
equations.   
The Lanchester equations are implemented in discrete event simulations by 
solving the equations at discrete time intervals.  When the analytic solution to the 
Lanchester Equations can not be found because of the complexity of the example, a 
discrete event simulation is not able to solve the equations to predict the exact time future 
events occurred.  Therefore, the exact future event times are not generated.  A discrete 
event simulation evaluates events at predetermined time intervals.  This is referred to by 
Bratley, Fox, and Schrage as a synchronous discrete event simulation (1987, p. 17).   
In general, synchronous discrete event simulation has several potential 
drawbacks.  One drawback is non-simultaneous events must be treated as simultaneous if 
they fall within the same time period.  This requires all possible interaction combinations 
to be anticipated, modeled and planned.  Additionally, when the step size is decreased, 
the accuracy of results increases; however, the speed of the simulation decreases (Bratley, 
Fox, & Schrage, 1987, p. 17).  To increase the speed of the simulation, it is possible to 
skip intervals if enough information about the system can be obtained.  Skipping intervals 
must be based on expected conditions and the required fidelity of the solution, both 
further complicating the simulation (Bratley, Fox, & Schrage, 1987, p. 17). 
A discrete event simulation must approximate the values of attributes and 
variables between events.  This can be resolved by reducing event times, but it may force 
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the model to take substantially more time to complete.  A system dynamics model does 
not approximate to achieve the level between events.  A benefit of system dynamics 
models, when required by the analysis, is their ability to smoothly transition the levels of 
the attributes and variables.  This does not imply that the levels can not be adjusted in 
step increments as demonstrated later in this chapter with the implementation of reserve 
troops. 
In some modeling scenarios the arrival of a regiment, army, or additional fighters 
can be adequately and appropriately modeled as a discrete event, perhaps as the average 
time.  In other settings, the actual flow of troops into the fight may be critical, suggesting 
the use of system dynamics.  An example might be the arrival of Marschall Blücher’s 
forces at Waterloo.  While the main body had not totally arrived, the appearance of the 
forward elements on the battlefield was instrumental in turning the tide of battle. 
Basic Discrete Event Simulation and System Dynamics Models 
There are numerous methods to model the Lanchester Laws.  This study 
implemented the basic Lanchester Laws in a simple discrete event simulation.  The 
entities generated within the discrete event simulation, for this study, do not have any 
attributes, nor require any resources.  As real world aspects (like ammunition, equipment 
and supplies) are added to the model, they would be modeled as attributes or resources.  
Figure IV-1 is the pictorial representation of a basic implementation of the Lanchester 
Square Law developed in Arena 10.0.   
 101
Casualties Write Variables Casualties
Dispose of 
Entity
Casualties
New Entity
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Rt+1 = Rt – Bt · k
 
Figure IV-1: Discrete Event Simulation of the Lanchester Square Law 
 The furthest left container created a new entity at each time interval.  The entity 
flowed to the Casualties container where the global variables representing the number of 
Blue and Red forces at time t + 1 (Bt+1 and Rt+1) were calculated based on the attrition 
coefficients (c and k) and the current size of the forces (Bt and Rt).  After the global 
variables were adjusted, the simulation proceeded to output the status of the variables and 
then the entity was disposed.  The balloons on the figure display the equation within each 
container. 
The system dynamics representation of the Lanchester Square Law focused on the 
level of Blue and Red Forces (Bt and Rt), where the forces were the number of personnel 
or the total combat value.  Blue and Red forces levels were changed by the rate of Blue or 
Red Attrition.  Figure IV-2 is the depiction of the system dynamics representation of the 
basic illustration.  Red Attrition through time (RAt) was the total number of Red Forces 
killed (or otherwise removed from battle) by the surviving Blue Forces during each time 
interval, and vice versa for Blue Attrition (BAt).  The Blue Attrition Coefficient (k) 
represented the number of force of Red that could be killed per unit of Blue force.     
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Figure IV-2: System Dynamics Model of the Lanchester Square Law 
Discrete Event Simulation and System Dynamics Models with Reserves 
This subsection demonstrates that a system dynamics model performs the same as 
a discrete event simulation for a more complicated model.  The basic discrete event 
simulation and system dynamics models were modified to represent Dewar, Gillogly, and 
Juncosa’s (1996) combat model presented in Table IV-1 .  Dewar, Gillogly, and Juncosa 
simulated a two sided conflict with troop replacements using a discrete event simulation 
with a time-step of one-half hour.  Their model used the Lanchester Square Laws with a 
Red Attrition Coefficient (c) of 1/2048 and the Blue Attrition Coefficient (k) that equaled 
1/512.  The initial Red (R0) and Blue (B0) Troop sizes are also presented in Table IV-1.  
When specific thresholds based on a force ratio or percent of surviving forces were 
breached, reinforcements were requested.  The reinforcement block size was 300 troops.  
Each side had five reinforcement blocks and the reinforcements arrived 70 time steps (or 
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35 hours) after the reinforcement threshold were breached.  Withdrawal (or defeat) of the 
forces was declared once additional predetermined thresholds for either combat ratio or 
percent of surviving forces was crossed.  Victory was declared based on a specific 
combat ratio (i.e. forces were substantially outnumbered), or a force strength dropping 
below a predetermined level (i.e. the battle was too costly to continue) based on the 
thresholds in Table IV-1. 
Table IV-1: Combat Model (Dewar, Gillogly & Juncosa, 1996: Table 1, Page 39) 
Parameter Blue Red 
Initial troop strength B0 = 839 R0 = 1,500 
Combat attrition 
calculation Bt+1 = Bt – Rt/2048 Rt+1 = Rt – Bt/512 
Reinforcement threshold Rt/Bt ≥ 4 or Bt < 0.8 B0 Rt/Bt ≤ 2.5 or Rt < 0.8 R0 
Withdrawal threshold Rt/Bt ≥ 10 or Bt < 0.7 B0 Rt/Bt ≤ 1.5 or Rt < 0.7 R0 
 
 Figure IV-3 depicts the discrete event simulation which represents Dewar, 
Gillogly, and Juncosa’s combat model.  The Casualties were computed as described for 
Figure IV-1.  Next, the model checked to see if the conditions required to declare the 
winner were met.  This is represented in Figure IV-3 as the diamond labeled ‘winner.’  If 
there was a winner, the global variable indicating a combat force had won was changed.  
If there was not a winner, the model checked to see if the Blue side was currently waiting 
for reserves.  If the Blue side was not waiting for reserves, the model checked the Blue 
reinforcement thresholds to see if Blue Reinforcements were necessary.  If reserves were 
required, the global variable for Blue Waiting for Reserves was triggered, and the model 
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scheduled the event to add reinforcements in 70 time steps.  The model reset the Blue 
Waiting for Reserves variable after 70 time steps and disposed of the entity.  If the 
system was waiting on Blue Reserves or did not need Blue Reserves, similar checks were 
made regarding Red Reserves.  This implementation did not allow for both Red and Blue 
forces to add Reserves at the same time period.  This was possible to implement but 
would add an additional layer of condition checks and directives to the model.  As 
discussed earlier, a drawback of synchronous discrete event simulations is all possible 
material critical state-spaces and conditions must be anticipated and those paths and 
conditions must be tested and implemented within the model. 
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Figure IV-3: Discrete Event Simulation of the Combat Model 
The results of the discrete event simulation are presented in Figure IV-4.  This 
figure presents the number of forces surviving at each time period.  The discontinuous 
points were due to the arrival of the 300 reinforcements.  The Red Forces required all of 
their reserves, while the Blue Force won after only adding three reserve blocks.   
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Figure IV-4: Results of the Combat Model 
The basic system dynamics model was modified to represent Dewar, Gillogly, 
and Juncosa’s combat model by first creating the levels of Blue/Red Force Strength and 
Combat Ratio.  The Blue/Red Force Strength was the percent of forces still alive at the 
current interval of the battle.  The Combat Ratio was the Red Forces divided by the Blue 
Forces.  The Combat Ratio and Blue/Red Force Strength levels were required to 
determine the requirement of Red and Blue Reserves.  If the reserve force thresholds 
were achieved, the system checked to see if it was waiting on reserves and if there were 
reserve blocks available.  If all conditions were met to add the new reserves, the value 
labeled Add Red Reserves (RRt) and/or Add Blue Reserves (BRt) was changed to 300 and 
the rate flowed to the Red and Blue Forces respectively.   
The system dynamics representation of the simple combat model was presented in 
Figure IV-5.  As opposed to the discrete event simulation, the system dynamics model 
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allowed both Red and Blue Forces to be added at the same time, since the addition of 
troops does not require all possible interaction combinations to be anticipated for each 
time interval.  Additionally, the time the reserves were requested could be identified at 
the exact moment the thresholds were reached.  The timing could be more precisely 
identified within the discrete event simulation by reducing the time step, but the time step 
was already small relative to the scenario. 
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Figure IV-5: System Dynamics Model of the Combat Model 
The discrete event simulation and system dynamic models produce equivalent 
results.  In both representations, the reserves arrived on the same day and the battle 
concluded on the same day.  There were only minor variations in the force size 
throughout the run of the model.  The largest difference between the sizes of forces 
reported by each model for the 1,310 time intervals was 0.0013 or 0.00011% of the 
response.  Figure IV-4 can be used to represent the results from both the discrete event 
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simulation and the system dynamics models.  The correlation of Blue force at the end of 
each time interval of the discrete event simulation with results from the system dynamics 
model was 1 – 1.29E-12.  Red correlation was 1 – 1.11E-12.  Both represent a correlation 
of results which is approximately one.  This exercise demonstrates that system dynamics 
models can effectively model the Lanchester Laws which have been historically modeled 
as a discrete event simulation; in addition if a continuous flow more accurately models 
the environment, a system dynamics model may be preferred. 
The system dynamics model of these events and rates can be easily adjusted based 
on the current environment.  For example, if the reserves were located near the engaged 
troops, the time of arrival of the reserves could be less than when the front line of troops 
were at a distance.  Additionally, the system dynamics models could ‘flow’ the reserves 
into the engaged forces as logistics allowed rather than assuming all the reserves arrived 
at the same time (as typically expected within a discrete event simulation).  A system 
dynamics based model can easily incorporate this change by connecting the ‘level’ 
indicating the troop’s location to the ‘level’ indicating time to wait for reserves.  The time 
to wait on the reserves is no longer a constant and can depend on the location of troops 
and the rate of their arrival.  In addition, the rate of arrival of troops to the front can be 
controlled, if desired. 
The discrete event simulation and system dynamics examples focused on the 
engagement, or battle, level of warfare.  As the Lanchester Laws have been applied to all 
levels of warfare (engagement, mission, campaign and strategic), both approaches can be 
used to as a modeling framework for all levels of warfare.  This is not meant to suggest 
current discrete event simulations are inadequate or inappropriate.  Rather as combat and 
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conflict become more affected by continuous, dynamic interacting elements, especially at 
the campaign or theater level and the data to model such events becomes more available, 
system dynamics may offer a different level of insight to decision makers.  Historically, 
system dynamics has been applied to a vast array of levels in planning from the factory 
floor to world models (see Forrester, 1961, 1969 and 1971, among others).  This suggests 
that it can be applied from skirmishes through strategic levels, given proper inputs.  
System dynamics models are particularly appropriate when not accounting for the 
continuation of time, leads to issues of accuracy.  Its consideration provides another 
modeling option.  As with all modeling, the analyst should select the appropriate 
technique for the fidelity required by the decision environment. 
Implementation of Fatigue 
Thus far the values of the attrition coefficients have been static.  While in real 
combat the troops would become more or less effective as the battle continues and 
fatigue, among other attributes, change.  As a demonstration of potential options, the 
dynamic attributes of the system dynamics model was expanded by incorporating a 
‘fatigue’ coefficient into the Dewar, Gillogly, and Juncosa’s combat model.  To model 
this, fatigue was represented as the effective combat power for a force.  A force having 
no fatigue retains 100% of its combat power.  Over time while in combat, fatigue 
increases, effectively reducing combat power.  The new attrition coefficient now equaled 
the original coefficient multiplied by one minus the fatigue factor.  It was first assumed 
that the initial forces have no fatigue.  It was further assumed that the reserves entered the 
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conflict with no fatigue.  When the reserves entered, the percentage of fatigue was reset 
to reflect the addition of fresh troops.   
In this excursion it was assumed that when the reserves entered, the new fatigue 
was a weighted average of the fatigue from the reserves and the existing forces.  For 
example, when 1000 troops were fatigued at 30% and 500 fresh reserves entered combat, 
the new fatigue value was two thirds (1000/1500) of it previous value or 20% based on 
this illustrative fatigue aggregation formula (any appropriately vetted factor may be 
used).  This implementation implied that the reserves were mixed throughout the current 
combatants when the reserves entered combat (of course, a damping function or morale 
boost could be included).   
Fatigue is modeled in the discrete event simulation by the creation of four new 
global variables.  These could be referred to as the Blue/ Red Attrition Coefficients (c / k) 
and Blue/ Red Fatigue (BF / RF).  Additionally, new decision nodes are required to 
decide how, why and when to change these new global variables.  The alterations are 
possible, but not insignificant.  
The system dynamics model added two new levels (identified as Red and Blue 
Fatigue).  The system dynamics model with the fatigue factor is presented as Figure IV-6.  
Red and Blue Fatigue were a function of the rate reserves entered the system and the 
current level of forces.  The attrition coefficients (c and k) were now a function of fatigue.  
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Figure IV-6: System Dynamics Model with Fatigue 
The systems dynamics based modeling approach did not require the effect be 
modeled as a new fatigue level; however, by directly representing this new term, the 
model emphasized the new factor.  The concept of fatigue could have been directly 
represented within the attrition coefficient value with the arrows from ‘Red Forces’ and 
‘Add Red Reserves’ being connected to the appropriate ‘Attrition Coefficient.’   
Figure IV-7 presents the fatigue of each force over time. 
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Figure IV-7: Fatigue of Red and Blue Forces 
The arrival of Red reserves through 300 hours of conflict had the effect of 
reducing overall Red fatigue.  Once all the reserves were committed, Red fatigue 
impacted Red’s overall effectiveness since relief was not available later in the battle.  
This was opposed to the Blue forces which maintained less battlefield fatigue.  The 
model was run beyond the Blue victory termination point to demonstrate this point.  
Figure IV-8 compares the force levels of both the Red and Blue forces with and 
without the effects of fatigue.  Not only did both sides suffer more losses, the battle ended 
significantly sooner due to the impacts of fatigue.  While fatigue was added in this 
sample example, any number of factors can be incorporated as appropriate.  System 
dynamics offers an additional option to the modelers when the scenario and fidelity of the 
analysis requires this level of detail. 
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Figure IV-8: Comparison of Results 
This example demonstrated how to dynamically represent the Lanchester Laws 
within a dynamic conflict model and shows the inclusion of a softer factor.  By including 
fatigue, a qualitative aspect has been directly incorporated into the combat effectiveness 
coefficient.  The rate of attrition is now altered by the change of fatigue.  Therefore, there 
is now a change of rates being included in the combat model.  The combat ratio and 
attrition is still used by the system dynamics model; however, the values of the combat 
effectiveness coefficients are no longer static.  The coefficients are now dynamic and 
continuous.  This changes the paradigm generally used in discrete event simulation which 
focuses on the events in the model.  System dynamics highlights the rates of change.  
While Lanchester Laws requires ‘breakpoints’ to declare victory, the focus is on the rate 
of attrition.  System dynamics provides an ability to change the rates based on other, 
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possibly softer, aspects.  This indicates a strength provided by dynamically representing 
the Lanchester Laws if appropriate to the analysis. 
This simple example illustrates how feedback loops can be used is a system 
dynamics simulation.  While ‘softer’ factors were used, the approach can be applied to 
any factor where rates of continuous flow are to be modeled. 
Summary 
Discrete event simulation and system dynamics models have been used to 
approximate first, second, and third generation warfare.  However, in some operational 
settings it may be insufficient to model only military attrition.  This can be particularly 
true in insurgency warfare or the broader fourth generation operations.  All instruments of 
power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) must be represented.  System 
dynamics provides an ability to include the impacts of the softer aspects of diplomacy, 
information, economics, as well as military actions, when continuous flows might 
provide improved insight over discrete event simulation.  Feedback loops and changing 
the rate of rates can be useful in capturing the broader non-attrition and non-maneuver 
aspects of conflict.   
This chapter compared the use of discrete event simulation and system dynamics 
to model first and second generation (example on Lanchester Laws) to establish the 
viability of the approach.  The chapter then provided a simple system dynamics model 
which fatigued the forces.  The fatigued forces provided an example of how other aspects 
required when modeling fourth generation operations could be implemented into combat 
models. 
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A systems dynamics presentation was developed to model a two sided conflict 
subject to continuous, non-linear, transient behaviors with feedback.  The system 
dynamics presentation of the model provides the decision maker with a clearer 
representation of a continuous system than a discrete event simulation.  The specific 
interactions are represented as levels, rates, and decision functions.  The system dynamics 
format can be more straightforward than the sometimes ‘black box’ appearing 
presentation of a discrete event simulation.   
 System dynamics models can be quickly adjusted to represent new assumptions.  
Additionally, as discussed in the introduction to system dynamics, system dynamics 
model are able to represent ‘fuzzy’ concepts that are traditionally not approached by 
discrete event modelers.  Furthermore, system dynamics models smoothly transition the 
values within the levels, as opposed to approximating the values as required by a discrete 
event simulation. 
 While some discrete event simulations are able to represent continuous variables, 
this does not imply the simulation represents completely dynamic models.  When 
incorrect conclusions could occur due to not accounting for continuous time, a model 
developed to implement a system dynamics framework should be used. However, if a 
mix of discrete and continuous variables is advantageous in a modeling effort, systems 
which incorporate both can be developed and utilized.  Care in selecting time steps must 
be taken to assure accuracy sufficient for the analysis. 
The implementation of Lancaster Laws within a system dynamics model adds a 
significant amount of flexibility to how combat models are able to incorporate the 
dynamics of battle.  This added flexibility provides a means to model the impacts of the 
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population’s resolve and combatants’ spirit.  Additionally, this may allow combat models 
to capture many other aspects of the conflict such as the political, economic, and 
informational; rather than exclusively the military impacts. 
This chapter accomplished the third contribution of the dissertation, the 
construction of a theoretical modeling framework to dynamically portray fatigue and 
other behavioral factors within a combat model.  This chapter also demonstrated the 
utility of using a system dynamics modeling framework to represent the Lanchester Laws 
as opposed to the traditional discrete event simulation framework.   
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V. Public Resolve 
Chapter Overview 
In October of 2006, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, 
stated:  
Baghdad is the center of gravity in Iraq, and the American people are the center 
of gravity for our enemies.  And what the American people believe and the 
American people's ability to sustain -- what they must sustain to defeat this enemy 
is what our enemies are trying to influence. (p. 1) 
 
General Pace highlights the importance of public opinion in the war in Iraq and 
subsequently the global war on terrorism - the ‘Long War.’  This chapter presents an 
analysis that incorporates, into a model, the impacts of the continuous actions of our 
forces on the resolve of the United States population.  The utility and effectiveness of 
historical methods is statistically tested against the suggested model.  Multiple linear 
regression models, as well as generalized linear models are used.  The chapter discusses 
new key factors that influence the public’s opinion.  In this chapter public resolve refers 
to the percent of the US population which supports an on going conflict. 
It is apparent that our adversaries are directly targeting the public resolve of the 
US population.  Results from this chapter provide commanders, decision makers and 
analysts models to aid in gauging the adversaries impact on the US’s resolve.  
Additionally, these models are included in the final combat model presented in Chapter 7. 
This chapter investigates the American public’s perception of the ongoing 
operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq.  Models of public resolve are constructed and 
statistically evaluated based on linear and non-linear modeling techniques, with the intent 
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to develop a modeling framework of public resolve.  The framework was founded on 
empirical evidence of key factors influencing the public resolve. 
The importance of the public support and resolve is highlighted.  Public resolve 
from Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq are then reviewed.  Two simple least squares 
linear regression models of public resolve are presented.  The first model uses the number 
of days into the conflict as an independent variable, while the second model uses the 
logarithm of casualties as the independent variable.  This latter model was first 
introduced by Mueller (1973, p. 60).  In both cases the dependent variable was public 
support for the war as given by polling data. 
The third section of the study presents a multiple linear regression model 
expanding on the findings of the two previous models and also evaluates ten additional 
independent variables specific to Iraq.  A model of public support based on four 
statistically significant variables is provided.  These variables reflect actions taken by 
both the insurgents and the US military.   
A factor analysis of the identified key variables is also performed.  The subsection 
applies the technique to minimize the impacts of the correlation between the statistically 
significant variables revealed in the multiple linear regression analysis. 
The next section provides an alternate model of public support based on logistic 
regression.  The benefits of this technique are then discussed.  This section also applies 
the William’s procedure for fitting a model with overdispersion (extra binomial 
variation). 
The fifth section provides some insights to the impact of negative and positive 
media reporting of the event ongoing in theater.  The percent of positive media reports is 
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used as a new independent variable in the model.  Unfortunately the data available only 
spanned a small portion of the conflict; therefore, the analysis was performed with a 
limited data set compared to the other analyses in the chapter. 
The chapter concludes with a check of the model by comparing the model’s 
results with recent polling data.  Additionally, the key relations that have been revealed 
are reviewed.  Finally, the implications of the research and possible paths for future 
research are suggested. 
Simple Least Squares Linear Models 
Recognizing that the tactics of fourth generation operations include attacking the 
public resolve of the adversary, this effort quantifies the effect of the continuous actions 
employed by the enemy.  The study gauges the national resolve in a clash of wills using 
polling data as a proxy for public resolve and support of recent and current wars.  The 
specific questions used by the various polling data sources are detailed in Appendix A.  A 
simple linear regression for several factors was performed on data from Korea, Vietnam, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq.  The response collected represented the percent of the United 
States population which supported the current conflict. 
Duration of Conflict 
When the data on public support, based on the number of days into the conflict 
was fit for the Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq with time as the independent variable, a 
decrease in public support was identified.  The start of conflict for Korea (25 June 1950), 
Afghanistan (7 October 2001) and Iraq (20 March 2003) was used as the start of 
hostilities.  For the purpose of this analysis, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution (7 August 
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1964) was used as the start of hostilities for the Vietnam conflict since this authorization 
approved the escalation of forces in the theater (Snow, 1994, p. 210). 
Tables V-1 though V-4 present the fitted public resolve models for Korea, 
Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq respectively.  For this analysis, the magnitude of the 
t-test statistic (t Stat) was compared to the appropriate reference value from the two-sided 
t-distribution with α = 0.05.  If any coefficient or model was determined to be statistically 
insignificant, the equation indicated this in bold markings. 
Table V-1: Public Support for Korea per Time 
Regression Statistics 
R2 0.15
Adjusted R2 0.05
Standard Error 8.34
PRESS 1128.23
R2Prediction -0.54
Observations 11
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 106.93 106.93 1.54 0.25 
Residual 9 625.79 69.53   
Total 10 732.73       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 48.56 4.76 10.20 3.03E-06 
Days into Conflict -0.0109 0.0088 -1.24 0.25 
 
Table V-2: Public Support for Vietnam (1965-1973) per Time 
Regression Statistics 
R2 0.85
Adjusted R2 0.85
Standard Error 3.64
PRESS 387.39
R2Prediction 0.80
Observations 23
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 1612.23 1612.23 121.47 3.44E-10 
Residual 21 278.73 13.27   
Total 22 1890.96       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 60.13 1.82 33.12 1.3E-19 
Days into Conflict -0.0126 0.0011 -11.02 3.44E-10 
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Table V-3: Public Support for Afghanistan per Time 
Regression Statistics 
R2 0.95
Adjusted R2 0.94
Standard Error 347.57
PRESS 0.93
R2Prediction 4.03
Observations 18
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 4717.69 4717.69 291.09 1.09E-11 
Residual 16 259.31 16.21   
Total 17 4977.00       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 90.33 1.25 72.29 1.48E-21 
Days into Conflict -0.01949 0.0011 -17.06 1.09E-11 
 
Table V-4: Public Support for Iraq per Time 
Regression Statistics 
R2 0.71
Adjusted R2 0.70
Standard Error 5.43
PRESS 5722.94
R2Prediction 0.70
Observations 191
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 13402.02 13402.02 454.17 3.77E-52 
Residual 189 5577.21 29.51   
Total 190 18979.23       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 64.96 0.76 85.53 4.8E-153 
Days into Conflict -0.0204 0.0010 -21.31 3.77E-52 
 
Table V-1 indicates that there is not a significant linear trend for public support of 
the Korean War, based on days of conflict.  The R2 in Table V-1 suggests the model does 
not explain much of the variation in the observed data and the coefficient for days of 
conflict.  Additionally, the magnitude of the t-test statistic for the days coefficient (-1.24) 
is less than the critical value from the t-distribution (tα=0.05,44=2.32).  Therefore, the null 
hypothesis fails to be rejected and there is insufficient evidence that the coefficient is not 
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zero.  Additionally, the PRESS statistic and R2Prediction indicate this model should not be 
used to predict the public resolve. 
It should be noted that combat in the Korean War lasted just over three years 
before the cease fire was signed.  The Korean War followed on a global war that 
generally had national support.  It appears that the limited duration of the conflict and 
proximity to World War Two may have influenced the Korean War data that is based on 
duration of the conflict.   
The R2 for each of the other conflicts suggests a stronger connection between time 
and public support.  Additionally, the magnitudes of the t-test statistic for all the 
coefficients in Tables V-2 through V-4 are greater than the critical value; therefore, the 
null hypotheses can be rejected, indicating strong evidence that the coefficients are not 
zero (with α = 0.05).  Finally, the F-test statistics are greater than the F-test critical values 
further indicating the coefficients are statistically significant. 
The Prediction Error Sum of Square (PRESS) statistic was used to determine the 
R2Prediction.  The R2Prediction for Vietnam (Table V-2) and Afghanistan (Table V-3) both 
indicated the model accounted for over 80% of the variability of the residuals for the 
predicted values.  The model of Iraq (Table V-4) only accounted for 70% of the variance 
when predicting. 
The fitted decline of support for Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq varies from 
0.0127% to 0.0204% per day.  The data used for Vietnam spans nine years of the conflict.  
The first five years on the conflict was also analyzed for comparison to the conflict in 
Iraq and Afghanistan using similar timeframes.  When the first five years of data for the 
Vietnam conflict were used in the analysis (see Table V-5), the R2 for the Vietnam model 
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rose to 0.89 with a slope of 0.0185% per day.  Additionally, the range of slopes for 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Vietnam (prior to 1970) only varied from 0.0185% to 0.0204% loss 
of support per day.   
Table V-5: Public Support for Vietnam (1965-1969) per Time 
Regression Statistics 
R2 0.89
Adjusted R2 0.88
Standard Error 2.70
PRESS 142.89
R2Prediction 0.86
Observations 17
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 876.92 876.92 120.46 1.45E-08 
Residual 15 109.20 7.28   
Total 16 986.12       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 66.26 1.99 33.23 1.83E-15 
Days into Conflict -0.0185 0.0017 -10.98 1.45E-08 
 
Figure V-1 presents the available polling data for the Vietnam conflict along with 
two linear regression lines.  The solid line depicts the result of fitting all of the available 
data, while the dashed line includes only the data prior to 1970.   
 123
010
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
A
ug
-6
5
O
ct
-6
5
D
ec
-6
5
M
ar
-6
6
M
ay
-6
6
A
ug
-6
6
O
ct
-6
6
Ja
n-
67
M
ar
-6
7
Ju
n-
67
A
ug
-6
7
N
ov
-6
7
Ja
n-
68
A
pr
-6
8
Ju
n-
68
A
ug
-6
8
N
ov
-6
8
Ja
n-
69
A
pr
-6
9
Ju
n-
69
S
ep
-6
9
N
ov
-6
9
Fe
b-
70
A
pr
-7
0
Ju
l-7
0
S
ep
-7
0
D
ec
-7
0
Fe
b-
71
M
ay
-7
1
Ju
l-7
1
S
ep
-7
1
D
ec
-7
1
Fe
b-
72
M
ay
-7
2
Ju
l-7
2
O
ct
-7
2
D
ec
-7
2
M
ar
-7
3
DATE
PU
B
LI
C
 S
U
PP
O
R
T 
(%
)
Vietnam Polling Data
Linear trend prior to 1970
Linear trend of entire conflict
 
Figure V-1: Public Support of the Vietnamese War with Linear Trends  
When only the first five years of Vietnam were included in the regression, the R2 
increased from 0.85 (Table V-2) to 0.89 (Table V-5), and standard error of the model 
(RMSE) decreased from 3.64 to 2.70.  Figure V-2 presents the decline of support for the 
wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq over time.  The linear trend of all data points for 
each conflict is also presented.  The slopes of the fitted models for Vietnam (prior to 
1970), Afghanistan, and Iraq are approximately parallel suggesting public opinion in 
modern wars decline at a fixed rate over time.  For the available data, this rate of decline 
is between 0.018% to 0.021% per day or roughly 0.6% per month. 
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Figure V-2: Decline of Public Support over Duration of Conflict 
The confidence interval for a regression coefficient (βi) in a linear model with n 
data points and p variables is given by, 
/ 2, ii n p
t SEα ββ −± .  The 95% confidence intervals 
for the slopes (β1) of the fitted models Afghanistan, Iraq and Vietnam are presented in 
Figure V-3.  The confidence interval for the coefficient for time all overlap at 0.02.  This 
suggests a hypothesis that public opinion declines at approximately the same rate over 
time for similar conflicts.  Based on these three data sets, the hypothesis that public 
opinion declines at 0.02% per day cannot be statistically rejected.  This suggests that for 
each month roughly 0.6% of the total public support is lost.   
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Figure V-3: Confidence Interval of Slope (Duration of Conflict) 
The confidence intervals on the public support at the start of the conflict are 
presented in Figure V-4.  The Y-intercept (β0) is interpreted to be the initial support for 
the conflict.  Clearly, public support varied widely at the start of these conflicts.  
However, note that the 95% confidence intervals for the first four years of Iraq and the 
first five years of Vietnam overlap at 65%.  Based on these two data sets, the hypothesis 
that public opinion began at 65% cannot be statistically rejected.  
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Figure V-4: Confidence Interval of Y-Intercept (Duration of Conflict) 
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Equation V-1 presents a composite model for public support based on both 
Vietnam and Iraq data.  This implies that a model of the public support for Iraq is 
statistically indistinguishable from the model of the first five years of Vietnam. 
 65 0.02Public Support days= −  (V-1) 
The residual plots did not indicate trends within the residuals which would require 
further analysis for Vietnam (Figure V-5) or Afghanistan (Figure V-6).  The residuals for 
Korea are not included since the model has been determined to not be statistically 
significant.   
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Figure V-5: Residuals for Vietnam Model (Days into Conflict) 
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Figure V-6: Residuals for Afghanistan Model (Days into Conflict) 
The residuals for the model of Iraq indicate that the number of days into the 
conflict has a non-linear impact on the response (top of Figure V-7).  Therefore, the 
model was regressed with number of days into the conflict squared (Days2) as an 
additionally variable.  The results of this regression are in Table V-6.  The residuals for 
the analysis are included in the bottom of Figure V-7.  The inclusion of the squared 
number of days into the conflict improves the predictability (R2Prediction improves from 
0.70 to 0.83) and the residuals indicate no trends. 
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Figure V-7: Residuals for Iraq Model (Days into Conflict)  
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Table V-6: Public Support for Iraq per Time Squared 
Regression Statistics 
R2 0.83
Adjusted R2 0.83
Standard Error 4.11
PRESS 3285.97
R2Prediction 0.83
Observations 191
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 2 15801.87 7900.94 467.49 1.09E-73 
Residual 188 3177.36 16.90   
Total 190 18979.23       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 71.71 0.81 88.85 1.7E-155 
Days into Conflict -0.0522 0.0028 -18.91 2.36E-45 
Days into Conflict2 2.35E-05 1.97E-06 11.92 9.45E-25 
 
Logarithm of Casualties 
While simple linear models for the public support using the number of days into 
the conflict provided a good fit for Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq (the model of Iraq 
improved when using the variable squared); the variable did not adequately fit the Korean 
conflict.  Mueller suggests an alternative to the number of days in the conflict.  He related 
the number of casualties in both the Korean and Vietnam wars to the public opinion polls 
of the day.  He found that the support for the war dropped by 15 percentage points each 
time the order of magnitude of number of casualties increased (Mueller, 1973, p. 60).  As 
we are modeling US resolve and support, casualties were defined as total number of US 
military killed and wounded during the conflict.  Additionally, Mueller suggested that the 
Korean and Vietnamese conflicts even begin with essentially the same level of support 
(1973, p. 60).   
Using the data provided in Mueller’s book,  Figure V-8 was created.  In  Figure 
V-8 , the percentage of the US population which supported the wars in Korea and 
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Vietnam was correlated with the base ten logarithm of the total number of casualties.  
Figure V-9 presents the same data plotted relative to time.   
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 Figure V-8: Casualties versus Public Support (Mueller’s Model)  
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Figure V-9: Mueller's Model with Date Indicated 
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Using the same methodology presented by Mueller, the public support for the war 
in Iraq is given in Figure V-10.  Figure V-11 presents the data relative to the date of the 
war.  
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Figure V-10: Casualties versus Public Support (Iraq) 
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Figure V-11: Date versus Public Support (Iraq) 
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 When the data of public support were fit for Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq with an 
analysis based on Mueller’s work, a decrease in public support relative to casualties was 
identified (log10(cas)).  Tables V-7 though V-9 present the data for models based on the 
log of casualties for Korea (Table V-7), Vietnam (Table V-8) and Iraq (Table V-9).  The 
tables present the model results as described earlier.  All the models were significant. 
Table V-7: Public Support for Korea per Casualty (Based on data from Mueller, 1973, p. 61) 
Regression Statistics 
R2 0.83
Adjusted R2 0.82
Standard Error 5.21
PRESS 1138.25
R2Prediction 0.74
Observations 25
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 3610.9 3610.9 112.3 2.53213E-10 
Residual 23 739.6 32.2   
Total 24 4350.5    
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 114.46 13.82 8.28 2.34E-08 
Log10(cas) -14.89 2.39 -6.23 2.34E-06 
 
Table V-8: Public Support for Vietnam per Casualty (Based on data from Mueller, 1973, p. 61) 
Regression Statistics 
R2 0.90
Adjusted R2 0.89
Standard Error 3.20
PRESS 316.8
R2Prediction 0.86
Observations 24
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 2041.3 2041.3 186.57 3.18E-12 
Residual 22 240.7 10.9   
Total 23 2282.0       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 124.98 6.04 20.68 2.34E-16 
Log10(cas) -16.51 1.16 -14.23 6.85E-12 
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Table V-9: Public Support for Iraq per Casualty 
Regression Statistics 
R2 0.85
Adjusted R2 0.85
Standard Error 3.84
PRESS 2869.21
R2Prediction 0.85
Observations 191
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 16185.85 16185.85 1095.14 1.44E-80 
Residual 189 2793.37 14.78   
Total 190 18979.23       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 108.52 1.76 61.77 2.9E-127 
Log10(cas) -15.02 0.45 -33.09 1.44E-80 
 
The t-test statistics indicate the coefficients for the models for public support 
based on logarithm of casualties are all statistically significant.  Additionally, the R2 and 
adjusted R2 values above 0.80 signify the models appropriately represent the variance 
within the data.  
Figure V-12 provides the residuals for Korea, Vietnam and Iraq.  No significant 
trends occur in the data.  The residuals versus the log of casualties, predicted value and 
time have been included in the figure. 
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Figure V-12: Residuals for Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq (Log10(Casualties)) 
Figure V-13 presents the 95% confidence intervals of the coefficient for log10(cas) 
for each of the three wars and indicates that Mueller’s rule of thumb (as casualties 
increased by an order of magnitude: the support for the war dropped by about 15 
percentage points) is supported by the data from Iraq.  It should be noted that casualties 
can only increase with time; therefore, a correlation between these factors is expected 
(the rate, however, may vary).  Additionally, the 95% confidence intervals for the start of 
the war (Y-Intercept) for Korea, Vietnam and Iraq overlap at 113% of public support as 
seen in Figure V-14.  Based on these three data sets, the hypothesis that public opinion 
theoretically began at 113% cannot be statistically rejected. 
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Figure V-14: Confidence Intervals of Y-Intercept (Log10(Casualties)) 
Based on the confidence intervals, Equation V-2 provides a generic model of 
public support as the logarithm of total casualties in Iraq.   
 10113 15log ( )Public Support casualties= −  (V-2) 
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The model does not fit well in early stages of the conflict when the casualties are 
low or zero.  However, this only occurs when there are less than ten casualties.  Further 
addressing this issue Mueller states: 
The intercept figure is a backward extrapolation to an imaginary starting point 
percentage … at the point when casualties would have been zero.  To avoid this 
absurdity a transformation of the dependent variable could have been undertaken, 
but this would have complicated the analysis without adding any important new 
information.  (Mueller, 1973, p.60) 
 
Least Squares Multiple Linear Regression 
Basic Model 
In the previous section, two single variable models for the three conflicts were 
presented.  This section considers a model combining both previous variables along with 
additional variables into a single model.  Using data provided by The Brooking Institute 
within the Iraq Index, ten variables were included in a least squares multiple linear 
regression (MLR) model (O’Hanlon & Kamp, 2006):  
Number of US troops present 
Daily attacks by insurgents 
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) 
Insurgents captured or killed 
Foreign nationals taken prisoner 
Total insurgents 
Total foreign insurgents 
British fatalities 
Iraqi civilian fatalities 
Iraqi military fatalities   
 
The original variables (log10(cas) and number of days) were also included in the MLR.  A 
stepwise linear regression analysis was performed and eight of the new variables were 
rejected at an α = 0.05 level, for modeling public support.  For this data, the α must be 
 136
relaxed to 0.17 before the next variable (British Fatalities) would be included in the MLR 
model.  Table V-10 provides the results and appropriate p-value from the analysis. 
Table V-10: Results from Stepwise Procedure 
Variable Estimate P-value 
Intercept 91.47 4.42E-41 
Log10(cas) -7.322 0.00161 
Insurgents (Captured/Killed) 0.0008418 0.00228 
Days -0.05957 0.00240 
Daily Attacks -0.0403 0.00813 
British Fatalities 0 0.1684 
Iraq Military Fatalities 0 0.2166 
Total Insurgents 0 0.3020 
Iraqi Security Forces 0 0.3999 
Iraq Civilian Fatalities 0 0.4515 
Foreign Insurgents 0 0.4947 
Foreigners Kidnapped 0 0.6334 
US Troops 0 0.9565 
 
The remaining four variables were statistically significant at an α = 0.05 level: 
logarithm of number of casualties (log10(cas)), number of insurgents captured 
(insurgents), days into the conflict (days), and daily number of attacks by insurgents 
(attacks) (see Appendix B).  Table V-11 is the complete MLR model.  The model and 
coefficients are significant, as shown in the table.  Log10(cas), days, and daily attacks 
have a negative impact on public support, while insurgents captured or killed has a small, 
but positive effect on public support.  Figure V-15 plots the data along with the fitted data 
curve from the MLR model.  The ‘MLR results’ line of Figure V-15 used the historical 
values of each independent variable for the month indicated along the horizontal axis. 
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Table V-11: Public Support for Iraq (MLR Model) 
Regression Statistics 
R2 0.87
Adjusted R2 0.86
Standard Error 3.72
PRESS 2728.43
R2Prediction 0.86
Observations 191
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 4 16400.2 4100.0 295.69 1.98E-79 
Residual 186 2579.1 13.9   
Total 190 18979.2    
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 91.47 5.24 17.47 4.42E-41 
Log10(cas) -7.322 2.287 -3.20 0.00161 
Insurgents Killed 0.0008418 0.000272  3.09 0.00228 
Days -0.05957 0.01935 -3.08 0.00240 
Attacks -0.04030 0.01506 -2.68 0.00813 
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Figure V-15: Public Support of Iraq (MLR Results) 
 Table V-12 is the correlation matrix of the significant variables.  As suggested 
earlier, the log10(cas) was correlated with the number of days into the conflict.  Similarly, 
the number of insurgents capture or killed was correlated with the number of days into 
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the conflict.  This correlation suggests redundancy in the significant variables and 
violates the independence assumption discussed in Chapter 2.  Multicollinearity may 
cause the variable’s standard error to increase or the t-test statistic to decrease, among 
other problems.  These consequences would cause concerns about the suitability of the 
model.  Factor analysis may be applied to produce rotated factors which are uncorrelated 
and therefore do not have the consequences associated with multicollinearity. 
Table V-12: Correlation of Variables for MLR 
 Log10(cas) Insurgents Days Attacks 
Log10(cas) 1 0.84 0.88 0.76 
Insurgents ~ 1 0.99 0.91 
Days ~ ~ 1 0.90 
Attacks ~ ~ ~ 1 
 
 The residuals plots for each variable from the MLR are presented in Figure V-16.   
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Figure V-16: Residual Plot for Each Variable in MLR Model 
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The three linear regression models presented in this section are compared in 
Figure V-17.  Table V-13 compares the R2, F-test statistics, and standard errors (RMSE) 
for the three models.  The data curves relied on the historical data of each independent 
variable at the month indicated. 
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Figure V-17: Comparison of Linear Models of Public Support 
 
Table V-13: Comparison of Linear Models 
  Iraq (Days) 
Iraq 
(Log10(cas)) Iraq (MLR) 
R2 0.71 0.85 0.87 
Adjusted R2 0.70 0.85 0.86 
R2Prediction 0.70 0.85 0.86 
F-Test 454.16 1095.13 295.69 
Standard Error 
(RMSE) 5.43 3.84 3.72 
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 The MLR analysis indicates that the actions taken by the insurgents and by the US 
military shape the public opinion of the conflict.  The number of US casualties and 
number of insurgent captured are influenced by the actions and decisions of both sides, 
while the insurgents alone are able to directly have an effect on the number of daily 
attacks.  Therefore, the MLR model is able to quantify, for the variables used, the impacts 
to public opinion from actions taken by both the insurgents and the military.  
Factor Analysis 
 The fitted model provides a precise estimate of the coefficient and the coefficient 
is the influence of the variable.  Multicollinearity makes the direct influence of a variable 
potentially difficult to precisely obtain.  One method to address multicollinearity is to 
apply an orthogonal factor analysis.  This section provides a basic overview to factor 
analysis and applies the technique to the data used to fit the multiple linear regression.  
Fruchter (1954), Harman (1976), and Montgomery, Peck and Vining (2001), among 
others, all provide more details.   
 Factor analysis is a method to analyze data which reveals significant, unobserved 
factors within observed variables or factors.  If orthogonal factors are extracted the 
factors may be used to avoid the multicollinearity of the underlying variables.  This does, 
however, require interpretation of the factors.   
The technique is very similar to principle component analysis.  However, factor 
analysis is generally preferred when the goal is to determine an underlying structure, 
while principle component analysis is typically applied for data reduction (Harmon, 
1976, p. 14).  Additionally, Dillon and Goldstein state that principle component analysis 
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is variance oriented, and factor analysis is focused of the covariance (Dillon & Goldstein, 
1984, p. 71).  If an orthogonal rotation is used, these orthogonal representations are 
uncorrelated by design to satisfy the multiple linear regression assumption of 
independence.  Oblique rotations may also be used to identify other factors.  This 
research uses regression analysis of the uncorrelated factors to build a model of public 
resolve. 
An orthogonal, varimax factor analysis was originally performed on the data with 
all twelve variables; however, the results did not provide any additional analytic insight.  
Therefore, the remainder of the section only refers to the factor analysis performed on the 
four significant variables found in the multiple linear regression analysis.  Table V-14 
presents the resulting eigenvalues and percent variability accounted for by their factors.  
A factor analysis of four variables yields four eigenvalues each associated with a factor.  
The percent variability is the contribution of the factor to the variance of all the variables 
(Harmon, 1976, p. 18). 
Table V-14: Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Eigenvalue 3.6554 0.2496 0.0943 0.0006 
Percent 
Variability 91.39 6.24 2.36 0.02 
Cum Percent 91.39 97.63 99.98 100 
 
Franklin et al. (1995) and Horn et al. (1979) both indicate the number of factors 
selected in the factor analysis is a highly debated issue.  Some methods, such as Kaiser’s 
rule, retain all components with eigenvalues greater than one (Franklin et al., 1995, p. 
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101).  Some tests such as Bartlett’s Chi-Square test use the latent roots of the residual 
matrix (Horn et al., 1979, p. 288).  Other tests rely on graphical interpretations.  Cattell’s 
scree test looks for the knee of the curve when plotting the eigenvalue of each factor in 
the analysis.  Cattell suggests using the number of factors after the trend in the plot no 
longer changes rapidly; therefore, the ‘knee in the curve’ is counted when determining 
the number of factors.   
Criticism for each method exists.  Kaiser’s rule can over extract components and 
thus not include factors which may help provide understanding of the data (Franklin et 
al., 1995, p. 103).   Bartlett’s Chi-Square test is highly dependent upon sample size and 
Cattell’s scree test may overestimate the number of factors (Franklin et al., 1995, p. 103). 
Applying Cattell’s scree test, Figure V-18 suggests the use of two factors.   
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Figure V-18: Scree Plot for Factors of Public Resolve 
An orthogonal rotation was performed using the varimax method (see Harman, 
1976, p. 290-299).  Table V-15 is the factor loading matrix for the key factors of public 
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resolve.  As observed during the scree test, two factors were obtained from the factor 
loading matrix.  A pattern exists in the matrix where the first factor has influences from 
the days into the conflict, number of daily attacks and total insurgents captured or killed.  
This was defined as the time driven component.  The second factor is primarily 
influenced by the log10 of US casualties.  This factor was defined as the casualty driven 
component. Table V-16 provides the rotation matrix. 
Table V-15: Factor Loading Matrix of Public Support Key Factors 
Variable 
Factor 1 
Time Driven 
Component 
Factor 2 
Casualty Driven 
Component 
Log10(cas) 0.48 0.85 
Insurgents 
(Captured/Killed) 0.86 0.49 
Days 0.81 0.57 
Daily Attacks 0.82 0.43 
 
Table V-16: Rotation Matrix of Public Support 
Variable 
Factor 1 
Time Driven 
Component 
Factor 2 
Casualty Driven 
Component 
Intercept -1.18 -2.22 
Log10(cas) 0.593 -0.375 
Insurgents 
(Captured/Killed) 0.000303 -0.000380 
Days -0.0176 0.0253 
Daily Attacks -0.00288 0.00511 
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 Applying the rotation to the initial data with four variables yields a new set of 
data with two factors.  A multiple linear regression of public resolve and these two 
factors yields the ANOVA table presented in Table V-17. 
Table V-17: Public Support for Iraq (Two-Factor Analysis Model using MLR) 
Regression Statistics 
R2 0.85
Adjusted R2 0.85
Standard Error 3.85
PRESS 2874.18
R2Prediction 0.85
Observations 191
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 2 16197.76 8098.88 547.40 4.01E-79 
Residual 188 2781.47 14.80   
Total 190 18979.23       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 51.11 0.28 183.64 4.8E-214 
Time Factor -4.77 0.28 -17.26 1.23E-40 
Casualty Factor -7.91 0.28 -28.69 1.35E-70 
 
 The standard error (RMSE) of the model remains very close to the error of the 
other linear models as presented in Table V-13; however, the model does not possess the 
multicollinearity of the previous models.   
Figure V-19 depicts the results of the factor analysis model and provides the 
multiple linear regression model results (Table V-11) for comparison.  The ‘MLR results’ 
and ‘Factor Analysis’ lines of the figure used the historical values of each independent 
variable/ factor for the month indicated along the horizontal axis.   
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Figure V-19: Comparison of Public Support from MLR Model and Factor Analysis Model 
Several of the residuals from the factor analysis are presented in Figure V-20.  No 
significant trends were observed in the data. 
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Figure V-20: Residuals from Factor Analysis (Two Factors) 
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As with any factor analysis, the ideal number of factors to be used can be 
contested.  The scree test indicates that two variables should be included.  It should be 
noted, since the second eigenvalue is much less than one, justification can also be made 
for one factor.  Table V-18 are the results when only one factor was used and regressed to 
the public opinion response.  
Table V-18: Public Support for Iraq (One-Factor Analysis Model using MLR) 
Regression Statistics 
R2 0.21
Adjusted R2 0.21
Standard Error 8.90
PRESS 15161.97
R2Prediction 0.20
Observations 191
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 4020.50 4020.50 50.80 2.1E-11 
Residual 189 14958.73 79.15   
Total 190 18979.23       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 51.11 0.64 79.40 4.2E-147 
Factor 1 -4.55 0.64 -7.13 2.1E-11 
 
The results in Table V-18 indicate the use of one factor results in a weaker model.  
Additionally, the residuals in Figure V-21 suggest a trend in the data.   
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Figure V-21: Residuals from Factor Analysis (One Factor) 
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One limitation of least squares linear regression models is they should not be 
used, if not supported, for extrapolation beyond the range of the variables used in 
building the model.  For methods to approximate the response beyond the known data 
ranges see Bratley, Fox, and Schrage (1987), among others.  Because of this limitation, 
the results of the analyses should be viewed cautiously when projected outside the range 
supported by the data.   
An approach to avoid exceeding the bounds for public resolve is to build a 
multivariate logistic regression model.  A benefit of logistic regression is the expectation 
function is constrained between zero and one.  Since the data for public resolve 
represents the percent of the population which supports the conflict using logistic 
regression limits the fitted model to feasible responses.  This approach is presented in the 
next section. 
Generalized Linear Model 
The public support for the conflict in Iraq was fit to a logistic regression model 
using the twelve independent variables identified in the previous section on MLR.  Since 
the number of people questioned for each survey was known, it was possible to use a 
binomial model.  Each survey (pi or observation) questioned ni people, with mi people 
supporting the conflict.   
The survey data referenced within Appendix A and the data for the factors from 
the Iraq Index was used to fit a logistic regression model (Appendix B).  Five variables 
were determined to be significant; the same four variables used in the MLR and the 
independent variable indicating the number of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).  The model is 
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presented in Table V-19.  The summary of the regression coefficients and standard error 
is presented for each of the factors.   
Table V-19: Public Support for Iraq (Logistic Regression Model) 
Goodness of Fit Factor 
Deviance 809.7
Pearson Deviance 802.7
  -LogLikelihood χ2 df Prob > χ 
Difference 2824.02 5648.04 5 0.0E-200 
Full 133229.03    
Reduced 136053.05    
  Coefficients Standard Error χ2 Prob > χ 
Intercept 2.42 0.12 461.2 2.70E-102 
Days -0.0009919 0.0004 6.4 0.011 
Log10(cas) -0.552 0.048 134.1 5.27E-31 
Attacks -0.00129 0.00026 24.2 8.80E-07 
Insurgents Killed 1.77E-05 5.30E-06 11.1 0.00086 
Iraq Security Force -5.88E-07 2.26E-07 6.8 0.0093 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, deviance was used to measure overall adequacy of the 
logistic regression model.  The deviance for this model was 809.7, which was greater 
than the critical value, χ2α=0.05, 185 = 225.  Since deviance > 225, it was concluded this 
initial model was not adequate.   
 The model was evaluated for additional independent variables and the residuals 
were investigated for trends indicating if additional transformations of factors were 
required.  No additional variables were found and the residuals did not indicate any 
required transformations.  Figure V-22 presents the normalized predicted responses 
compared to the deviance residuals.   
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Figure V-22: Residuals from Public Support (Logistic Regression Results) 
Since no other variables could be added to account for the variability within the 
results and no specific trends were discovered in the residual analysis, the data was 
assumed to be overdispersed or exhibit extra binomial variation.   
The Lambert and Roeder test of convexity was used for the model of public 
support represented in Table V-19.  The resulting graph (Figure V-23) was clearly 
convex, indicating the presence of overdispersion.  Overdispersion indicates the actual 
variance is greater than the expected variance.  Since a binomial was used for the data, 
the variance is based directly on the mean.  This direct connection between mean and 
variance was not the best representation of the data.  The overdispersion factor,φ , 
accounts for this disconnect.   
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Figure V-23: Convexity Plot of Logistic Regession Model of Public Support 
Using William’s procedure, φˆ  was determined to equal 0.003627 when all twelve 
factors of the model were included.  The weights for each observation were calculated 
and the model was refit.  The model adjusted for overdispersion had the same four 
significant factors as the MLR.  Table V-20 is the final logistic regression model of 
public support.  The equation displays the regression coefficients, standard error, and χ2 
for each factor.  Figure V-24 presents the logistic regression model and the original 
survey data.  The ‘Logistic Regression results’ line of the figure used the historical values 
of each independent variable for the month indicated along the horizontal axis. 
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Table V-20: Public Support for Iraq (Logistic Regression Model Corrected for Overdispersion) 
Goodness of Fit Factor 
Deviance 188.0
Pearson Deviance 186.0
William’s Weight 0.003627
  -LogLikelihood χ2 df Prob > χ 
Difference 705.30 1410.61 4 3.46E-304 
Full 27446.21    
Reduced 28151.51    
  Coefficients Standard Error χ2 Prob > χ 
Intercept 2.16 0.22 98.82 2.77E-23 
Days -0.00204 0.00077 6.96 0.0083 
Log10(cas) -0.436 0.094 21.55 3.45E-06 
Attacks -0.00162 0.00056 8.42 0.0037 
Insurgents Killed 3.04E-05 1.08E-05 7.89 0.0050 
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Figure V-24: Public Support of Iraq (Logistic Regression Results) 
Unfortunately, deviance of the model was no longer a valid check of the overall 
adequacy of the model, due to William’s procedure which adjusts the deviance to the 
degrees of freedom within of the model.  No conclusion about the statistical significance 
of the model can be made; therefore, the logistic regression model was not used later in 
the development of the model of fourth generation operation in Chapter 7.  
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As with the MLR model, the same correlations were observed (see Table V-12).  
As applied in the MLR section, factor analysis was used to address the observed 
multicollinearity.  The time and casualty components were used from the factor analysis 
performed in the previous section.  These factors were regressed using logistic regression.  
Table V-21 provides the results from the logistic regression.  The deviance of the model 
was significantly higher than the critical value from the χ2 distribution, implying the 
model was again inadequate.  As observed earlier in this section, the lack of fit may result 
from a lack of independent variables or overdispersion. 
Table V-21: Public Support for Iraq (Factor Analysis Model using Logistic Regression) 
Goodness of Fit Factor 
Deviance 974.4
Pearson Deviance 966.8
  -LogLikelihood χ2 df Prob > χ 
Difference 2741.65 5483.30 2 0 
Full 133311.40    
Reduced 136053.05    
  Coefficients Standard Error χ2 Prob > χ 
Intercept 0.103 0.0047 491.3 7.54E-109 
Time Factor -0.191 0.0045 1831.6 0 
Casualty Factor -0.334 0.0057 3757.5 0 
  
While logistic regression offers several potential benefits, including a response 
which is constrained between zero and one, this research did not use the technique or 
models in later chapters of the dissertation.   
Impact of Media Reporting 
This research suggested one additional important variable; the percent of positive 
stories about the war in Iraq.  This area of research required data provided by two studies 
conducted by The Media Research Center.  The first study investigated the major 
network evening news coverage (ABC, CBS, and NBC) of the war in Iraq from January 
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through September 2005 (Noyes, 2005, p. 1).  The second study analyzed news reports of 
the cable television channels (CNN, MSNBC, and Fox News Channel) for ten weeks 
from May 15th through July 21st 2006 (McCormack et al., 2006, p. 2).   
The Media Research Center classified each of the news stories of the war as 
positive, negative, or neutral.   
To be classified as “positive,” the optimistic news had to exceed the pessimistic 
by at least a three-to-two margin; to be counted as a “negative” story, the story 
had to be similarly dominated by bad news. Stories that could not be assigned to 
either group were counted as balanced or neutral. (Noyes, 2005, p. 2) 
 
It should be noted that the classification of what is positive, neutral, and negative 
may be open to interpretation.  Be that as it may, the Media Research Center’s data was 
taken as accurate for this analysis.  Clearly, the analysis should be repeated if this 
assumption proves to be inaccurate. 
The percent of stories which were reported to be positive regarding the war in Iraq 
was never greater than 28% in the Media Research Center’s analysis.  While the percent 
of negative stories reached a high of 83% at the end of May 2006.  On average, for the 
period reported by the Media Research Center, 58% of the stories were negative, 30% 
were neutral and only 12% were positive.   
Using least squares simple linear regression, the percent of positive and negative 
stories were both regressed to public support.  The analysis used the public opinion data 
from the two timeframes the Media Research Center provided data.  This limited the 
analysis to only thirty-five points of data.  Table V-22 provides the resulting model based 
on the number of positive stories, and Table V-23 provides the model based on percent of 
negative stories.  The same hypothesis tests were used as discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Table V-22: Public Support for Iraq based on Percent of Positive Stories 
Regression Statistics 
R2 0.34
Adjusted R2 0.32
Standard Error 2.44
PRESS 221.37
R2Prediction 0.26
Observations 35
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 100.99 100.99 16.98 0.000239 
Residual 33 196.30 5.95   
Total 34 297.29       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 43.12 0.97 44.25 5.8E-31 
Percent Positive 30.16 7.32 4.12 0.000239 
 
Table V-23: Public Support for Iraq based on Percent of Negative Stories 
Regression Statistics 
R2 0.031
Adjusted R2 0.002
Standard Error 2.95
PRESS 328.71
R2Prediction -0.11
Observations 35
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 9.24 9.24 1.06 0.310934 
Residual 33 288.05 8.73   
Total 34 297.29       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 49.24 2.47 19.96 5.45E-20 
Percent Negative -4.06 3.95 -1.03 0.311 
 
Table V-22 shows there was a correlation between the percent of positive stories 
and the increase in public support for the conflict.  The R2 indicated that this factor alone 
did not fully explain the variance of the data.  However, the factor was statistically 
significant.  Conversely, Table V-23 indicated the percent of negative stories was not 
statistically significant.  The magnitude of the t-test statistic (-1.03) was less than the 
critical value from the t-distribution (2.03).  Additionally, as expected based on the t-test, 
the F-test statistic indicated the model was not statistically significant.   
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A multiple linear regression analysis was also performed using the twelve 
previous independent variables and the percent of positive and negative news reports.  
The completed analysis created a model which included the logarithm base ten of the 
total US casualties and the percent of positive media reports.  The other variables were 
not considered to be statistically significant at an α = 0.05 level.  The decrease in 
significant factors (from the previous MLR model) was anticipated given the smaller 
sample size.  Table V-24 provides the model for the limited timeframe.  
Table V-24: Public Support for Iraq (MLR with Percent of Positive Media Reports) 
Regression Statistics 
R2 0.997
Adjusted R2 0.967
Standard Error 2.61
PRESS 253.35
R2Prediction 0.997
Observations 35
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 2 76578.22 38289.11 5636.74 1.7E-41 
Residual 33 224.16 6.79   
Total 35 76802.38       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Log10(cas) 38.70 7.64 5.06 1.53E-05 
Percent Positive 10.01 0.24 41.36 5.19E-30 
 
 As the R2 and F-tests indicate, the model provides significant insight into the 
factors impacting the public resolve for the time period.  Figure V-25 illustrates the 
original data for public resolve (Iraq Polling Data), and the model’s response at each data 
point given the independent variables historical value for the date on the horizontal axis 
(MLR results).  The figure also presents the percent of positive media reports (Positive 
Reports).  The connection between the changes in the public resolve and the number of 
positive reports is clear.  Positive reports appear to have a mitigating effect, improving 
public support for the war.  
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Figure V-25: Public Support and Percent of Positive Media Reports 
 Further analysis of the final data point on Figure V-25 provides an illustration of 
how this impact may be evaluated.  Given there were no positive reports that week, there 
was no positive impact; however, if the percent of positive reports increased to 10%, the 
model suggested that the notional support of the war would increase to 47% from 43%.  
Similarly, if the percent of media reports were at levels seen in early 2005 (21%), the 
model implied that support for the war might have been as high as 52%.  Additionally, if 
the percent of positive media reports was at the reported high of 28%, the public support 
may have been as high as 54% (a full 10% increase in total public support). 
 Unfortunately, the data covered less than a year of the conflict in Iraq.  Therefore, 
percent of positive media stories was not included in the final model of public resolve 
used later in this dissertation.  While not included in the model for the dissertation, the 
independent variable and related importance did require a discussion.  Further research 
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and analysis of media reporting, as well as other scores of positive, neutral and negative 
stories from varied raters, would allow this variable to be included within a model of 
public resolve.   
Recent Polling Data and Summary 
 Recent Polling Data 
 The models presented in this chapter were created using data ending in 2006.  
These were compared to activities which occurred in July 2007.  The opinion survey 
from 6-8 July shows only 36% support (Gallop); July 18th-21st, 36% (ABC); and finally, 
July 20th-22nd, 42% (CBS).  This gives a simple average of 38.0% of the US population is 
supporting the current conflict in Iraq.  The standard deviation is 3.5%.     
 The least squares simple linear regression model based only on days into the 
conflict (Table V-4) suggests the public support should be 33.1%.  The model based on 
the logarithm of the number of casualties (Table V-9) suggests the public support should 
be 41.2%.  The MLR model (Table V-11) reports 37.9% in July 2007, GLM (Table 
V-20) reports 38.8%, and the factor analysis model (Table V-17) reports 35.0%.  The 
values were based on reported data for each factor for mid-July 2007 (O’Hanlon & 
Campbell, 2007).  All the models, except the least squares simple linear regression model 
based on days, provided predictions very close to the observed values and were within 
one standard deviation of the data.  Based on the data available, it can be supported 
statistically that public resolve decreases over time and is related to the casualties 
sustained. 
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The least squares multiple linear regression model of public resolve provides 
insights to the implications of current policy and military doctrine.  The number of US 
casualties and duration of the conflict which has already occurred can not be reduced; 
therefore, their contribution to public resolve cannot be reversed.  However, if the total 
number of insurgents captured (or killed) increased and the number of daily attacks 
decreases, the model suggests that public support for the conflict may increase.  The 
research also suggests (based on a limited sample) that positive media reports have a 
positive effect on public support. 
The Brookings Institute’s Iraq Index suggest that at the end of 2006 there were 
roughly 25,000 insurgents (O’Hanlon & Campbell, 2007, p. 26) and approximately 175 
daily attacks made by insurgents (O’Hanlon & Campbell, 2007, p. 7).  Theoretically, if 
all of these estimated insurgents could be removed (additionally causing the daily attacks 
to reduce to zero) without creating new insurgents, the percent of population supporting 
the conflict based on the statistical model could increase by 28.1%, suggesting over 71% 
of the US population might support the conflict.  If only a quarter of this objective was 
completed, the model suggested the public resolve could potentially increase to over 
50%.  Unfortunately, data from Korea, Vietnam, or Afghanistan provide no empirical 
evidence that the downward trend of public resolve has been reversed. 
Summary 
This chapter presented multiple models of US support for conflicts, with 
particular attention to Iraq.  The data for building these models included recent public 
opinion data along with historical data from Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan.  The first 
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model, a simple least squares linear regression with time as the covariate, showed a 
similar trend in slope for Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq, suggesting that public opinion 
declines at ~0.6% per month or ~2% per quarter.  Additionally, public support for the 
first four years of Iraq and the first five years of Vietnam (1965-1969) can be represented 
with the same model (Equation V-1).  This conclusion indicates that the decline of public 
support for Vietnam and Iraq over time are statistically the same. 
Mueller proposed that as the number of casualties increase by an order of 
magnitude, the public support for a war decreases by 15%.  This was based on data from 
Vietnam and Korea.  This research concludes Mueller’s proposed model is still valid for 
the conflict in Iraq. 
 When looking for other variables which influence public opinion, a multiple 
linear regression analysis and logistic regression analysis both identify the same four 
variables.  The key variables were the logarithm of the number of US casualties, days 
into the conflict, number of daily attacks made by insurgents, and number of insurgents 
captured or killed.  Only the number of insurgents captured or killed had a positive 
impact on public opinion.   
Factor analysis was applied to the key variables found during the linear and 
logistic regressions.  This analysis was able to eliminate the correlation within the factors 
used in the models.  Finally, the impact of the percent of positive media reports regarding 
the war in Iraq was analyzed.  The factor was determined to have significant influence on 
the public resolve for the conflict; however, there was insufficient data spanning the 
duration of the conflict to support including the factor in the following chapters. 
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As seen in this chapter, both the multiple linear regression model (Table V-11) 
and the logistic regression model (Table V-20) can be used to estimate the public resolve 
for the conflict.  As they are both members of generalized linear models (GLM), GLM 
has been demonstrated as a valid and powerful technique to estimate the US public 
resolve during a conflict. 
The chapter constructed a modeling framework of public resolve.  The framework 
was founded on empirical evidence of key factors influencing the public resolve.  The 
proposed model within this study demonstrates how actions made by both the insurgents 
and the US military impact public opinion.  The R2Prediction values for several of the 
models indicate the prediction of the variance within the model is greater than 80%.  
Further research incorporating perturbations, such as elections and troop surges, 
to the public resolve should be pursued.  These impacts may significantly change the 
regression coefficients.  These models for public resolve can be used within current 
combat models to gauge the public support of various courses of action.  Additionally, 
the impact of public resolve can be connected to the combat effectiveness of our troops. 
This chapter presented the fourth contribution of the dissertation.  The chapter 
constructed a modeling framework of public resolve.  The framework was founded on 
empirical evidence of key factors influencing the public resolve. The proposed model 
within this study demonstrates how actions taken by both the insurgents and the US 
military impact public opinion. 
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VI. Modeling Morale 
Chapter Overview 
Warfare has always included aspects of fighting spirit and morale.  This can be 
seen by the effects of drums, the Spartan’s red cloaks, the sighting of a single Iroquois 
Confederation scout, Lord Haw-Haw’s or Hanoi Hannah’s broadcasts, or today’s 
asymmetric conflicts with the employment of improvised explosive devises (IEDs).  
These aspects can be seen currently in the many facets of information operations and 
information warfare.  However, as the services expand their information operation 
efforts, this ability to directly influence the hearts and minds of the population and 
soldiers will be more commonplace.   
This chapter develops a theoretical modeling framework of combat spirit.  Several 
factors which impact the framework are discussed.  The chapter concludes with an 
application of the modeling framework.  The example models the morale of notional 
brigades and battalions that have deployed into Iraq based, in part, on the actual histories.  
An excursion based on the impact of multiple deployments is also presented. 
Supposition of Soldier Morale 
This section develops an equation representing the model of morale provided by 
Stafford-Clark and Menninger.  The morale curves were introduced in Chapter 2.  This 
equation, which is based on control theory, enables other influences to be modeled 
impacting the morale of deployed soldiers.    
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Applying the log decrement method from control theory, both the Stafford-Clark 
model and Menninger model were represented as a second order response to an impulse.  
The heights at arrival, engagement, and acceptance were used to derive ζ, and the 
distance between peak times of engagement and acceptance was used to calculate the 
period of the function.  The coefficients from the log decrement method are presented in 
Table VI-1, arbitrarily assuming the system’s steady-state is zero and the height at arrival 
is 0.5.   
Table VI-1: Coefficients for Response to an Impulse 
 Stafford-Clark Menninger Model of Soldier Morale 
ζ 0.18 0.21 0.2 
Period, T  
(% of deployment) 0.77 0.71 0.7 
 
Equation VI-1 presents the model of soldier morale based on the length of 
deployment (L) and time in theater (t). 
 ( )
11.832 8.9760.1070 sin
t
LSoldier morale t L e t
L
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜⎝ ⎠⎟
 (VI-1) 
Using the data from Table VI-1, the transient response to an impulse was overlaid 
on the original morale curves provided by Stafford-Clark and Menninger (Figure VI-1 
and Figure VI-2).  Unfortunately, a statistical fit of the relation can not be conducted 
since the original graphs were only hand drawn and not mathematically derived. 
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Figure VI-1: Comparing the Stafford-Clark Curve and a Response to an Impluse 
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Figure VI-2: Comparing the Menninger Curve and a Response to an Impluse  
 Figure VI-1 and Figure VI-2 indicate that the model of soldier morale from 
Equation VI-1 provides similar results as the hand drawings provided by Stafford-Clark 
and Menninger.  From these observations a general supposition of soldier morale is 
proposed: 
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Supposition of Soldier Morale: The Morale of an individual or unit engaged in a 
classical combat situation can be modeled as a second order system represented as 
the transient response to an impulse.  Specifically, the period is 70% of the length 
of deployment and ζ  = 0.2.   
 
While individual elements will always affect a specific unit’s morale, the 
supposition can be used in combat models.  The coefficients of the proposed relation are 
presented in Table VI-1.  Figure VI-1 also compares this proposed relation with the 
Stafford-Clark morale curve and the fitted impulse.  The proposed relation is not 
illustrated in Figure VI-2, since the data are obscured by the fitted impulse.  The system 
is well represented by an impulse, since the unit is at an average level of morale while in 
garrison waiting to be deployed.  The deployment order is the impulse to the system.  The 
morale curves suggested within this study do not start at zero.  This represents the time 
required to transit to theater and engage the enemy. 
Assuming a deployment of twelve months, with peak morale occurring prior to 
deployment and the minimum morale occurring one-third of the way through the 
deployment, the morale curve for a typical brigade is estimated by Figure VI-3.  
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Figure VI-3: Morale Curve of a Twelve Month Deployment 
 165
 The supposition is supported by research on OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
conducted by Smith and Hagman (2006).  They researched the morale and cohesion of 
members of the 172nd Stryker Brigade, immediately preceding their deployment to Iraq 
and also six months into their deployment (mid-deployment).  They categorized the 
results of their surveys based on horizontal changes, vertical changes and organizational 
changes.  This represented how the members associated with their comrades (horizontal), 
the unit cohesion with their commanders (vertical) and of the overall brigade 
(organizational).  The results (as seen in Figure VI-4) demonstrate the soldiers lost unit 
cohesion with their leadership (vertical) both directly and organizationally.  The cohesion 
between comrades did not change (horizontal).  The trend of loss of morale from pre-
deployment to mid-deployment further supports the supposition of soldier morale 
presented in this section.  Comparing the initial morale with the morale at month six, in 
Figure VI-3, tracks with the decrease suggested by Smith and Hagman. 
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Figure VI-4: Platoon Member Ratings of Cohesion  
(Smith & Hagman, 2006, Figure 2 Page 8) 
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 The control theory based soldier morale model introduced and developed in the 
section, supported by historical and empirical evidence, is next adapted by introducing 
several factors which may impact the shape and attributes of the morale curve. 
Influencing Factors 
The basic morale curve may be adjusted to represent several key factors.  These 
factors differ between each conflict due to military policies and environment.  This 
section highlights and develops several of these factors with support for their importance 
and methods to integrate the factors into the morale curve.   
Unit Cohesion 
As opposed to World War II, soldier could leave combat before the conflict ended 
in the Vietnam War.  “The realization that one did not have to get killed or wounded to 
return stateside, as was the expectation in World War II, raised hopes and individual 
morale” (Helmus & Glenn, 2005, p. 18).  On the other hand, individual rotations within 
Vietnam caused lower unit cohesion (Helmus & Glenn, 2005, p. 18). The enlisted 
soldiers generally rotated out of theater after 12 months, while the officers might only 
spend six months in theater (Helmus & Glenn, 2005, p. 17).  The experience of the 
commander directly impacted the morale and effectiveness of the soldier.   
Over half the battalion commanders in Vietnam were routinely relieved without 
cause prior to the end of their sixth month in command in country: over half the 
company commanders were similarly relieved before they completed four months 
in command.  (Thayer, 1975, p. 225) 
 
The vertical unit cohesion was difficult to build and maintain when commanders were 
rotated more often than the troops.  Additionally, combat effectiveness was directly 
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impacted.  The average number of KIAs per month for a battalion commander with less 
than six months experience was 4.98 soldiers in 1965 and 1966.  A battalion commander 
with over six months experience averaged 4.25 KIA per month (Thayer, 1975, p. 225).  
The impact is more significant when reporting the number of soldiers lost in sizable 
skirmishes (five or more deaths in a company in one day).  The battalion commander 
with less than six month in command lost 2.46 soldiers per month, while the commander 
with more than six months experience lost 1.62 soldiers per month in sizable skirmishes 
(Thayer, 1975, p. 225).  Therefore, it was good for effectiveness to be assigned in a unit 
with an experienced commander; however, since these commanders were routinely 
reassigned, it was difficult to assure these benefits.   
 The current policy of the US Army is that soldiers train and deploy together so 
that can meet operational requirements (AR 600-35, 2006, p. 3).  The policy is designed 
to increase both morale and combat effectiveness.  Unit cohesion is stronger since the 
unit trains and deploys together.  Further, extended training and operational time with the 
same commanders improve unit combat effectiveness.   
Veteran Status 
Rotation policy also relates directly to the next factor: combat veteran status.  A 
soldier who is a combat veteran performs differently than the soldier on their first 
deployment.  Quester et al. provide some insight into how morale changes over multiple 
deployments.  Quester et al. suggest that more deployments lower the soldier’s morale 
and therefore lower the reenlistment rates (2006, p. 9).  Figure VI-5 shows that the 
reenlistment rate decreases for first time USMC reenlistments as the number of 
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deployments increase.  A first term reenlistment is a young Marine facing their first 
reenlistment decision (Quester et al., 2006, p. 1).  Fifty-three percent of the Marines 
making reenlistment decisions have no dependents and thus are single without children 
(Quester et al., 2006, p. 7). 
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Figure VI-5: FY05 Reenlistment Rates for First Term Marines  
(Quester et al., 2006, Figure 4 Page 9) 
 
More information on the morale of veterans can be found in the Mental Health 
Advisory Team’s (MHAT) Reports.  The third report dated May 2006 provided 
information on the soldier’s morale deployed during OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
04-06.  One of the insights from the MHAT’s Report was the personal morale between 
first time and multiple deployers did not vary significantly.  Specifically, 55% of first 
time deployers and 57% of multiple deployers ranked their morale as medium, high or 
very high (MHAT-III, 2006, p. 18).  On the other hand, individual views of how these 
individuals viewed their unit morale did significantly differ; only 45% of the multiple-
time deployers ranked morale as medium, high or very high, compared to 59% for first 
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timers (MHAT-III, 2006, p. 18).  This difference was shown to be statistically significant 
(z-value = -2.48, p <0.05) (MHAT-III, 2006, p. 18).  These results imply that the combat 
veteran’s perception of unit cohesion decreases, by 14%, when each unit redeploys to 
theater.  The same trend was observed in the MHAT-IV report.   
 Multiple deployers are also more susceptible to mental health problems.  The 
MHAT-IV report indicates acute stress, depression, and anxiety were all statistically 
higher among multiple deployers when compared to first time deployers.  Figure VI-6 
provides the percent of soldiers who screened positive for each mental health problem.   
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Figure VI-6: Mental Health Problems of First and Multiple Time Deployers 
(MHAT-IV, 2006, Figure 8 Page 23) 
 
As seen with unit morale, the multiple time deployers on average exhibit lower 
morale and potentially lower combat effectiveness.  Their effectiveness is potentially 
lower since they are more susceptible to mental health problems.  
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Deployment Duration 
Another factor which may impact the morale of the forces is the actual 
deployment duration as opposed to the DEROS (date of expected return from overseas.)  
Hosek, Kavanagh, and Miller provide a model which predicts the probability of retention 
based on time away as opposed to expected time away.  Table VI-2 provides the results 
of their model and suggests how the intention to stay (thus implying morale) decreases as 
the actual time in theater extends beyond the expected DEROS.   
Table VI-2: Probability of Intension to Stay  
(Hosek, Kavanagh & Miller, 2006, Table 4.8 Page 78) 
 Army Navy USMC Air Force 
Enlisted 
Much Less 0.34 0.34 0.28 0.44 
Less 0.39 0.33 0.27 .04 
Neither 0.36 0.33 0.29 .041 
More 0.36 0.27 0.27 0.38 
Much More 0.31 0.17 0.27 0.24 
Officer 
Much Less 0.6 0.5 0.54 0.59 
Less 0.57 0.58 0.54 0.59 
Neither 0.62 0.53 0.55 0.58 
More 0.58 0.54 0.53 0.49 
Much More 0.48 0.38 0.46 0.44 
 
 The rows indicate the probability of intension to stay in the military based on the 
actual duration of deployment versus the expected DEROS.  For example the ‘Much 
Less’ column indicates the when an enlisted sailor was actually deployed much less time 
than expected, the rate of retention was predicted to be 34%.  On the other hand, when an 
enlisted sailor spent much more time deployed than expected, the probability the sailor 
stayed in the Navy was only 17%.  The percent of expected reenlistments dramatically 
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decreased from those whom returned from theater when expected (indicated as the 
Neither row in Table VI-2) and those whom returned much later than expected.  Navy 
enlisted were nearly one half the original rate, while the Air Force enlisted saw a decrease 
of 17%.   
We can model the impact of deployment changes by adjusting the morale curve 
based on the timing of the announcement to extend a unit or return the unit sooner than 
expected.  If a unit is extended for a few months soon after arriving to the theater of 
operations, the morale curve may simply be stretched to adjust to the longer duration.  
However, if the extension is announced just prior to returning stateside, the morale curve, 
which is already on the down slope from acceptance to reentry, continues to decrease 
perhaps at a higher rate. 
Leadership 
 The leadership of a unit is also very important to the soldier’s morale.  Examples 
of how leaders were able to manifest victory from their troops can be found throughout 
the pages of history.  Several examples occurred during the Civil War battle of Manassas 
in 1861.  Brigadier General Barnard Bee rallied his brigade stating: 
There is Jackson standing like a stone wall. Let us determine to die here, and we 
will conquer. Follow me. (Freeman, 1950, p. 82) 
 
The result was: 
 
His men obeyed the call; and, at the head of the column, the very moment when 
the battle was turning in our favor he fell, mortally wounded. (Freeman 1950, 
p. 82) 
 
Brigadier General Thomas Jackson was henceforth referred to as ‘Stonewall.’  Later 
during the same battle, addressing the 2nd and 4th Virginia Infantry, Stonewall Jackson 
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stated, “Reserve your fire till they come within fifty yards, then fire and give them the 
bayonet; and when you charge, yell like furies!” (Henderson, 1906, p. 151).  This was 
considered the first use of the Rebel Yell, further demoralizing the forces of the Union.  
McPherson states: 
Startled by this screaming counterattack the discouraged and exhausted Yankee 
soldiers, their three-month term almost up, suddenly decided they had fought 
enough.  They began to fall back, slowly and with scatted resistance at first, but 
with increasing panic as their officers lost control, men became separated from 
their companies, and the lest shred of discipline disappeared.  The retreat became 
a rout as men threw away guns, packs, and anything else that might slow them 
down in the wild scramble for the crossings of Bull Run. (1988, p.344) 
 
The image of ‘Stonewall’ Jackson standing before the troops as a ‘stone wall’ and his 
directive to use the Rebel Yell provided the leadership required to break the morale of the 
Union forces.  This loss of morale allowed the Confederate States of America to win the 
battle that day.   
This section provided an overview of how specific factors can impact the model 
of soldier morale.  The next section provides an example of how the model can provide 
insight to the conflict in Iraq. 
Application (Notional Morale in Iraq) 
 In this section, the model of soldier morale is applied to illustrate a notional 
estimate of the morale based on the US troops in Iraq.  The morale of each land brigade 
and amphibious battalion is approximated using the model of soldier’s morale.  By 
combining the morale for each unit, an overall morale of land and amphibious units is 
estimated.  This estimate offers insight the morale within theater, providing commanders 
the ability plan operations when morale is at high levels. 
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The date each US Army Brigade and USMC Battalion entered and left theater 
was used to model the notional morale.  Korb et al. published the dates of the US Army 
Combat Brigade’s deployments in their report titled, Beyond the Call of Duty (2007).  
The Center for Naval Analysis’s Marine Corps Deployed Unit Database (2007) was used 
to obtain the dates of USMC Battalion deployments.  While the actual dates are used, 
other parameters are notional; thus the illustration, while based on existing units, is 
notional.  The following analysis should not be assumed to actually represent any 
particular unit’s morale.  The notional estimated morale for each brigade/ battalion was 
represented by the model of soldier morale.  The morale curve was scaled to the length of 
the deployment and the system, prior to the impulse, was set at 0.5 (average morale on a 
scale from zero to one).  Additionally, the lowest morale of an average unit was assumed 
to occur at one third of the deployment duration.  Again, individual factors will certainly 
affect specific unit morale.   
The estimated morale of a single unit deployed for twelve months can be seen in 
Figure VI-3.  Figure VI-7 presents an overall notional estimate of hypothetical 
amphibious troop morale for four years of conflict.  The overall estimated morale was 
determined by using the weighted average of the each battalion.  The weight was based 
on the number of amphibious troops in each battalion.  Figure VI-7 also provides the 
estimated morale for two ground force battalions.  The time the battalion arrived in 
theater and duration can be observed. 
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Figure VI-7: Hypothesized Morale of Amphibious Units and two Battalions 
 Figure VI-8 presents the notional estimate for all land and amphibious units for 
four years.  The hypothesized land unit’s morale and overall morale were both calculated 
using weighted averages, as discussed previously.   
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Figure VI-8: Overall Hypothetical Morale 
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 Excursions can be tested by applying the insights from the influencing factors 
previously discussed.  For example, the morale curve can be adjusted to reflect the impact 
of veteran units returning to theater.  Quester et al.’s data about retention rates implies 
that morale deceases at least 6% each time an individual returns to theater (Quester et al., 
2006, p. 9).  In this scenario it was assumed that 50% of the troops previously deployed 
with unit; therefore, the overall morale of the unit decreased 3% each time the unit 
returned to theater.  With more data it would be possible to take a weighted average of 
the number of veterans in a unit.  Figure VI-9 illustrates the hypothesized impact to 
amphibious units’ morale after implementing such a notional loss of morale for veterans.   
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Figure VI-9: Hypothetical Amphibious Unit’s Morale as Impacted by Combat Veteran Status 
Figure VI-9 projects the morale to the fifth year of the conflict based on the 
deployment schedule.  After five years of the conflict, the baseline assumption of morale 
projects morale at roughly 0.5.  However, as more veterans return to theater the overall 
amphibious unit’s morale is decreased by as much as 0.085.  While actual unit morale is 
 176
affected by unit cohesion, experience, training, and leadership, this model can be used to 
estimate the optimal deployment schedule to maximize the morale within theater.  For 
example if all the troops enter the theater simultaneously, the morale will fall to its low 
when all the troops enter the engagement phase at the same time.  On the other hand, if 
the forces were appropriately staggered, some troops will be at the engagement phase 
while others troops will have higher morale since they were at the arrival or acceptance 
phase.  Figure VI-10 demonstrates the morale for two different deployment schedules.  
The first assumes twelve month deployments begin in the spring and six month 
deployments begin in both the spring and fall.  The second scenario had the forces evenly 
deployed (or staggered) every month.  The higher variance of the morale when the forces 
deploy in large groups is evident, when compared to the steady morale in theater when 
the deployments are evenly spread among all the months.  
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Figure VI-10: Hypothetical Morale of Various Deployment Schedules 
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The model can also be used in other, more complex simulations and war-games to 
estimate combatant morale.  Of course, actual morale is a fusion of individual unit 
cohesion, training, leadership, and experience. 
Although the application presented within this study focuses on the friendly 
operations, the theoretical modeling framework might be extended to an insurgency as 
well.  Hypothetically, the insurgent is recruited when a significant event creates an 
impulse to their morale which sends their support for the insurgency above the recruit’s 
specific threshold.  Since the insurgent has no expected duration of the conflict, the 
duration of the impact of the impulse is two years unless another significant event occurs.  
This duration is based on the time to create a new sense of self as described by 
Menninger (Menninger, 1988 p. 204).  The individual morale for each insurgent must be 
modeled since they are not among a deployed unit.  However, it may be possible to group 
the insurgents based on the months they were recruited and adjusted by the operations 
they participate in.  Any hypothesized results would have to factor in the effects of 
religious fervor and a suicide bomber mentality. 
Since the model of soldier morale is based on control theory, there are at least two 
means to improve the results.  First, regression analysis techniques can be applied to 
obtain statistically significant regressors for the control factors.  As the number of data 
points are provided, the regression and fit of the control theory improves.     
The performance parameters of control theory can also be optimized.  The 
parameters can be optimized to impact the level of morale.  It is possible to adjust 
parameters of the combatant’s morale so that a planned major operation can be conducted 
while the morale and effectiveness of the engaged combatants is expected to be high.  For 
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more information on the methods and procedures used to optimize the performance of 
control theory by adjusting the parameters, see Ogata (1997) among others. 
While developed to model the soldier’s morale, this framework can also be used 
in other situations where morale is important.  Obviously, this model provides a 
mathematical framework which can be used to model the deployments of Peace Corps 
members; however, as Menninger suggests his non-mathematical model can be applied 
universally, this control theory based framework may be applied universally.  The model 
can be applied to model the morale and effectiveness of a new employee, when 
developing a lesson plan to teach students, or to anticipate the performance of a project 
team.  Providing a new employee the encouragement or needed support during the initial 
slump may produce a more effective employee.  Whereas developing a lesson plan which 
integrates the morale curve may produce a more effective learning environment and 
therefore more effective students.  Given the morale cycle, work effort and effectiveness 
might be estimated in project planning.  Additionally, this model may be applied to 
model the morale of a firm after a merger, the start-up of a new company, or a team built 
for a specific task. 
Summary 
The fighting spirit and morale of the troops is a target in fourth generation 
operations.  This chapter provided a model which could be implemented to minimize the 
impact to the morale of our troops.  By investigating the troop’s morale and combat 
spirit, the impact to their combat effectiveness can be better understood. 
 179
A theoretical modeling framework of combat spirit was developed.  Several 
factors which impact the framework are discussed.  The chapter concluded with an 
illustration of the modeling framework.  The notional morale of each brigade and 
battalion that have deployed into Iraq was presented and combined to produce the 
hypothetical morale for land and amphibious units.  An excursion based on the impact of 
multiple deployments was also presented. 
The model of soldier morale based on a systems response to an impulse can be 
used as a measure of effectiveness during courses of action analyses.  The morale factor 
can be used within a combat model to insure the combatants are effective and efficient 
during the combat maneuvers.  With the proposed model, the effects of average morale 
can be incorporated into larger modeling efforts. 
This chapter presented the fifth contribution of the dissertation.  This contribution 
constructed a theoretical modeling framework that dynamically models soldier morale.  
This provides a capability to model and evaluate the aggregate impact of soldier morale 
due to various courses of action the commander may take or from other external factors. 
This chapter also completes the third objective of this research.  This objective 
was to construct a theoretical modeling framework to dynamically portray public resolve, 
will-to-fight, morale and combat spirit within a combat model.  The public resolve 
portion of the objective was completed in Chapter 5, and the morale and combat spirit is 
presented in this chapter.  These elements will next be combined into an overall model of 
elements of fourth generation operations. 
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VII. Modeling Elements of Fourth Generation Operations 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides an analytic framework for modeling elements of fourth 
generation operations.  This framework captures the morale of a deploying force and 
public resolve in support of their forces.  The model remains a model of conflict and 
combat; however, the impacts from the political, economic, and informational 
instruments of power are represented in the model through the dynamic adaptation of 
public resolve and soldier morale.   
This chapter combines the results of the previous four chapters creating a model 
of some elements of modern conflict.  The methodology to build the model is presented 
along with the submodels.  Additionally, the data for a scenario based on OPERATION 
IRAQI FREEDOM is populated during the discussion of model development.  Once the 
complete model is developed, the next section provides a discussion on the verification 
and validation of the model.  The verification and validation process is based on a 
multiple step procedure which is intended to provide confidence in the model.   
The final section provides two demonstrations of the potential applications of the 
model.  The first demonstration varies five key factors, providing a potential decision 
maker with insight to the importance of each factor.  The second demonstration 
emphasizes the versatility and importance of feedback loops and highlighting the 
framework’s ability to include softer aspects of combat.  
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Analytic Framework of Elements of Fourth Generation Operations 
The analytic framework of the model of elements of fourth generation operations 
is presented in this section.  This model expands on the system dynamics representation 
of the Lanchester Laws presented in Chapter 4.  A scenario based on the US forces (Blue) 
and insurgents (Red) in Iraq, from March 2003 through December 2006, was used to 
populate the model with data.  The deployment and redeployment schedules determined 
the number of Blue forces in theater (troops participating in the conflict).  The scenario’s 
implementation predetermined the Blue deployment schedules; however, it is possible to 
alter the implementation creating other options to deploy the Blue forces.  The number of 
Red forces was determined by the rate Red accumulated new forces which depended on 
the recruiting and training of insurgents.   
Figure VII-1 is the system dynamics representation of a top-level model of 
elements of fourth generation operations.  Using the symbology presented in Chapter 2, 
the square containers indicate levels, valves indicate rates, the double arrows show flow 
created by the rates, and single arrows indicate dependencies between various model 
components.  
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Figure VII-1: Simple Model of Combat 
The system dynamics representation of the Lanchester Laws is focused on the 
level of Blue and Red forces, where the forces are the number of personnel as represented 
by Helmbold’s general form of the Lanchester Laws (Equation II-15).  Blue and Red 
force levels are changed by the rate of Blue and Red Casualties.  Red Attrition is the total 
number of Red forces killed (or otherwise removed from battle) by the surviving Blue 
forces, and vice versa for Blue Attrition.  The Red and Blue Casualty rates depend upon 
the number of forces and their respective attrition coefficients.  The Blue forces increase 
as units Deploy into theater and decrease as the units redeploy to home station.  The Red 
force increase is determined by the number of new forces which enter on their side.   
In the broader analytic framework, either Red or Blue may increase by way of 
either deployments or simple increases.  In the scenario, Blue deploys and Red flows as a 
rate of recruitment.  The deployment of Blue forces requires a Deploy Date and 
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Deployment Duration for each unit.  The Deploy Date is used to create a Deploy 
Schedule of when all troops enter the theater.  This schedule, along with the Brigade Size, 
provides the information required for the rate of Deploy.  Similarly, the Deployment 
Duration and Deploy Date determine the Redeploy Date.  The Redeploy Date is used to 
create the Redeploy Schedule and count the Number of Deployments each unit has 
completed.  The Redeploy Schedule is used by the Deploy rate to remove all surviving 
troops from the theater of operations.  These interactions can be seen in the left side of 
Figure VII-2.  It should be noted that the system dynamics framework allows for more 
complex representations, including feedback loops, if the situation and the data support 
such models.   
RED
COEFFICIENT (RC)
BLUE
COEFFICIENT (BC)
BCAS = 0.0111 * R * (B/R)1-0.44
(w)
RCAS = 0.0287 * B * (R/B)1-0.69
USMC and USA 
Data
1600 0 14
6400 14 16
2200 16
for i
for i
for i
≤ <
≤ <
≥
R =
RED INCREASE
- RCAS
RED (R)
BLUE (B)
B =
DEPLOY - BCAS
- REDEPLOY
 
Figure VII-2: Model of Fourth Generation Operations 
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The actual date each US Army Brigade and USMC Battalion entered and left 
theater was used in this example model.  Korb et al. published the dates of the US Army 
Combat Brigade’s deployments in their report titled, Beyond the Call of Duty (2007).  
The Center for Naval Analysis’s Marine Corps Deployed Unit Database, was used to 
obtain the dates of USMC Battalion deployments.  While the actual dates are used, other 
parameters are notional; thus the illustration, while populated with existing units, is 
notional.   
Unlike Blue forces deploying into and redeploying out of theater, the Red forces 
in the model enter and accumulate.  Red Monthly Increase changes the rate of increase of 
insurgents.  This was established by the number of insurgents in theater and number of 
insurgents captured or killed as reported by the Iraq Index.  In this example scenario, it 
was assumed the rate of increase equaled the monthly change in total insurgents plus the 
number of insurgents captured or killed.   
Analysis of the data provided by O’Hanlon and Kamp identified three distinct 
rates of insurgent increase.  The average of the increase in insurgents for the first thirteen 
months of the conflict was 1,596 (O’Hanlon & Kamp, 2006, p. 16, 17).  For simplicity, 
1,600 insurgents were added to the model each month for the first thirteen months.  This 
was followed by a steep increase in insurgents for three months.  The average month 
increase was 6,405 (O’Hanlon & Kamp, 2006, p. 16, 17).  Therefore, the rate of new 
insurgents was 6,400 for this three month period.  Since this steep increase, the average 
number of new insurgents per month has been 2,196 (O’Hanlon & Kamp, 2006, 
p. 16, 17).  The scenario thus assumed a rate of 2,200 insurgents per month.  Equation 
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VII-1 summarizes these rates of insurgent increase, where i is the number of months 
transpired in the scenario.   
 
( ) 1,600 0 14
6,400 14 16
2,200 16
Rateof increaseof insurgents i for i
for i
for i
= ≤ <
≤ <
≥
 (VII-1) 
This is a very simplified model to add new insurgents to the model.  If a more 
detailed insurgent model is required, see Allan and Stahel (1983), Coyle (1985), 
Hetherington (2005), and Anderson (2006).  Models to capture these works can be added 
to the basic model as required.  A continuous flow into and out of theater can be 
modeled. 
It was initially assumed that the Lanchester Square Law could be used to 
represent the attrition of the conflict.  Equation VII-2 represents the appropriate 
coefficients and equations resulting from applying the method of least squares to fit the 
data from the Iraq Index, created by the Brookings Institute.  The t-test statistic was used 
to as the test criteria for evaluating the fit of the data.  When comparing the difference 
between the original data and the results from the Lanchester Laws, the data suggests 
symmetry about zero.  Figure VII-3 provides a histogram of the errors for the Blue 
attrition and Figure VII-4 provides the results for the Red attrition.  Therefore, the 
assumptions discussed in Chapter 2 regarding the t-test appear to be satisfied and the t-
test may be used to test the significance of the attrition coefficients.  Bracken (1995) and 
Chen and Chu (2001), among others, have also used the same technique for determining 
the attrition coefficients for the Lanchester Laws.  As sever skewness does not appear, the 
t-test was used.  Of course, other tests are possible and should be used when appropriate. 
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Figure VII-3: Histogram of Blue Attrition Error 
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Figure VII-4: Histogram of Red Attrition Error 
Unfortunately, the t-test for the model indicates that one of the coefficients is not 
statistically significant at the α = 0.05 level for a two sided null hypothesis test for β = 0.  
Therefore, the model of attrition based on the Lanchester Square Law was rejected.   
 
0.05,44
0.05,44
0.03425 2.32
0.01379 17.96 2.32
dB R t t
dt
dR B t t
dt
α
α
=
=
= = <
= = >
1.24 =
=
 (VII-2) 
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Since the Lanchester Square Law was not appropriate to model the attrition, 
Helmbold’s general form of the Lanchester Laws was applied (Equation II-15).  
Helmbold’s general form allows for a mixing of the square, linear, and logarithm laws; 
therefore, modeling direct fire, area fire, and attacks on non-combatants.  Data from the 
Iraq Index was used to empirically determine the values of the Red and Blue Coefficients 
and the Weiss Parameter (see Appendix B).  The data was initially regressed requiring 
the same Weiss parameter (w) for both the Red and Blue attrition.  This model was not 
rejected at the α = 0.05 level and it is presented in Equation VII-3.  Based on Schaffer’s 
research, the Weiss parameter at w = 0.664 can be interpreted as indicating the Red and 
Blue forces are both using a mix of area and direct fire (Schaffer, 1967, p. 24). 
 
1 0.664
0.05,44
1 0.664
0.05,44
0.01763 15.27 2.32
0.02970 20.51 2.32
dB B R t t
dt R
dR R B t t
dt B
α
α
−
=
−
=
⎛ ⎞= = >⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞= = >⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
=
=
 (VII-3) 
While the model is not inappropriate, it assumes the proportion of area and direct 
fire used by the Red and Blue forces was the same.  To better match the tactics employed, 
the research next focused on finding an individual Weiss parameter for each side of the 
conflict.  Equation VII-4 includes the coefficients derived from the method of least 
squares regression of the Red and Blue forces with different Weiss parameters.   
 
1 0.44
0.05,44
1 0.69
0.05,44
0.01111 14.97 2.32
0.02869 20.51 2.32
dB B R t t
dt R
dR R B t t
dt B
α
α
−
=
−
=
⎛ ⎞= = >⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞= = >⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
=
=
 (VII-4) 
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A Red Weiss Parameter of w = 0.44 can be interpreted to imply that the Red 
forces are concentrating on area fire.  However, Red’s techniques occasionally involve 
killing noncombatants.  This can be seen in the tactics of the Improvised Explosive 
Device (IED).  The Blue Weiss Parameter of w = 0.69 implies that the Blue tactics are a 
mix of both area and direct fire.  Schaffer suggested that in an ambush, the ambushee’s 
initial response is area fire but the combatant transitions to direct fire as the ambusher is 
acquired (Schaffer, 1967, p. 24).  Shaffer’s theory is empirically supported by this 
research, and Equation VII-4 was implemented in the model of elements of fourth 
generation operations. 
The model of soldier morale based on Equation VI-1 and Figure VI-3 was 
implemented as a submodel of the model of elements of fourth generation operations.  
This implementation for each unit can be seen in Figure VII-5.   
Tminbreak
Xminbreak
0.70 * D 2 π / PERIOD
ωD / √(1-ζ2) 0.2
2
2
sin 1
1
ntn
ne t
ζωω ω ζζ −−
D / 3
0.03
(D)
 
Figure VII-5: Submodel of Soldier Morale 
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The Deployment Duration and Number of Deployments are calculated previously 
in the model, hence they are represented in the figure as dotted lines as opposed to solid 
outlines (see Figure VII-2).  These parameters are used to calculate the actual number of 
months each unit is in theater (D).  This deployment duration is used to calculate the 
Period (T), Damped Natural Frequency (ωd), Natural Frequency (ωn), and Time of 
Minimum Morale (Tminbreak).  Tmin, Tmax,, Tadjust,, Xmin, and Xminbreak are all used to adjust the 
phase of the unit’s morale curve so the first period of low morale occurs at one third of 
the deployment duration.   
Quester et al.’s data about retention rates implies that morale deceases at least 6% 
each time an individual returns to theater.  In the illustrative scenario it was assumed that 
50% of the troops previously deployed with unit; therefore, the overall morale of the unit 
decreased 3% each time the unit returned to theater.  Thus, the Veteran Impact was set at 
0.03.  This decrease was applied for each subsequent return to combat.  The value could 
also be a weighted average of experienced troops in a unit if such information were 
available. 
 The final submodel estimates the United States Public Opinion for an ongoing 
conflict.  The implementation of the factors from Table V-11 can be seen in  
Figure VII-6.  The number of days in the conflict (days), Blue Casualties, and Red 
Casualties are all levels from the model.  The number of Daily Attacks was not directly 
available but was estimated from other available data.  A multiple linear regression was 
performed using the known factors/levels the model produced against the number of daily 
attacks reported by the Iraq Index.  Table VII-1 summaries the result of that regression.  
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The model of daily attacks suggests that the number of daily attacks can be estimated by 
the square of the cumulative Blue Casualties (BCAS) and size of Red forces (R).   
BLUE ATTRITION
( )1091.47 0.05957 7.322log
0.04030 0.0008418
cas
CAS
date B
DA R
− −
− +
23.20 07 0.00465 0.00394CAS CASe B B R− − +
 
Figure VII-6: Submodel of Public Resolve 
 
Table VII-1: Model of Daily Attacks 
Regression Statistics 
R2 0.96
Adjusted R2 0.94
Standard Error 16.60
PRESS 12846.36
R2Prediction 0.96
Observations 44
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 305766.88 101922.29 370.06 3.38E-29 
Residual 41 11292.12 275.42   
Total 44 317059.00       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
BCAS -0.00465 0.0017 -2.67 0.0109 
BCAS2 3.20E-07 5.6E-08 5.71 1.1E-06 
R 0.00394 0.00071 5.52 2.09E-06 
 
Figure VII-7 illustrates the original data for the number of daily attacks and 
compares this to the estimates produced by the model of daily attacks given the data from 
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the Iraq Index (O’Hanlon & Kamp, 2006, p. 22).  The data produced by the simulation 
are also presented in the figure.  The simulation data is discussed in the section on 
verification and validation. 
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Figure VII-7: Number of Daily Attacks 
While both the multiple linear regression model (Table V-11) and the logistic 
regression model (Table V-20) can be used to estimate the public resolve for the conflict, 
the MLR model was used when constructing the model of elements of fourth generation 
operations demonstration.  As discussed in Chapter 5 a benefit of logistic regression is 
the expectation function is constrained between zero and one.  The logistic regression 
model can be implemented by changing the equation for Public Opinion indicated in 
Figure VII-6.  
This section introduced an analytic framework of elements of fourth generation 
operations via a notional scenario.  This model is empirically supported by data from the 
current conflict in Iraq.  This framework is not limited to the Iraq conflict as presented in 
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this study, but may be extended to other conflicts.  The next section provides the 
verification and validation of the analytic framework.  
Verification and Validation 
The Department of Defense provides the following definitions for verification, 
validation and accreditation with respect to the modeling and simulation process. 
Verification. The process of determining that a model implementation and its 
associated data accurately represents the developer's conceptual description and 
specifications (DODI 5000.61, 2003, p. 15) 
 
Validation. The process of determining the degree to which a model and its 
associated data are an accurate representation of the real world from the 
perspective of the intended uses of the model (DODI 5000.61, 2003, p. 15) 
 
Accreditation. The official certification that a model, simulation, or federation of 
models and simulations and its associated data are acceptable for use for a 
specific purpose (DODI 5000.61, 2003, p. 10) 
 
These definitions can be summarized as: verification ensures the model is built correctly, 
validation ensures the model performs correctly, and accreditation accepts the model for 
the proper use.  This study is only able to perform tests which support verifying and 
validating the model.  Accrediting the model requires a user to perform additional tests 
with a specific purpose and accept the model as able to perform the specific purpose. 
 Forrester and Senge discussed the requirements to verify and validate system 
dynamics models.  They stated: 
There is no single test which serves to ‘validate’ a system dynamics model. 
Rather, confidence in a system dynamics model accumulates gradually as the 
model passes more tests and as new point of correspondence between the model 
and empirical reality are identified (Forrester & Senge, 1980, p. 209). 
 
Sterman summarizes the frustration of validating system dynamics models: 
1. There can be no absolute test of validity, 
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2. There can be no objective tests of validity, 
3. There can be no single test of validity. (Sterman, 1984, p. 51) 
 
Forrester and Senge suggest a three phase process to build validation.  The phases 
validate the model structure, model behavior, and policy implications.  Each phase is 
discussed in greater detail in the following sections with the results from the verification 
and validation of the model of elements of fourth generation operations.  Figure VII-8 
provides an overview of the tests suggested by Forrester and Senge.  The core tests 
(which are shaded in Figure VII-8) are considered by Forrester and Senge as being the 
most important (1980, p. 226).   
Confidence – Building
Tests
Model Structure Model Behavior Policy Implications
Structure Verification 
Parameter Verification
Extreme Conditions
Boundary Adequacy
Dimensional
Consistency
Behavior 
Reproduction
Behavior Prediction
Behavior Anomaly
Family Member
Extreme Policy
Boundary Adequacy
Behavior Sensitivity
Surprise Behavior
System Improvement
Changed- Behavior 
Prediction
Boundary Adequacy
Policy Sensitivity
* Shaded containers are core tests  
Figure VII-8: Confidence-Building Tests (Forrester & Senge, 1980, Table 1 Page 227) 
Building on Forrester and Senge, Khazanchi (1996), Coyle and Exelby (2000) and 
Martis (2006) provide applications, clarifications and insights for some of the tests. 
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Model Structure 
 Validation of the model structure was divided into multiple tests.  Each test is 
focused on how the model is built.  These tests closely align with the DoD definition of 
verification.  The first test is the structure verification.   
Verifying structure means comparing structure of a model with structure of the 
real system that the model represents.  To pass the structure-verification test the, 
the model structure must not contradict knowledge about the structure of the real 
system (Forrester & Senge, 1980, p. 212) 
 
The structure verification also questions if all the relevant structures have been modeled.  
The justification of the basic structure of the model, as seen in Figure VII-1, is based on 
the research of the Lanchester Laws, discussed in Chapter 2.  This structure is expanded 
to the combat model presented in Figure VII-2, Figure VII-5 and Figure VII-6 providing 
the necessary factors for the model of conflict.  Both the Red and Blue forces and their 
movement (at a strategic level) are modeled.  The attrition of those forces is available 
along with the notional soldier morale.  Additionally, the Blue’s Public Opinion of the 
conflict is represented.  The model exhibits the proper structure for modeling elements of 
fourth generation operations. 
The next test is the parameter verification.  This test addresses whether the 
parameters are consistent with numerical values and are recognizable to the real world.  
The basic parameters within the model are the individual soldier and time, accounted for 
in terms of months.  The public opinion and soldier morale parameters are scaled from 
zero to one, representing the respective percent of public support and level of morale.  All 
parameters are based on numerical values fitted to the real world values, except the 
morale parameter.  This parameter assumes the notional morale of a soldier is bounded 
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and averages 0.5.  Consequently, all parameters have a recognizable meaning in the real 
world.   
The third test is the extreme condition test.  The test focuses on running the model 
at the parameter’s boundaries and comparing the data to the real system’s behavior in the 
same conditions.  Forrester and Senge state: 
The extreme-conditions test is effective for two reasons. First, it is a 
powerful test for discovering flaws in model structure. Many proposed 
formulations look plausible until considered under extreme conditions. 
 
The second reason for utilizing the extreme-conditions test is to enhance 
usefulness of a model for analyzing policies that may force a system to 
operate outside historical regions of behavior.  (1980, p. 214) 
 
Unfortunately, as is the difficulty in verifying any combat model, it is not possible to 
replicate the conditions of combat solely for the purpose of model verification and 
validation.  Therefore, this test can not be accurately performed for the example.  The 
model can only be compared to how the real world is expected to perform.  The equations 
that underlay the system dynamics model produce reasonable results for conditions 
ranging in number of units deployed, size of units deployed, number of insurgents, and 
number of casualties for each side.  In the demonstration section of this chapter, five 
factors are varied to notional extreme conditions and produced reasonable responses.  
The demonstration did not reveal any flaws in the model structure.    
 The next test of structure validation is boundary adequacy of the structure.  This 
focuses on the level of aggregation of the model (Forrester & Senge, 1980, p. 215).  The 
test evaluates if the necessary parameters for the decision are all internal to the model.  
The submodels and parameter settings are statistically significant at the α = 0.05 level.  
The insights into the number of forces, casualties, public opinion, and soldier morale are 
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the focus of the model.  The model is able to estimate each of these parameters with its 
current structure with only one external input: the deployment schedule of the Blue 
forces.  This allows for the Blue deployment schedule to be varied, providing insights to 
policy changes.  As a result, all other decisions are endogenous to the model.   
The final test of the structure is dimensional consistency.  This investigates if all 
the equations are using the proper units within the model.  As briefly discussed earlier, 
the units within the model account for the number of individual soldiers and time is 
tracked by months.  These dimensions are consistent with the specific purpose of the 
notional scenario.  All equations in the model use these two parameters except for the 
model of public opinion.  The input for this submodel is the number of days into the 
conflict; therefore, the time scale is converted to days when used in the equation.  
  The model conforms to all the model structure tests.  Accordingly, the 
confidence that the structure can represent the selected elements of fourth generation 
operations is strong.  The next set of tests suggested by Forrester and Senge focus on the 
models behavior and results. 
Model Behavior 
 Once the tests of model structure have been performed, the tests of model 
behavior are conducted.  These tests focus on the results, responses or behaviors of the 
model.  The first test is behavior reproduction.  The focus of this test is a qualitative 
comparison of the model results with historical data.  Sterman suggests that when the 
model data can be statistically compared to the real system, a test of statistical character 
is used (1984, p. 52).  The behaviors of the real world data and the simulation results are 
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presented for the number of soldiers, casualties, daily attacks and public opinion.  The 
figures test the behavior reproduction when viewing the historical fit.  Additionally, a 
paired t-test was performed at monthly increments to validate the statistical character.  
The null hypothesis was that there was no difference (δ) between the simulation results 
and the real world data, and the alternative hypothesis was that they were different 
(H0: δ = 0; Ha: δ ≠ 0).   
Figure VII-9 illustrates the results from the model and historical data.  Similar 
trends and cycles of the historical and model data can be seen in the plot of the data.  
Additionally, the paired t-test indicates there was no statistical difference.  The paired 
t-test statistic equaled t=|0.65|, which was less than the critical value from the 
t-distribution, tα=0.05,31=2.36.  Consequently, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected; we 
cannot assume there is a difference between the real and simulated results. 
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Figure VII-9: Simulation Results of Size of Blue Forces 
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The size of the Red forces is based on the number of insurgents captured or killed 
(Equation VII-4) and the number of new insurgents (Equation VII-1).  Figure VII-10 
compares the actual number of insurgents from the Iraq Index and the simulation results.  
As with the Blue forces, the historical and model data reflect similar trends.  The paired 
t-test results are t=|1.39| < tα=0.05,45=2.32.  We fail to reject the null hypothesis that the 
average of the differences is zero.  As a result it can not be shown that there is a statistical 
difference between the model and the true data. 
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Figure VII-10: Simulation Results of Size of Red Forces 
 Next, Figure VII-11 demonstrates the monthly number of Blue Casualties.   
Although the real data had a higher variance, the simulation did reflect the trends of the 
data.  Statistically, t=|-0.142| < tα=0.05,45=2.32, consequently the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected and again, there was no statistical difference suggested.  The cumulative impact 
was that at the end of December 2006 the model estimates 25,388 Blue Casualties while 
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the Iraq Index reports approximately 25,631 US troops wounded or dead (O’Hanlon & 
Campbell, 2007, p. 11, 13).  This was a difference of less than 300, with a cumulative 
error of less than 1%. 
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Figure VII-11: Simulation Results of Blue Casualties 
Figure VII-12 contrasts the simulation estimates of Red Casualties and the Iraq 
Index data at each month.  Once again, the paired t-test suggested no statistical difference 
(t=|-0.523| < tα=0.05,44=2.32).  The cumulative impact was that by the end of November 
2006 the model estimated 82,949 Red casualties while the Iraq Index reported 
approximately 82,470 insurgents captured or killed (O’Hanlon & Kamp, 2006, p. 16).  
This was a difference of less than 500 insurgents and a cumulative error of less than 
0.6%. 
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Figure VII-12: Simulation Results of Red Casualties 
The simulation results of the number of daily attacks using Table VII-1 was 
included previously in Figure VII-7.  The paired t-test indicated no statistical difference 
between the Iraq Index data and the simulation results (t=|-0.25| < tα=0.05,44=2.32).   
The final historical comparison was the Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) 
estimate of Public Opinion.  The model results are plotted in Figure VII-13.  The 
historical estimate and model results display no statistical difference based on the paired 
t-test, t=|0.50| < tα=0.05,45=2.32.  As a result, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of 
δ = 0 for any of the major comparisons with historical data and simulation data.  
Therefore, it is assumed the model satisfied the behavior reproduction and statistical 
character tests for the elements tested. 
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Figure VII-13: Simulation Results of Public Support 
As the behavior reproduction test focuses on reproducing historical data, behavior 
prediction tests focuses on future behavior.  System dynamics “models do not strive for 
prediction of future values of system variables…However, system dynamic models 
should tell certain things about the behavior in the future” (Forrester & Senge, 1980, 
p. 219). 
Using the data from July 2007, the model behavior was evaluated based on how it 
could project the future behavior.  The percent of public support for the war in July 2007 
was 38.0% (see Chapter 5).  The model shows the public support would be 36.6%.  The 
difference falls with the standard error of the polling data.  Additionally, the model 
estimates there would be 29,797 Blue casualties.  The Iraq Index reported there were 
30,612 Blue casualties (O’Hanlon & Campbell, 2007, p. 17, 19).  As seen in Figure 
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VII-11 there were a few months that the Blue forces suffered an intense number of 
casualties.  The actual number of Blue casualties that occurred in June and July 2007 
similarly spiked causing the model to underestimate the actual values.  While these 
estimates are not exact, the behaviors do match expectations.   
The next test is behavior anomaly, which investigates if the model responds to 
assumptions and parameters being removed from the system.  This test also provides 
insight to the assumptions since “one can often defend particular model assumptions by 
showing how implausible behavior arises if the assumption is altered” (Forrester & 
Senge, 1980, p. 220).  Since the model was empirically built, all factors are statistically 
significant.  If any factor was removed, the model may no longer produce defendable or 
understandable results.  The demonstration section provides an example of how 
parameters of five factors are changed.  This analysis provides further justification of the 
inclusion of the factors, since each factor screened shows impact on the responses. 
 The family member test was then considered.  This test was focused on whether 
the model can be applied to other examples of systems within the same class.  This 
insures the model has broad applications as opposed to being specifically designed for 
only one purpose.  Sterman asked, “can an urban model generate the behavior of New 
York, Dallas, Carson City, and Calcutta when parameterized for each?” (1984, p. 52).  
The basic structure of the Lanchester laws has been applied to a number of battles and 
conflicts.  Taylor (1983) provided specific applications of the Lanchester Laws.  The 
submodel of public opinion evolved from data from the wars in Korea, Vietnam, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq.  Additionally, the submodel of soldier morale was based on 
research from World War Two and Peace Corps deployments.  Even though the 
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framework, in its entirety, has not been applied to a different ‘family member,’ each 
individual model has been applied to its setting.   
  Forrester and Senge also suggest the extreme policy test.  They ask “does the 
model behave as we might expect for the real system under the same extreme policies 
circumstances?” (1980, p. 221-222).  All of the equations of the model produce logical 
outputs as the parameters are moved to the extremes.  The only exceptions may be in the 
submodel of public opinion.  This model is capable of producing negative public opinion.  
Negative public opinion can happen due to two circumstances: when there are too many 
Blue casualties; and when the conflict lasted a long time.  This does not invalidate the 
model.   This outcome implies caution should be used when applying the relations 
outside the range of the data used to develop them.  This model, however, is still able to 
produce findings which can be used for comparison of policies or courses of action.  In 
addition, a nation could possibly turn against a war. 
 As with the tests of model structure, the model behavior has a test of boundary 
adequacy.  Again, this test investigates if all the structure is valid at the boundary of the 
relations.  The rationale for the model structure test on boundary adequacy is still valid 
since the parameters within the model are all empirically justified through statistical tests, 
all at an α = 0.05 level. 
The final behavior validation tests explore the behavior sensitivity of the model to 
plausible variations and surprise behaviors.  Behavior sensitivity asks, does the model 
still pass the previous behavior tests when the parameters are varied?  Surprise behaviors 
are behaviors which are unexpected but offer insight to how the system operates.  By 
changing the size of each brigade and battalion in the model, the size of Blue forces can 
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be changed.  By changing the force size by plus or minus 20% and 10%, Figure VII-14 
and Figure VII-15 were created.  Figure VII-14 shows the size of Red forces decreasing 
as the size of Blue forces increases.  As expected, as the Blue Forces are reduced, the size 
of Red Forces increased.  Similarly, when Blue forces increased the number of Red 
forces decreased.  As these results are consistent with expectation, the behavior 
sensitivity test is considered satisfied. 
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Figure VII-14: Behavior of Red Forces as Total Blue Forces Varies 
 Figure VII-15 shows that by increasing the number of Blue forces, there are 
initially more Blue Casualties.  While this might be seen as a surprise behavior, more 
troops in theater provide more targets.  As more troops enter, there are initially more 
casualties; however, after 36 months, the number of Blue casualties for the larger force is 
less than the other courses of action.  This switch in casualty rates does not occur earlier 
in the model due to the rapid increase of Red forces at the 13th month.  The demonstration 
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section of this chapter sets five factors at different settings simultaneously in a full 
factorial design of experiments.  The response of that analysis additionally justifies the 
behavior sensitivity and surprise behavior tests.  In conclusion, the model passes both of 
these tests. 
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Figure VII-15: Behavior of Blue Casualties as Total Blue Forces Varies 
The final phase to validate a system dynamics model suggested by Forrester and 
Senge is validating the policy implications.  The “tests of policy implication differ from 
the other tests in their explicit focus on comparing policy changes in a model and in the 
corresponding reality” (Forrester & Senge, 1980, p. 224).  Since these tests all require the 
implementation of the policy evaluated in the system dynamics model and then compared 
to the policy implemented in reality, such tests are beyond the scope of this research.  
Such an analysis is left for future research.   
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 Many of the validation tests of model structure and behavior were able to be 
applied to the model of elements of fourth generation operations.  As the model is applied 
in more situations and the results observed, the confidence in the model is expected to 
increase.  Forrester and Senge suggest all five tests of the model structure, and 
specifically three model behavior tests (reproduction, anomaly, and sensitivity), are core 
tests.  The model presented in this dissertation was able to satisfy all eight of these core 
tests. 
Demonstrations 
This section provides demonstrations of the potential applications of the model of 
elements of fourth generation operations.  First, five of the factors within the model were 
varied to provide a possible decision maker insight into the importance of each factor and 
their interactions.  These five factors were: (1) size of Blue forces deployed, (2) rate of 
new Red Forces, (3) Red fighting effectiveness, (4) percent impact of morale on Blue 
fighting effectiveness, and (5) implementation of veteran status.  The responses 
considered for review were the estimated public support for the war, number of Red 
forces and the Blue/Red combat ratio which provides insight where the higher the ratio, 
the higher the likelihood of success for Blue forces.   
The second demonstration focuses on the functionality of the modeling 
framework.  The rules of engagement within the model are adjusted based on the public’s 
support for the conflict.  The interactions within the model and feedback loops are 
identified.  
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This section is divided into three subsections.  The first defines the setting used in 
the demonstration.  The second subsection is the results of the screening experiment.  The 
third subsection provides the second demonstration. 
Settings of First Demonstration 
A five factor full factorial design of experiments was chosen for the first 
demonstration.  The demonstration is therefore a screening experiment capable of 
providing insights about the factors, the related responses and also the factor interactions.  
Since this is a deterministic model, only one replication was performed at each setting for 
a total of 32 experiments. 
The first factor changed the size of Blue deployed battalions and brigades.  The 
size of each brigade/ battalion was changed by 25%, depending on the high or low 
setting.  As discussed earlier, this changes the total number of Blue force in theater.  
Initially, the unit strength of the battalions/ brigades was 2,600/ 6,300 respectively.   
The second factor alters the rate that Red forces increase their recruitment.  
Equation VII-1 suggests that after sixteen months, 2,200 new Red forces are added each 
month.  The factor changes this rate by 10%.  Thus, it assumed the rate of new Red forces 
may be as low as 1,980 or as high as 2,420.  This provided the decision maker insight on 
how efforts to stop the recruiting of new Red forces impact the battle.  Again, if some 
other vetted relationship were available, it could be represented. 
The third factor directly adjusted the fighting effectiveness.  The Red Coefficient 
was set 20% lower at the low setting and 20% higher at the high setting from the base 
setting.  This replicates actions taken by the Blue forces which directly impact Red’s 
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capability to wage war.  This may occur by interdicting the Red’s weapons, for example.  
This may also happen if Blue reduces their vulnerability to Red’s weapons or tactics by 
improving armor or techniques.   
The fourth factor adjusted the level of impact of Morale on the Blue Coefficient 
(BC).  Similar to how Bracken implemented the Bracken Tactical Parameter, the Blue 
Coefficient was adjusted where Morale was substituted for Bracken’s Tactical Parameter 
(see Equation II-16).  The morale impact factor (M) varied from 0 to 1 to adjust the 
significance of Morale to the changes of the Blue Coefficient.  When M = 0 there was no 
impact and the original Blue Coefficient was used.  However, when M = 1, twice the 
Morale was used as a multiplier of the Blue Coefficient.  Since pre-deployment morale 
was 0.5, twice the morale was used, so when morale was greater than average, the troops 
were more efficient (morale factor greater than one).  Similarly, there was a decrease in 
capabilities when the morale was less than one.  The equation (2Morale*M + 1 – M) BC 
was used to account for transient values of M.  If some other known or fitted relationship 
existed, it could be used in the model.  Since this factor was not implemented in the 
previous section on verification and validation, the ‘baseline’ case assumes the level to be 
at the lower or no impact value. 
Based on historical evidence, each time a unit is returned to theater, their overall 
morale is decreased by 3% (see Figure VII-5) (Quester et al., 2006, p. 9).  This final 
factor was adjusted if this impact to overall morale was implemented or not.    
Table VII-2 provides a summary of the settings used in the screening experiment.  
The levels used in the screening experiment were set at -1 for the low setting and 1 for 
the high setting; therefore, normalizing the factors for analysis. 
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Table VII-2: Screening Experiment High and Low Factors 
 Setting Baseline (0) Low (-1) High (1) 
Size of Blue Forces (B) 
Battalion / Brigade ±25% 2,600/6,300 1,950/4,725 3,250/7,875 
Rate of Red Increase 
(RRI) ±10% 2,200 1,980 2,420 
Change of Red 
Coefficient (C) ±20% 0.0111 0.00889 0.0133 
Morale  
Impact (M) 0 to 1 0 0 1 
Veteran  
Impact (V) On/Off 0 0 0.03 
 
Screening Experiment Results 
Thirty two experiments were run completing the full factorial design of 
experiments for five factors.  Three responses were observed: Blue/Red combat ratio, 
public support for the war, and the number of Red forces.   
Figure VII-16 provides the main effect plots and Figure VII-17 provides the 
interaction plots for the Blue/Red combat ratio.  The numbers on the x-axis indicate the 
settings for the factors indicated in each column for both figures.  For the interaction 
plots, the numbers on the plots provide the settings for the factor of each row.  When the 
slope of the line is horizontal, the factor indicated by the row has limited influence on the 
results.  The influence of the factor identified in the column is observed by the separation 
of the two lines.  The difference in slope of the two lines within a plot implies an 
influence of the interaction of the two factors. 
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Figure VII-16: Main Effect Plots for Blue/Red Combat Ratio 
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Figure VII-17: Interaction Plots for Blue/Red Combat Ratio 
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The plot in the first row and third column indicates the Combat Ratio was 
approximately ten when the Size of Blue Forces was at the high setting.  This plot 
additionally indicates the influence from the Red Coefficient was minimal.  On the other 
hand, the plot in the first row and second column indicates an influence from the change 
in Size of Blue Forces, the Rate or Red Increase and their interaction term. 
As described by Deitchman, and portrayed in Figure II-11, when the insurgent 
forces achieved victory the average combat ratio was four regular soldiers per insurgent 
(1962, p. 821).  On the other hand, when the regular forces achieved victory the average 
combat ratio was approximately ten regular soldiers per insurgent (Deitchman, 1962, p. 
821).  This analysis suggests that lowering the number of Blue forces in theater by 25% 
may lead to defeat no matter the setting or any of the other factors.   
Figure VII-16 illustrates that when the Size of Blue Forces was decreased by 
25%, the combat ratio was less than four to one.  Conversely Figure VII-17 indicates, 
increasing the number of Blue forces by 25% and lowering the Red’s recruiting by 10% 
lead to a combat ratio greater than ten to one.  Only by increasing the number of Blue 
forces could the combat ratio be improved to a winning outcome.   
The factor with the most influence on the combat ratio was the Size of Blue 
Forces.  When the Blue forces increased in size there was a positive influence on the 
Blue/Red combat ratio.  The second most influential factor was the Rate of Red Increase, 
indicating as the red recruited more forces there was a negative impact on the combat 
ratio.  The third most influential factor was the interaction of the Size of Blue Forces and 
the Rate of Red Increase.  All the other settings and conditions appear indeterminate. 
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Table VII-3: Estimated Effect on Red/Blue Combat Ratio 
Term  Estimated Effect 
Intercept 6.91 
Size of Blue Forces (B) 7.82 
Rate of Red Increase (RRI) -3.04 
Change of Red Coefficient (C) -0.136 
Morale Impact (M) -0.24 
Veteran Impact (V) -0.3 
B * RRI -2.12 
B*C -0.05 
RRI*C 0.03 
B*M -0.144 
RRI*M 0.096 
C*M 0.014 
B * V -0.22 
RRI*V 0.094 
C*V -0.0022 
M * V -0.3 
 
Keeping a larger number of forces may be the course of action required to win 
this notional conflict.  To do this, public support must also remain high.  Figure VII-18 
provides the main effect plots and Figure VII-19 provides the interaction plots for the 
public support.  Figure VII-19 shows that if there are an increased number of Blue forces 
and the Red fighting effectiveness is decreased, then the public support for the war is 
approximately 50%.  The Red fighting effectiveness can be reduced by technology or 
other tools available in fourth generation operations.  Technologies may be able to reduce 
the weapon effectiveness by increasing armor strength, preventing IEDs, or decreasing 
the total number of weapons available to the Red forces.  The Red Coefficient may also 
be impacted through political, economic or informational methods.  For example, the 
Blue forces may have a more effective media campaign, creating a less efficient Red 
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force.  Figure VII-19 also indicates the significance of the interaction of the Morale and 
Veteran impact. 
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Figure VII-18: Main Effect Plots for Public Opinion 
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Figure VII-19: Interaction Plots for Public Opinion 
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 Table VII-4 provides a summary of the influence of the factors on US public 
support.  As seen in Figure VII-18 the most influential factor on US public support was 
the Size of Blue Forces, followed by the Change in Red Coefficient.   
Table VII-4: Estimated Effect on Public Support 
Term  Estimated Effect 
Intercept 38.74 
Size of Blue Forces (B) 15.58 
Rate of Red Increase (RRI) 1.2 
Change of Red Coefficient (C) -5.88 
Morale Impact (M) -0.88 
Veteran Impact (V) -0.8 
B * RRI 1 
B*C -0.24 
RRI*C -0.44 
B*M 0.08 
RRI*M -0.054 
C*M -0.068 
B * V 0.002 
RRI*V -0.056 
C*V -0.036 
M * V -0.8 
 
It may seem counterintuitive that as Blue forces increase, the public support also 
increases.  This change occurs in the simple scenario because more Red forces are 
captured which directly impacts public opinion.  Additionally, with a larger Blue force 
there are less Blue casualties and less daily attacks by the Red forces in the notional 
scenario.   
The size of Red forces in theater directly impacts the Blue/Red combat ratio and 
indirectly impacts the public support.  Not surprisingly, by reducing the number of Red 
forces the ratio favors a victorious Blue force.  The results when investigating the factors 
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impacting the size of Red force, as seen in Figure VII-20, Figure VII-21 and Table VII-5, 
were very similar to the results of the Blue/Red Combat Ratio. 
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Figure VII-20: Main Effect Plots for Size of Red Forces 
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Figure VII-21: Interaction Plots for Size of Red Forces 
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Table VII-5: Estimated Effect on Size of Red Forces 
Term  Estimated Effect 
Intercept 23723 
Size of Blue Forces (B) -16531 
Rate of Red Increase (RRI) 8507 
Change of Red Coefficient (C) 331 
Morale Impact (M) 688 
Veteran Impact (V) 733 
B * RRI -1268 
B*C -133 
RRI*C 45 
B*M -142 
RRI*M 50 
C*M -3 
B * V -28 
RRI*V 56 
C*V 11 
M * V 733 
 
This screening experiment produced insights indicating the most significant 
factors impacting the combat ratio, public support for the war, and number of Red forces 
for the notional example.  To obtain a historically effective combat ratio, the number of 
Blue forces must be increased and the recruiting of Red force must be reduced.  To 
positively impact public support, enough troops must be employed to gain victories and 
the effectiveness of the adversary must be reduced.  The public support must remain high 
to ensure the troops stay in theater.  To reduce the number of adversaries in the theater, 
again more troops must be sent and training and recruiting of Red forces must be 
reduced.  Additionally, this analysis suggests that in the notional scenario, the outcome of 
the current course of action is undetermined, while reducing the number of forces may 
lead to defeat. 
 217
Second Demonstration 
This subsection demonstrates a second application of the model.  This example is 
notional and is intended to highlight some of the features the framework provides.  The 
intent of the demonstration is to present the functionality of the modeling framework 
illustrated with of elements of fourth generation operations.  Specifically, the 
demonstration provides insight to how the framework can be applied to model the 
transition of rules of engagement (ROE) affected by US public support of the conflict, 
demonstrating feedback loops and dynamic rates of flow.  Figure VII-22 illustrates the 
model of elements of fourth generation operations including public resolve.  This model 
of public resolve was empirically developed in Chapter 5.   
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Figure VII-22:  Model of Elements of 4GO with Public Resolve 
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The model represented by Figure VII-22 can change to include the influence that 
Public Support has on the ROE.  The ROE dictate Blue’s response when attacked.  The 
response was the fighting behavior of the Blue Forces.  As indicated in Equation VII-4, 
the attrition of Red forces was represented as a mix of direct and area fire.  As public 
support for the conflict decreased, the rules of engagement are adjusted to reflect more of 
an emphasis on direct fire; therefore, limiting the possibility of collateral damage.  For 
this demonstration, when public support was greater than 75% Equation VII-4 was used 
to represent Blue’s attrition of Red’s Forces.  When public support was below 25% the 
Blue forces can only employ direct fire attacks (w = 1), thus Equation VII-2 was applied 
or the Lanchester Square Laws.   
When public support was between 25% and 75%, a linear transition for the Blue 
Weiss Parameter and Blue Coefficient was used.  This excursion is represented in Figure 
VII-23.  Since the model is dynamic, the value of the Weiss Parameter may continuously 
vary between these extremes to appropriately model the engagements at a campaign 
level. 
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BCoef = 0.0289 PO + 0.00657
BWeiss = -0.62 PO + 1.155
 
Figure VII-23: Rules of Engagement Demonstration 
The model results without implementing the impacts of public support on the 
ROE were used as a baseline case.   This was compared to the results with the dynamic 
ROE in Figure VII-24.     
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Figure VII-24: Number of Red Casualties per Month with Dynamic Rules of Engagement 
The dynamic ROE excursion captured or killed more Red forces early in the 
conflict when the public support was high.  As the conflict continued, the baseline case 
demonstrated a higher effectiveness against Red forces, since the Blue forces applied a 
direct fire approach requiring more time and accuracy to attack the target. 
 The impacts of feedback are observed in two areas of this demonstration.  The 
first feedback loop is from Red Attrition to Public Opinion to Rules of Engagement.  This 
feedback loop continues to both the Blue Coefficient and Blue Weiss Parameter, 
completing at Red Casualties and Red Attrition.  This loop is a positive influence where 
higher attrition causes, higher public support and thus more Red Casualties.   
The second feedback loop was from Red forces to Blue Attrition to Public 
Opinion.  The loop continues to Rules of Engagement, and the Blue Coefficient and Blue 
Weiss Parameter, which impacted the Red Casualties reducing the number of Red forces.  
This feedback loop had a negative influence on the US public opinion.   
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This demonstration presents an example of how the analytic framework of 
elements of fourth generation operations can be applied and altered to provide insights 
for a decision maker.  The dynamic relationships require additional data and support; 
however, this is an initial framework which may be applied to provide additional 
information.  The modeling framework provides a basis to develop a number of 
approaches as relations are developed and verified. 
Summary 
The objective of this chapter was to present an analytic framework for elements of 
fourth generation operations, demonstrating how some elements may be included.  The 
framework is a strategic level dynamic model of modern conflict.  The model is 
empirically based on Helmbold’s general form of the Lanchester Laws.  The components 
of the formulation suggest that the insurgents’ tactics use area fire techniques causing 
havoc, while the regular forces may initially respond by area fire but transition to a more 
effective direct fire approach. 
The framework was introduced and information on the verification and validation 
of the framework was presented.  The structure and behaviors of the base model passed 
several validation tests.  The model however, was not tested against policy 
implementations since these tests involve “comparing policy changes in a model and in 
the corresponding reality” (Forrester & Senge, 1980, p. 224).  The policy implementation 
test would likely occur during an accreditation process.   
Examples of the framework’s utility were provided through two demonstrations.  
The first demonstration was a full factorial screening experiment of five factors.  Three 
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responses were analyzed, providing insight to the notional results of several scenarios.  
The number of Blue forces in theater positively impacted both the public support for the 
war and the combat ratio.  These responses are critical to the success of the conflict.  
Each factor included in the analysis was shown to influence the results and were 
considered significant.  This further provides validation and verification of the model and 
its implementation.  The second demonstration emphasized the importance of feedback 
loops and the framework’s ability to represent softer aspects of combat 
The system dynamics framework provides a mechanism to incorporate elements 
of fourth generation operations.  It can be used either directly or in concert with other 
modeling approaches to aid in analyzing courses of action, effects, and plans in 
asymmetrical or irregular warfare. 
This chapter completed the sixth contribution of the research by constructing an 
analytic framework of elements of fourth generation operations which captures the public  
resolve and the combatant’s morale.  
 223
VIII. Conclusions 
 The objective and contribution of this research was to provide an analytic 
framework of elements of fourth generation operations, capturing the effects of will of 
the combatant and population.  This objective required four principle objectives to be 
completed, building upon each other to obtain the overarching objective.  This format 
resulted in six specific contributions to the field of operations research and particularly 
combat modeling.   
Contributions 
The first contribution developed a theory of fourth generation operations based on 
the framework of US Joint doctrine.  This contribution defined fourth generation 
operations as conflict which combines elements of guerrilla tactics, terrorism, traditional 
warfare, and the ability to exploit and skip generations of technology to conduct 
operations, particularly to target the will and morale of the enemy’s support structure, in 
order to achieve political victory.  This contribution was accomplished in the third 
chapter of the dissertation.  This achieved the first half (development) of the first 
principle objective which was to develop and model a theory of fourth generation 
operations based on the framework of US Joint doctrine. 
The second contribution developed the supporting principles of fourth generation 
operations.  This was also completed in Chapter 3.  The principles required to achieve 
victory in fourth generation operations are detailed in Table III-1.  The significant 
segment of the contribution was adding the principle of Population Perception and 
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clarifying the principles of Legitimacy and Perseverance.  This contribution also 
completed the second objective of the research. 
The third contribution of the dissertation was the construction of a theoretical 
modeling framework to dynamically portray fatigue within a combat model, which was 
accomplished in the fourth chapter.  This demonstrated the utility of using a system 
dynamics modeling framework to represent the Lanchester Laws as opposed to the 
traditional discrete event simulation framework.  The framework that was built is a 
hybrid of system dynamics since it demonstrated an ability to model discrete events 
(addition of reserve forces), while dynamically portraying the impacts of fatigue on the 
combatant’s effectiveness.   
The fourth contribution was the construction of a theoretical modeling framework 
of public resolve.  The model was founded on empirical evidence of four key factors.  
These key factors were: the number of days into the conflict, the logarithm base ten of the 
number of casualties, the number of daily attacks made by the adversary, and the number 
of adversary captured or killed.  This framework provides a capability to model and 
evaluate impacts of conflict on public resolve.   
The fifth contribution developed a theoretical modeling framework that 
dynamically portrays soldier morale.  By using the second order response to an impulse, 
the morale of a soldier, or unit, can be estimated in a combat model based on the 
expected deployment duration and the number of days deployed.  This provides a 
capability to model and evaluate impact of soldier morale due to various courses of action 
or from other external factors.  This contribution allows campaign and strategic level 
models to include a morale factor during future analyses. 
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The sixth chapter also completes the third objective of this research.  This 
objective constructed a theoretical modeling framework to dynamically portray public 
resolve, will-to-fight, morale and combat spirit within a combat model.  The public 
resolve portion of the objective was completed in Chapter 5, and the morale and combat 
spirit was presented in Chapter 6. 
The seventh chapter combines all the contributions to create a complete model of 
fourth generation operations.  This synergy provides the sixth contribution: construct an 
analytic framework of elements of fourth generation operations which captures the will of 
the population and combatants.  The final contribution provides new measures created to 
evaluate the impacts of public resolve and combat spirit.  This additionally completes the 
final principle objective of the research, which was to provide a capability to model and 
evaluate the impacts of public resolve, will-to-fight, morale, and combat spirit of 
combatants and population on the outcome of the conflict. 
Future Research 
This research builds on well established Lanchester laws and theory.  The 
dynamic framework of these laws presented within this dissertation allows for the impact 
of an array of factors and influences.  The expansion of these factors and influences can 
be both internal and external to the model, allowing the analyst to perform a wide array 
of analyses.  Examples of how this framework can be expanded include, but are not 
limited to: sub-dividing Blue forces, adding stochastic features, and adding other justified 
relations.  The subdivision of Blue forces to each country of the coalition, and also the 
indigenous police and military would provide additional insight to the effectiveness of 
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each type of unit.  It would also provide observation into how the force structure could be 
altered.  The model could also expand from a deterministic model to a stochastic model.  
This would allow the analyst to use probabilistic models when the data is uncertain.  
Finally, as discussed throughout this dissertation, the framework can be easily expanded 
to represent other important factors and relations as they become evident. 
Further research can model the impact of significant events, such as elections and 
troop surges, to the public resolve.  These models for public resolve can be used within 
current combat models to gauge the public support of various courses of action.  
Additionally, the impact of public resolve can be connected to the combat effectiveness 
of our troops. 
Chapter 5 demonstrated the positive impact that the percent of positive stories had 
on the public resolve for a limited data set.  Expanding the sample size to include data 
from the entire conflict would provide additional information on the public’s response to 
positive and negative news reporting.  Additionally, the technique used to measure the 
number of positive, neutral and negative stories may provide significant results.  
Modeling the ‘attrition’ of public morale would also be an interesting excursion.  
Similarly, future research may also apply the Lanchester Laws to the soldier’s morale and 
combat spirit; therefore, directly attritting the morale of the combatant. 
One other area of future research could be to apply the framework of elements of 
fourth generation operations to other scenarios and conflicts.  Specifically, the Vietnam 
War would be an excellent candidate for further investigation to help validate the 
modeling framework. 
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As data is built-up, the framework should be useful in many areas.  The 
framework can be used by analysts to provide insights aiding decision making.  The 
framework can also be used to investigate various scenarios of interest to the decision 
maker.  Finally, the framework could be used to develop and evaluate a multitude of 
courses of action.  The proposed fourth generation operations model provides a 
foundation to incorporate elements of counterinsurgency and asymmetric warfare in an 
increasing interconnected world. 
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Appendix A: Sources and Data for Public Resolve 
Table A-1 presents the public resolve data used in this study.  The table indicates 
the date the poll was taken, the results of the poll, and the source used to compile the 
responses.  If the source is indicated as being ABC, CBS, PEW or Gallop Poll, the data 
implies the actual question and response was reviewed and placed in the table.  The Pulse 
of Democracy: The War in Iraq (Gallop, 2006) and American Public Opinion on Iraq: 
Five Conclusions (Newport, 2006) are reports developed by the Gallop Association and 
include the specific data indicated.  The questions did differ slightly between conflicts 
and sources; therefore, the original questions asked are presented in Table A-2.  
  
Table A-1: Polling Data of Public Resolve 
 Yes, a mistake
No, not a 
Mistake 
No 
opinion
Don't Know / 
Refused To 
Answer 
Number 
polled Source
Iraq        
2007 July 20-22 51 42 7   889 5 
2007 July 18-21 63 36 1   1125 4 
2007 July 6-8 62 36 2   1014 1 
2006 Dec 7-11 61 36  2  1005 4 
2006 Dec 8-10 55 39  6  922 5 
2006 Dec 6-10 51 42  7  1489 6 
2006 Dec 8-10 53 45 2   505 2 
2006 Nov 12-13 56 40  4  721 5 
2006 Nov 9-12 51 41  8  1479 6 
2006 Nov 2-5 55 40 5   1516 2 
2006 Nov 1-4 53 44  2  1205 4 
2006 Oct 27-31 51 44  5  932 5 
2006 Oct 19-22 57 40  2  1200 4 
2006 Oct 17-22 47 43  10  1552 6 
2006 Oct 20-22 58 40 2   1002 2 
2006 Oct 5-8 63 35  2  1204 4 
2006 Oct 5-8 55 40  5  983 5 
2006 Oct 6-8 56 40 4   1007 2 
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 Yes, a mistake
No, not a 
Mistake 
No 
opinion
Don't Know / 
Refused To 
Answer 
Number 
polled Source
Iraq (continued)        
2006 Sep 21 - Oct 4 47 45  8  1804 6 
2006 Sep 15-19 51 44  5  1131 5 
2006 Sep 15-17 49 49 2   1003 2 
2006 Sep 5-7 56 42  2  1003 4 
2006 Aug 17-21 53 43  4  1206 5 
2006 Aug 11-13 53 41  6  974 5 
2006 Aug 3-6 59 39  1  1002 4 
2006 Jul 28-30 54 45 2    2 
2006 Jul 21-25 48 47  5  1127 5 
2006 Jul 21-23 56 41 2   1005 2 
2006 Jun 22-25 58 40  2  1000 4 
2006 Jun 23-25 55 43 1   1000 2 
2006 Jun 14-19 44 49  7  1501 6 
2006 Jun 10-11 51 44  5  659 5 
2006 Jun 9-11 51 46 2   1002 2 
2006 May 16-17 53 43  4  636 5 
2006 May 11-15 62 37  1  1103 4 
2006 May 4-8 56 39  5  1241 5 
2006 Apr 28-30 51 44  5  719 5 
2006 Apr 7-16 46 47  7  1501 6 
2006 Apr 6-09 58 41  1  1000 4 
2006 Apr 6-9 53 43  4  899 5 
2006 Apr 7-9 57 42 1   1004 2 
2006 Mar 9-12 54 41  5  1136 5 
2006 Mar 8-12 49 45  6  1405 6 
2006 Mar 10-12 57 42 1   1001 2 
2006 Mar 2-5 57 42  1  1000 4 
2006 Feb 28-Mar 1 55 43 2   1020 2 
2006 Feb 22-26 54 41  5  1018 5 
2006 Feb 9-12 55.02 42.2  2.42 0.32 500 1 
2005 Feb 4-6 44.76 54.68  0.44 0.13 1011 1 
2006 Feb 1-5 44 51  5  1502 6 
2006 Jan 23-26 55 44  1  1002 4 
2006 Jan 20-25 50 47  3  1229 5 
2006 Jan 20-22 50.84 46.23  2.49 0.44 1007 1 
2006 Jan 5-8 55 43  2  1001 4 
2006 Jan 5-8 49 47  4  1151 5 
2006 Jan 4-8 47 45  8  1503 6 
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 Yes, a mistake
No, not a 
Mistake 
No 
opinion
Don't Know / 
Refused To 
Answer 
Number 
polled Source
Iraq (continued)        
2006 Jan 6-8 50.02 47.47  1.91 0.61 504 1 
2005 Dec 15-18 52 46  1  1003 4 
2005 Dec 16-18 52.15 46.1  1.49 0.27 1003 1 
2005 Dec 7-11 48 47  5  1502 6 
2005 Dec 9-11 48.23 50.24  1.4 0.14 1003 1 
2005 Dec 2-6 48 48  4  1155 5 
2005 Nov 11-13 54.01 45.25  0.33 0.41 481 1 
2005 Oct 30 - Nov 02 60 39  1  1202 4 
2005 Oct 30 - Nov 01 50 42  8  936 5 
2005 Oct 28-30 53.51 45.24  1.18 0.06 801 1 
2005 Oct 21-23 49.05 49.13  1.27 0.55 1008 1 
2005 Oct 6-10 50 44  6  1500 6 
2005 Oct 3-5 55 41  4  808 5 
2005 Sep 16-18 59.56 38.59  1.8 0.05 812 1 
2005 Sep 9-13 50 44  6  1167 5 
2005 Sep 8-11 44 49  7  1523 6 
2005 Sep 8-11 53.16 45.64  0.86 0.34 1005 1 
2005 Aug 29-31 49 45  6  ~1000 5 
2005 Aug 28-30 53.14 46.17  0.48 0.21 1007 1 
2005 Aug 25-28 53 46  1  1006 4 
2005 Aug 5-7 53.94 44.16  1.65 0.25 485 1 
2005 Jul 29 - Aug 2 46 48  6  1222 5 
2005 Jul 22-24 45.96 52.73  1.31 0 1006 1 
2005 Jul 13-17 44 49  7  1502 6 
2005 Jun 23-26 53 46  1  1004 4 
2005 Jun 24-26 53 46 1    2 
2005 Jun 10-15 51 45  4  1110 5 
2005 Jun 8-12 45 47  8  1464 6 
2005 Jun 2-5 58 41  1  1002 4 
2005 May 20-24 49 47  4  1150 5 
2005 Apr 29-May 1 49.27 47.97  2.29 0.46 485 1 
2005 Apr 21-24 54 44  2  1007 4 
2005 Apr 13-16 48 47  5   5 
2005 Mar 18-20 46.02 50.92  2.7 0.37 441 1 
2005 Mar 10-13 53 45  2  1001 4 
2005 Feb 24-28 50 46  4  1111 5 
2005 Feb 25-27 47.31 50.93  1.26 0.51 1008 1 
2005 Feb 16-21 47 47  6  1502 6 
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 Yes, a mistake
No, not a 
Mistake 
No 
opinion
Don't Know / 
Refused To 
Answer 
Number 
polled Source
Iraq (continued)        
2005 Jan 14-18 49 45  6  1118 5 
2005 Jan 12-16 55 44  1  1007 4 
2005 Jan 14-16 51.68 47.3  0.78 0.24 1007 1 
2005 Jan 5-9 44 51  5  1503 6 
2005 Jan 7-9 50.21 47.63  1.54 0.61 1008 1 
2004 Dec 16-19 56 42  2  1000 4 
2004 Dec 1-16 44 49  7   6 
2004 Nov 18-21 48 46  6  885 5 
2004 Nov 19-21 47.36 51.23  1.23 0.17 502 1 
2004 Oct 29-31 44.49 51.74  2.33 1.44 1036 1 
2004 Oct 28-30 44 52  4  1345 5 
2004 Oct 27-30 41 48  11  2804 6 
2004 Oct 22-24 47.15 51.16  1.48 0.21 1537 1 
2004 Oct 15-19 42 46  12  803 6 
2004 Oct 14-17 46 50  4  1048 5 
2004 Oct 14-16 46.82 51.66  1.28 0.24 1013 1 
2004 Oct 9-10 45.83 52.87  0.96 0.34 547 1 
2004 Oct 1-3 39 50  11  1233 6 
2004 Oct 1-3 47.49 51.22  1.29 0 1017 1 
2004 Sep 23-26 51 46  3  1204 4 
2004 Sep 24-26 41.86 55.31  2.29 0.55 1006 1 
2004 Sep 8-13 39 53  8  2494 6 
2004 Sep 6-8 45 51  4  1202 4 
2004 Sep 3-5 37.71 57.42  3.87 1 542 1 
2004 Aug 26-29 50 48  2  1000 4 
2004 Aug 23-25 48.2 49.52  2.11 0.17 471 1 
2004 Aug 5-10 41 53  6  1512 6 
2004 Jul 30-Aug 1 47.75 50.02  1.66 0.57 1011 1 
2004 Jul 22-25 48 49  3  1202 4 
2004 Jul 19-21 49.7 46.75  3.3 0.25 1005 1 
2004 Jul 8-18 43 52  5  2009 6 
2004 Jul 11-15 51 45  4  955 5 
2004 Jul 8-11 53.55 45.53  0.72 0.2 524 1 
2004 Jun 23-27 46 48  6  1053 5 
2004 Jun 21-23 53.85 44.16  1.55 0.44 512 1 
2004 Jun 17-20 52 47  2  1201 4 
2004 Jun 3-13 38 55  7  1806 6 
2004 Jun 3-6 41.36 57.53  0.71 0.4 496 1 
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 Yes, a mistake
No, not a 
Mistake 
No 
opinion
Don't Know / 
Refused To 
Answer 
Number 
polled Source
Iraq (continued)        
2004 May 20-23 50 48  1  1005 4 
2004 May 20-23 46 49  5  1113 5 
2004 May 11 45 49  6  448 5 
2004 May 3-9 42 51  7  1800 6 
2004 May 7-9 43.91 53.83  2.25 0 497 1 
2004 May 5-6 47 49  5  802 4 
2004 Apr 23-27 46 47  7  1042 5 
2004 Apr 21-25 37 54  9  1000 6 
2004 Apr 15-18 47 51  2  1201 4 
2004 Apr 16-18 41.69 56.92  1.23 0.16 512 1 
2004 Apr 1-4 35 57  8  790 6 
2004 Mar 30 - Apr 1 39 55  6  1024 5 
2004 Mar 17-21 39 55  6  1703 6 
2004 Mar 10-14 37 58  5  ~1000 5 
2004 Mar 4-7 44 52  3  1202 4 
2004 Feb 24-29 32 60  8  715 6 
2004 Feb 24-27 39 54  7  ~1000 5 
2004 Feb 11-16 39 56  5  1500 6 
2004 Feb 12-15 37 58  5  1221 5 
2004 Feb 10-11 50 48  2  1003 4 
2004 Jan 15-18 41 56  3  1036 4 
2004 Jan 12-15 41.94 55.68  1.76 0.63 509 1 
2004 Jan 6-11 30 65  5  1503 6 
2003 Dec 19 - 2004 Jan 4 28 62  10  1506 6 
2003 Dec 21-22 34 62  4  799 5 
2003 Dec 18-21 39 59  2  1001 4 
2003 Dec 15-17 26 67  7  815 6 
2003 Dec 14-15 31 63  6  635 5 
2003 Dec 14 42 53  5  506 4 
2003 Nov 12-16 44 52  4  1023 4 
2003 Nov 3-5 39.01 60.33  0.66 0 518 1 
2003 Oct 26-29 44 54  2  1207 4 
2003 Oct 20-21 42 52  6  571 5 
2003 Oct 9-13 44 54  2  1000 4 
2003 Oct 6-8 40.61 58.61  0.41 0.37 522 1 
2003 Oct 03 33 60  7   6 
2003 Sep 10-13 37 61  2  1104 4 
2003 Sep 4-7 42 54  4  1004 4 
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 Yes, a mistake
No, not a 
Mistake 
No 
opinion
Don't Know / 
Refused To 
Answer 
Number 
polled Source
Iraq (continued)        
2003 Sep 03 31 63  6   6 
2003 Aug 20-24 37 57  5  1024 4 
2003 Jul 14 – Aug 5 30 63  7  2528 6 
2003 Jul 9-10 40 57  3  1006 4 
2003 Jul 7-9 27.13 71.59  1.28 0 508 1 
2003 Jun 20 - Jul 2 24 67  9  1201 6 
2003 Jun 18-22 33 64  3  1024 4 
2003 Apr 27-30 27 70  4  1003 4 
2003 Apr 10-16 19 74  7  924 6 
2003 Apr 8-9 19 74  7  809 6 
2003 Apr 2-7 20 72  8  912 6 
2003 Mar 28 - Apr 1 25 69  6  674 6 
2003 Mar 25-27 21 74  5  539 6 
2003 Mar 24-25 23.03 75.25  1.72 0 492 1 
2003 Mar 23-24 21 74  5  592 6 
2003 Mar 20-22 22 71  7  903 6 
Afghanistan        
2007 Mar 11 41 53  6  1027 7 
2007 Feb 25 41 56  3  1082 4 
2007 Jan 21 52 44  4  1008 7 
2006 Oct 2 48 50  2   7 
2006 Aug 3 41 56  3   7 
2004 Jul 19-21 25.56 71.77  2.59 0.08 1005 1 
2002 Sep 2-4 13.13 82.83  3.56 0.47 1002 1 
2002 Jan 25-27 8.54 89.06  1.82 0.58 1012 1 
2002 Jan 7-9 6.23 92.52  1.25 0 498 1 
2001 Dec 6-9 8.89 88.24  2.26 0.62 1003 1 
2001 Nov 26-27 6.62 91.73 1.65   1025 1 
2001 Nov 9-15 10.55 86.35 3.1   2418 1 
2001 Nov 2-4 11.1 85.72 3.18   1012 1 
2001 Nov 8-11 8.69 88.67  2.23 0.41 523 1 
2001 Oct 19-21 9.53 88.4 2.07   1006 1 
2001 Oct 11-14 6.73 92.63  0.32 0.32 534 1 
2001 Oct 7 5.21 90.32 4.47   670 1 
 234
 Yes, a mistake
No, not a 
Mistake 
No 
opinion
Don't Know / 
Refused To 
Answer 
Number 
polled Source
Vietnam War        
1973 Jan 12-15 60 29 11    3 
1971 May 14-17 61 28 11    3 
1971 Jan 8-11 60 31 9    3 
1970 May 21-26 56 36 8    3 
1970 Apr 2-7 51 34 15    3 
1970 Jan 15-20 57 32 11    3 
1969 Sep 17-22 58 32 10    3 
1969 Jan 23-28 52 39 9    3 
1968 Sep 26-Oct 1 54 37 9    3 
1968 Aug 7-12 53 35 12    3 
1968 Apr 4-9 48 40 12    3 
1968 Feb 22-27 49 42 9    3 
1968 Feb 1-6 46 42 12    3 
1967 Dec 7-12 45 46 9    3 
1967 Oct 6-11 47 44 9    3 
1967 Jul 13-18 41 48 11    3 
1967 Apr 19-24 37 50 13    3 
1967 Jan 26-31 32 52 16    3 
1966 Nov 10-15 31 52 17    3 
1966 Sep 8-13 35 48 17    3 
1966 May 5-10 36 49 15    3 
1966 Mar 3-8 26 59 15    3 
1965 Aug 27-Sep 1 24 60 16    3 
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 Yes, a mistake
No, not a 
Mistake 
No 
opinion
Don't Know / 
Refused To 
Answer 
Number 
polled Source
Korean War        
1953 Jan 11-16 36 50 14    3 
1952 Oct 17-22 43 37 19    3 
1952 Oct 9-14 43 37 20    3 
1952 Feb 28-Mar 5 51 35 14    3 
1951 Aug 3-8 42 48 11    3 
1951 Jun 16-21 43 40 17    3 
1951 Apr 16-21 37 45 18    3 
1951 Mar 26-31 45 43 12    3 
1951 Feb 4-9 49 41 9    3 
1951 Jan 1-5 49 38 13    3 
1950 Aug 20-25 20 65 15    3 
1: Data from Gallop Poll of date indicated 
2: Data from Gallop's Pulse of Democracy: The War in Iraq (Gallop, 2006) 
3: Data from American Public Opinion on Iraq: Five Conclusions (Newport, 2006) 
4: Data from ABC of date indicated 
5: Data from CBS of date indicated 
6: Data from PEW of date indicated 
7. Data from CNN of date indicated 
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Table A-2: Questions Asked During Polling 
Conflict Timeframe of Question Question 
Afghanistan 2001 - 2002 * Do you approve or disapprove of the current U.S. military action in Afghanistan? 
Afghanistan 2004 * Do you think the United States made a mistake in sending military forces to Afghanistan, or not? 
Iraq-ABC 2003-2006 
All in all, considering the costs to the United States 
versus the benefits to the United States, do you think 
the war with Iraq was worth fighting, or not? 
Iraq-CBS 2003-2006 
Looking back, do you think the United States did the 
right thing in taking military action against Iraq, or 
should the U.S. have stayed out? 
Iraq-Gallop 2003 -  2006 * & ** 
In view of the developments since we first sent our 
troops to Iraq, do you think the United States made a 
mistake in sending troops to Iraq, or not? 
Iraq-PEW 2003-2006 Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military force against Iraq? 
Korea Feb. 1951 -  Jan. 1953 *** 
Do you think the United States made a mistake in 
going into the war in Korea, or not? 
Korea Aug. 1950 -  Jan. 1951 *** 
In view of the developments since we entered the 
fighting in Korea, do you think the United States 
made a mistake in deciding to defend Korea, or not? 
Vietnam 1965 - 1973 ***
In view of the developments since we entered the 
fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a 
mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam? 
* Question from Gallop Poll of dates indicated 
** Question from Gallop's Pulse of Democracy: The War in Iraq (Gallop, 2006) 
*** Question from American Public Opinion on Iraq: Five Conclusions (Newport, 2006)
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Appendix B: Monthly Data for Operations in Iraq 
 The data in Table B-1 is complied from data within the Iraq Index (O’Hanlon & 
Kamp, 2006).  The value in the table is the estimated data at the end of the month.  Blue 
casualties include the cumulative number of wounded and killed.  The number of 
insurgents, Red forces captured and killed, and daily attacks are the estimates as reported.  
Table B-1: Complied Data from Iraq Index (O’Hanlon & Kamp, 2006) 
 
Date 
Days into 
Conflict 
Blue 
Casualties 
Number of 
Insurgents 
Red Captured 
& Dead Daily Attacks
March-03 11 267 0 0 0 
April-03 41 681 2500 0 0 
May-03 72 772 5000 1000 0 
June-03 102 949 5000 2000 8 
July-03 133 1222 5000 3000 16 
August-03 164 1439 5000 4000 18 
September-03 194 1717 5000 4750 25 
October-03 225 2174 5000 5500 32 
November-03 255 2593 5000 8500 32 
December-03 286 2894 5000 9500 19 
January-04 317 3128 4000 12000 19 
February-04 346 3295 4000 14000 21 
March-04 377 3668 4000 15750 24 
April-04 407 5012 5000 17750 53 
May-04 438 5847 15000 19750 53 
June-04 468 6473 15000 20970 45 
July-04 499 7079 20000 21970 47 
August-04 530 8035 20000 24470 77 
September-04 560 8818 20000 26970 58 
October-04 591 9522 20000 28970 61 
November-04 621 11056 20000 31970 77 
December-04 652 11659 21000 33970 52 
January-05 683 12205 18000 36470 61 
February-05 711 12711 18000 37470 54 
March-05 742 13099 16000 38470 45 
April-05 772 13728 16000 39470 60 
May-05 803 14420 16000 41470 70 
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Date 
Days into 
Conflict 
Blue 
Casualties 
Number of 
Insurgents 
Red Captured 
& Dead Daily Attacks
June-05 833 14930 17500 43470 70 
July-05 864 15449 19000 45470 70 
August-05 895 16147 19000 48470 70 
September-05 925 16722 19000 51470 90 
October-05 956 17433 17500 53470 100 
November-05 986 17995 17500 55470 90 
December-05 1017 18464 17500 57470 75 
January-06 1048 18841 17500 59470 75 
February-06 1076 19250 17500 61470 75 
March-06 1107 19727 17500 63470 75 
April-06 1137 20230 21000 65470 80 
May-06 1168 20701 21000 67470 100 
June-06 1198 21251 21000 69970 100 
July-06 1229 21735 21000 72470 140 
August-06 1260 22439 21000 74970 160 
September-06 1290 23301 21000 77470 170 
October-06 1321 24251 25000 79970 180 
November-06 1351 24828 25000 82470 175 
December-06 1382 25631 25000 84970 175 
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Appendix C: Equations Created in Public Resolve Chapter  
The regressions performed in this dissertation are implemented as equations 
within the model of elements of fourth generation operations.  This appendix provides the 
equations developed in the earlier chapters.  The name of the equations reflects the name 
of the table used when developed previously.  
The first line in each equation of the simple and multiple linear regression models 
provide the coefficients and the associated R2 of the model.  The second line provided the 
standard error for each coefficient along with the root mean square error, or standard 
error of the model in the last column.  The third line shows the t-test statistic for each 
coefficient, with the null hypothesis that the coefficient equaled zero (H0: βi = 0; 
Ha: βi ≠ 0).  The magnitude of the t-test statistic was compared to the appropriate 
reference value from the two-sided t-distribution with α = 0.05 (located in the final 
column) and the null hypothesis was rejected if the magnitude is greater than the critical 
value (indicating strong evidence of a non-zero coefficient), or failed to reject (implying 
there is little or no evidence suggesting that the coefficient is not zero).  The F-test for the 
model is included in the second to last line of each equation.  (While redundant for 
models with a single independent variable, it is provided for completeness.)  The null 
hypothesis for the F-test is that all of the coefficients are equal to zero (H0: βi = 0 ∀ i ; 
Ha: βi ≠ 0 some at least one i).  If the observed F-test statistic is larger than the 
appropriate reference value from the F-distribution, then the null hypothesis is rejected 
(indicating at least one coefficient is significant).  The final line provides the number of 
data points available for that conflict.  If any coefficient or model was determined to be 
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statistically insignificant the equation indicated this in bold markings.  As 
multicollinearity is present in several of the MLR models, care should be taken in 
reviewing the results. 
For the logistic regression equations, the summary of the regression coefficients 
and standard error is presented in the first two lines for each of the factors.  The third line 
provides the χ2 term for each coefficient, which is a measure of goodness of fit where the 
larger the number implies the better the fit.  If any coefficient or model was determined to 
be statistically insignificant, the equation indicated this in bold markings. 
Equation C-1 represents Table V-1: Public Support for Korea per Time.  (Not significant) 
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Equation C-2 represents Table V-2: Public Support for Vietnam (1965-1973) per Time. 
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Equation C-3 represents Table V-3: Public Support for Afghanistan per Time 
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Equation C-4 represents Table V-4: Public Support for Iraq per Time 
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Equation C-5 represents Table V-5: Public Support for Vietnam (1965-1969) per Time 
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Equation C-6 represents Table V-7: Public Support for Korea per Casualty 
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Equation C-7 represents Table V-8: Public Support for Vietnam per Casualty 
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Equation C-8 represents Table V-9: Public Support for Iraq per Casualty 
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Equation C-9 represents Table V-11: Public Support for Iraq (MLR Model) 
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Equation C-10 represents Table V-17: Public Support for Iraq (Two-Factor Analysis 
Model using MLR) 
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Equation C-11 represents Table V-19: Public Support for Iraq (Logistic Regression 
Model) (Not significant) 
  (C-11) 
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Equation C-12 represents Table V-20: Public Support for Iraq (Logistic Regression 
Model Corrected for Overdispersion) 
 
( )10 12.15 0.00204 0.436 ( ) 0.00162 3.030 05
2
0.05,186
(0.22) (0.00077) (0.094) (0.00056) (1.08 05)
98.81 6.96 21.55 8.41 7.89
1
188 219
191
days Log cas Attacks e Insurgents
e
Public Support
e
Dev
N
αχ
−− + + + − −
=
−
= +
= ≤ =
=
 (C-12) 
 243
Equation C-13 represents Table V-21: Public Support for Iraq (Factor Analysis Model 
using Logistic Regression) (Not significant) 
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Equation C-14 represents Table V-22: Public Support for Iraq based on Percent of 
Positive Stories  
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Equation C-15 represents Table V-23: Public Support for Iraq based on Percent of 
Negative Stories (Not significant) 
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Equation C-16 represents Table V-24: Public Support for Iraq (MLR with Percent of 
Positive Media Reports) 
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Equation C-17 represents Table VII-1: Model of Daily Attacks 
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